Flowers v. Phelps ( 1992 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 90–3334.
Alfred FLOWERS, Plaintiff–Appellee Cross–Appellant,
v.
C. Paul PHELPS, et al., Defendants,
v.
Norman JOHNSON, David Blaylock and Robert McBride,
Defendants–Appellants Cross–Appellees.
March 30, 1992.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
Before THORNBERRY, KING, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
KING, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-appellants Norman Johnson, David Blaylock, and
Robert McBride, correctional officers at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary at Angola, appeal the judgment of the district court
awarding a total of $3,000 in actual damages, $25,000 in punitive
damages and $1,406.25 in attorney's fees to Alfred Flowers, an
inmate, as a result of injuries sustained by Flowers in a beating
by the defendants. Flowers cross-appeals the district court's
reduction in attorney's fees from the amount that he requested.
Finding no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
When Flowers returned from a scheduled meeting with the
disciplinary board of the penitentiary on April 15, 1987,
corrections officers Johnson, McBride, and Blaylock ("the
defendants") left him outside on the walkway between the units
instead of escorting him to his unit. Then, they handcuffed
Flowers, attaching the handcuffs to a waist belt restraint and foot
shackles. The officers proceeded to beat and kick Flowers without
provocation.1 As a result of the beating, Flowers suffered from a
moderate swelling and probable sprain of his left ankle, a small
abrasion, and a limited range of motion due to pain. He was
treated with an ace bandage and pain medication. Flowers stated
that his knee locks and he has scars and chronic pain as a result
of the incident.
Flowers brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
against various officials of the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections and the Louisiana State Penitentiary in both
their official and individual capacities, including Johnson,
McBride, and Blaylock. The district court dismissed all defendants
from the suit except for Johnson, McBride, and Blaylock. The
district court then referred the suit to a magistrate.
Flowers' claims under the Eighth Amendment and Louisiana law
for excessive use of force were tried to a magistrate over a
two-day period. The magistrate issued a twenty-three page report
1
An inmate who testified on Flowers' behalf recounted that
he complained about the attack on Flowers to the defendants'
supervisor. The inmate testified that, instead of reporting the
incident, the supervisor located the defendants and told them
that "when they pulled off something like that to be sure no one
sees it."
and recommendations which discussed the testimony of numerous
witnesses in detail and made explicit credibility determinations.
Following the receipt of objections by the defendants, the
magistrate issued an even more extensive substitute report and
recommendation, addressing the en banc opinion in Johnson v. Morel,
876 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1989), which had been released only days
before the initial report. In summary, the magistrate accepted
Flowers' version of the beating, which was corroborated in
essential respects by the testimony of several witnesses, and found
the defendants' versions not credible.
The district court considered the magistrate's substitute
report and recommendation along with both Flowers' and the
defendants' written objections to this report. The district court
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law adopting the
recommendations of the magistrate, and referred the case back to
the magistrate for a determination as to attorney's fees. The
magistrate considered supplemental memoranda filed by both parties
pertaining to the award of attorney's fees, and issued a report
recommending Flowers' counsel be awarded $1,406.25. The district
court adopted these findings, and issued its final judgment with
respect to all issues and claims on July 19, 1990. The defendants
appeal from the district court's decision on the grounds that (1)
Flowers' notice of appeal was insufficient; (2) the district court
erroneously determined that Flowers showed an Eighth Amendment
violation; and (3) the Eleventh Amendment barred adjudication of
Flowers' state law claim. Flowers cross-appeals, contending that
(1) the defendants' notice of appeal was insufficient, and (2) the
district court erred in making a downward reduction of the amount
of attorney's fees claimed. We consider each of these issues
below.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of notices of appeal
Both Flowers and the defendants attack each others' notices of
appeal as insufficient under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(c). Flowers contends that the appeal by Sergeants Blaylock,
Johnson, and McBride is insufficient because all three appellants
were not named in the caption of the notice of appeal. Rule 3(c)
mandates that the notice of appeal must specify the party or
parties taking the appeal. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
487 U.S. 312, 317–18, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2409, 101 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1988).
The text of the defendants' notice of appeal expressly gives such
notice to both the court and Flowers. The notice meets the
requirements of Rule 3(c) because the identity of appellants,
Johnson, Blaylock, and McBride, appears on its face. See Barnett
v. Petro–Tex Chem. Corp., 893 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 110 S. Ct. 3274, 111 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1990).
The defendants argue that Flowers' notice of appeal is
insufficient because it fails to name the party against whom the
appeal is being taken. Rule 3(c), however, has no such
requirement. Longmire v. Guste, 921 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir.1991)
(noting that this concern is satisfied by Fed.R.App.P. 3(d)'s
requirement that the clerk notify all parties other than appellant
that appeal has been taken). As a result, we find that this
contention lacks merit.
B. Eighth Amendment claim
The district court determined that because the defendants
deliberately used totally unnecessary force in their brutal beating
of Flowers, Flowers demonstrated an Eighth Amendment violation.
The defendants argue that this is not the proper legal standard for
assessing an excessive use of force claim. The defendants maintain
that the district court was required to make a finding as to
whether Flowers' injuries met the significant injury requirement
before deciding whether the defendants used excessive force on
Flowers.
The Supreme Court's newly released opinion in Hudson v.
McMillian, ––– U.S. ––––, 112 S. Ct. 995, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (1992),
makes clear that a plaintiff who brings an excessive use of force
claim need not show a significant injury in order to prove an
Eighth Amendment violation. Rather, the proper inquiry is "whether
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." 112
S. Ct. at 998 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21, 106
S. Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)). The Court further
observed that while the seriousness of injury may prove relevant in
assessing whether the degree of force used was wanton and
unnecessary, the absence of serious injury does not end the Eighth
Amendment inquiry. Id.
The magistrate reviewing Flowers' claim, guided by Whitley,
concluded that "in the Eighth Amendment context, a finding that the
plaintiff suffered a severe injury is not constitutionally
required." The district court adopted this conclusion of law,
expressly agreeing with the magistrate that "there is no
degree-of-injury threshold for Eighth Amendment claims of excessive
force." With remarkable prescience, then, the district court used
the exact judicial inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court in Hudson
to assess Flowers' claim.
The magistrate found that the defendants attacked Flowers
without provocation or rational justification and, "[w]hile they
did not cause any objectively significant injury, it is clear that
their intention was to cause [Flowers] sufficient pain to dissuade
him from filing requests for administrative relief against the
defendants in the future." The magistrate further determined that
Flowers' repeated use "of the approved inmate grievance procedure
and his participation in a hunger strike cannot be considered
sufficient provocation to justify the conduct of the[ ]
defendants." These findings precisely undergird the district
court's conclusion that the Flowers showed an Eighth Amendment
violation "under the circumstances of this case involving the
2
deliberate use of totally unnecessary force." Therefore,
contrary to the defendants' assertion, the district court employed
the correct legal standard in assessing Flowers' claim.3
C. Award of attorney's fees
Flowers also contends that the district court erred in
reducing the amount of attorney's fees claimed. "[T]he court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
42 U.S.C. § 1988. At the request of the magistrate, the parties
provided supplemental briefs on the issue of attorney's fees. The
district court relied on the detailed, thorough findings and
recommendation of the magistrate made specifically on the issue of
2
The findings underlying the district court's decision to
award punitive damages also highlight the defendants' deliberate
and malicious treatment of Flowers. The district court awarded
punitive damages to Flowers based on the magistrate's finding
that "the defendants acted maliciously and wantonly and with
reckless indifference to [Flowers'] right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment," and its conclusion that a punitive
damages award "would adequately serve the dual goals of punishing
the defendants for their conduct and deterring others from
engaging in similar behavior."
3
The defendants also challenge the factual findings and
credibility determinations supporting the district court's
conclusion that Flowers suffered a constitutionally cognizable
injury. The record amply supports the magistrate's factual
findings adopted by the district court. In addition, the
magistrate reviewed the evidence and testimony presented by each
side for credibility and internal consistency, and recommended
judgment for Flowers. The district court reviewed each
credibility determination and found them all to be reasonable
before adopting the magistrate's findings. We find no error in
the district court's adoption of these findings.
attorney's fees.4 The district court did not err in adopting the
magistrate's recommendation.
The defendants counter that Flowers should not have received
attorney's fees because his injury was not constitutionally
significant. Because we uphold the district court's finding of an
Eighth Amendment violation, we find this argument meritless.
D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
district court from adjudicating Flowers' state law claim or
awarding money damages. The defendants point out that Louisiana
provides indemnity to state officials from damages and costs
arising out of suits for negligence or other acts committed within
the scope of the official's employment. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§
13:5108.1 and 13:5108.2. Section 13:5108.1(A) provides immunity
from suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1983, and §
4
In the supplemental brief, Flowers' attorney requested
$2,406.25 in attorney's fees for his representation of Flowers.
The defendants opposed this amount, pointing out that the
attorney did not account adequately for his hours on several
dates. After a review of the case file, from the pleadings to
the pretrial order, the magistrate reduced the attorney's
estimate of the time he expended to reflect the amount of time
required to prepare the work products relating to Flowers'
meritorious claims. The magistrate also reduced the proffered
hourly rate from $125 to $112.50. The magistrate observed that
"it was important to make an adequate record to support the
plaintiff's claims in light of the unfavorable jurisprudence,"
and that counsel's withdrawal before the evidentiary hearing left
Flowers to carry this difficult burden at trial. In light of
this observation, we conclude that the reduction in hourly fee
was reasonable.
13:5108.2(B) provides indemnity for "any claim, demand, suit, or
judgment in any court." However, both sections provide that no
such indemnity shall be paid if the damages result from "the
intentional wrongful act or gross negligence" of the state
official. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13:5108.1(A) and 13:5108.2(B).
The defendants rely on Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry,
799 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1986), and Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376
(5th Cir.1990), to support their position. In Voisin's Oyster
House, the plaintiff sued state employees only in their official
capacities. 799 F.2d at 188. We held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the suit because "a suit against [the defendant] in his
official capacity is really a suit against the state." Id. In
Hughes, we found that Louisiana law did not permit an individual
negligence action against a prison guard for failure to protect the
plaintiff from other inmates. 902 F.2d at 379 n. 5. Neither case
dealt squarely with the issue before us here—whether the Eleventh
Amendment bars a Louisiana state law action brought against a state
employee in his individual capacity for his wrongful, intentional
acts.
Louisiana's indemnity statute does not obligate the state to
pay damages awarded for intentional acts committed by its
employees. Flowers alleged that the defendants intentionally beat
and kicked him, an allegation which the district court found to be
true. Because the state statute does not mandate indemnification
in this case, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Flowers'
Louisiana tort claim. See Hughes, 902 F.2d at 379 n. 5.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.