United States v. Ruvalcaba ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-51106
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    VICTOR MANUEL RUVALCABA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. EP-98-CR-330-1-DB
    - - - - - - - - - -
    July 7, 1999
    Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Victor Manuel Ruvalcaba appeals his jury conviction for
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21
    U.S.C. § 841.   He argues that the district court erred by
    limiting his ability to cross-examine co-defendant and
    prosecution witness, Lorenzo Arreola, regarding the minimum
    sentence Arreola faced had he not plead guilty.   He also asserts
    that the district court erred by allowing the Government to
    cross-examine Ruvalcaba regarding the plea agreement he reached
    in a prior conviction.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    No. 98-51106
    -2-
    Given the scope of cross-examination that was permitted,
    which included the fact that Arreola pleaded guilty to only one
    count of the indictment against him and that he expected some
    relief for his testimony, Ruvalcaba’s Sixth Amendment rights were
    not violated, and the district court did not clearly abuse its
    discretion in not allowing this line of questioning.   See United
    States v. Restivo, 
    8 F.3d 274
    , 278 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
    v. Andrew, 
    666 F.2d 915
    , 924 (5th Cir. 1982).
    Although the district court erred in allowing the Government
    to cross-examine Ruvalcaba about the dismissal of a count on
    which he was indicted as part of the plea agreement he reached in
    his prior conviction, see United States v. Tumblin, 
    551 F.2d 1001
    , 1004 (5th Cir. 1977), this error is subject to harmless
    error analysis.   See United States v. Smith-Bowman, 
    76 F.3d 634
    ,
    636 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding such error is subject to harmless
    error analysis and requires reversal only if it affects a
    defendant’s substantial rights).   Considering the strength of the
    prosecution’s case and the fact that the nature of the charge
    dismissed was not put in evidence, this error was harmless.
    Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    AFFIRMED.