United States v. Dupaquier ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-30068
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GARY AUGUST DUPAQUIER,
Defendant-Appellant,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
_____________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,*
District Judge.
SCHWARZER, District Judge:
Defendant Gary Dupaquier was convicted of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(1988), using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp.
II 1990), and possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988). He now appeals his convictions and
sentences on all three counts. We reverse Dupaquier’s count one
conviction, affirm his count two and count three convictions,
vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
* District Judge of the Northern District of California,
sitting by designation.
Prior to the arrest leading to the convictions challenged
here, Dupaquier was convicted in Louisiana state court of burglary
and possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute.
Based on those convictions, Dupaquier was sentenced in 1979 to a
term of five years at hard labor. In July 1980, he was discharged
from state custody.
In August 1990, Dupaquier was arrested by Louisiana
authorities and charged with possession of firearms by a convicted
felon, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
possession of unregistered firearms. Pursuant to a plea bargain,
Dupaquier entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of
possession with intent to distribute and was sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment at hard labor. The other charges were dropped
and Dupaguier is currently serving his ten-year sentence.
Based on the same conduct for which he was arrested in 1990 by
state authorities, Dupaquier was indicted in January 1994 by a
federal grand jury and charged with possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1), using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(1), and possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 5861(d). According to
the indictment, all three offenses occurred on or about August 8,
1990. Following a trial, Dupaquier was convicted on all three
counts. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, he filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal on counts one and two, which the court
denied. Dupaquier was then sentenced to 240 months on count one,
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less 51 months’ credit for time served in state prison, a
concurrent term of 36 months on count three, and a consecutive term
of 60 months on count two. He now appeals his conviction and
sentence on all counts. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1291 and 18 U.S.C. section 3742(a).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dupaquier’s Conviction Under § 922(g)(1)
Count one charged Dupaquier with violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 922(g)(1) which makes it “unlawful for any person -- (1)
who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm . . . .” Dupaquier challenges his
conviction on count one on the ground that he was not “convicted”
within the meaning of section 922(g)(1). Dupaquier does not deny
the fact of the predicate convictions upon which the prosecution
was based. He contends, however, that his civil rights were
restored by state law prior to his arrest in 1990; thus pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) (1988), he was not a convicted felon for the
purposes of section 922(g)(1). Because the issue Dupaquier raises
is purely a question of law, our review is plenary. United States
v. Thomas, 991 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
607 (1993).
Enacted “to give federal effect to state statutes that fully
‘restore’ the civil rights of convicted felons where they are
released from prison . . . .,” section 921(a)(20) defines
conviction of a crime for purposes of section 922(g)(1). Thomas,
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991 F.2d at 209. Section 921(a)(20) provides that
[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such crime
shall be determined in accordance with the law
of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings
were held. Any conviction . . . for which a
person has . . . had civil rights restored
shall not be considered a conviction for
purposes of this chapter, unless such . . .
restoration of civil rights expressly provides
that the person may not . . . possess . . .
firearms.
Thus, we look to Louisiana law to determine whether Dupaquier was
a convicted felon for purposes of 922(g)(1). See Beecham v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1669, 1671 (1994). Specifically, we look to
Louisiana law to determine whether Dupaquier’s civil rights were
restored prior to his arrest. If his rights had been restored
under Louisiana law, his conviction on count one must be reversed.
To determine whether a convicted felon’s rights were
“restored” under section 921(a)(20), this court has adopted a two-
part test: We first ask whether “the state which obtained the
underlying conviction revives essentially all civil rights of
convicted felons, whether affirmatively with individualized
certification or passively with automatic reinstatement . . . .”
Thomas, 991 F.2d at 213. If so, we “then determine whether the
defendant was nevertheless expressly deprived of the right to
possess a firearm by some provision of the restoration law or
procedure of the state of the underlying conviction.” Id.
Thus, we begin by asking whether Louisiana revived, either
passively or actively, essentially all of Dupaquier’s civil rights.
Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution provides that
“[f]ull rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of
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state and federal supervision following conviction for any
offense.” Under the plain language of the Constitution, therefore,
Dupaquier’s civil rights were fully restored upon his discharge
from custody.
The district court concluded, however, and the government now
argues, that Dupaquier’s civil rights were not restored within the
meaning of section 921(a)(20) because the Louisiana legislature has
barred convicted felons who have not been pardoned from serving on
juries. See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 401(A)(5) (West Supp.
1990) (amended 1984). In support of that argument, the district
court and the government have cited our decision in Thomas for the
proposition that state law must restore three key rights--the right
to vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to serve on
a jury--in order for a felon’s rights to be restored within the
meaning of section 921(a)(20). That, however, is a faulty reading
of Thomas.
In Thomas, we did not treat the restoration of the three key
civil rights as the sine qua non of the restoration of a felon’s
rights under section 921(a)(20). Instead, to determine whether
state law had restored all or essentially all of Thomas’ civil
rights, we first looked to whether Texas law provided a generalized
restoration of a felon’s civil rights. See Thomas, 991 F.2d at
214. Only after finding that “Texas neither actively nor passively
restores all or essentially all of the civil rights of criminals”
did we look to whether Texas restored to a felon “the three civil
rights considered key by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits--the right to
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vote, hold public office, and serve on a jury.” Having found that
Texas provided neither a general restoration of a felon’s civil
rights nor a restoration of the three key rights, we held that
Thomas had not had his civil rights restored within the meaning of
section 921(a)(20) and was therefore a convicted felon for purposes
of 922(g).
Consistent with our analysis in Thomas, where, as here, a
state’s constitution declares full rights of citizenship to be
restored upon a convicted felon’s release from custody, we need not
look further to determine that the restoration satisfies section
921(a)(20). That the legislature has barred felons from serving on
juries is not inconsistent with that conclusion. The exercise of
the legislature’s power to establish qualifications for jurors
cannot be read as qualifying the plain language of the state’s
constitution restoring “essentially all” of a discharged felon’s
civil rights.
Having found that the Louisiana Constitution restored
essentially all of Dupaquier’s civil rights, we go to step two and
ask whether state law nevertheless deprived Dupaquier of the right
to possess a firearm. Under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 14:95.1
(West 1986), it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a
firearm until ten years after the date of completion of his
sentence. Thus, possession of a firearm became lawful for
Dupaquier after July 14, 1990. The conduct out of which the
instant charges arose occurred on or about August 8, 1990;
Dupaquier was not at that time deprived of his right to possess a
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firearm.
The government notes that, at the time Dupaquier received his
certificate of discharge from state prison, Dupaquier was also
given an untitled and unsigned document, which he was required to
sign, stating that “[t]his does not constitute a full pardon and
restoration of citizenship, and this does not entitle you to buy,
receive or possess firearms.” This document of uncertain
provenance cannot, of course, qualify the restoration of
citizenship provided for in the Louisiana Constitution; nor can it
extend the time period during which Dupaquier was prohibited by
statute from possessing a firearm. Indeed, the certificate points
to no authority that would give it any legal effect. Instead, the
certificate merely provides a felon with notice that he has been
officially released from state custody and apprises him of his
then-current status under the law as we have described it. Namely,
the certificate correctly informs a felon that the certificate, or
discharge from state custody, does not itself constitute a pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights. A felon’s rights are
restored by operation of the Louisiana Constitution “upon
termination of state and federal supervision,” which may in some
cases include a term of supervised release or parole to be served
after the felon has been discharged from state custody. Similarly,
the certificate correctly informs a felon that the certificate, or
discharge from state custody, does not entitle him to buy, receive
or possess firearms. Pursuant to state statute, the felon does not
regain the right to possess a firearm until ten years after the
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completion of his sentence. In sum, the certificate has no legal
effect, but simply provides a discharged felon with notice of his
then-current statuts under Lousiana law. Therefore, it has no
bearing on our analysis.
As we have found that the Louisiana Constitution restored
essentially all of Dupaqier’s civil rights upon completion of his
sentence on July 14, 1980, and the statutory restriction on his
right to possess firearms terminated on July 14, 1990, we hold that
Dupaquier was not a convicted felon within the meaning of sections
921(a)(20) and 922(g)(1) at the time of the alleged conduct on
August 8, 1990. His conviction on count one must therefore be
reversed.
B. The Enhancement of Dupaquier’s Sentence Under Section
924(e)
Dupaquier was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. section 924(e)(1)
(1988) (the Armed Career Criminal Act) which provides:
In the case of a person who violates section
922(g) . . . and has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such
person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than
fifteen years . . . .
Inasmuch as Dupaquier’s conviction under section 922(g) must be
reversed, his sentence under section 924(e) must necessarily be
vacated as well. We therefore do not reach the question whether
the three predicate convictions in Louisiana state court in 1979
were “multiple convictions arising from multiple criminal
transactions . . . [to] be treated as separate convictions [for
purposes of section 924(e)(1)] . . . .” United States v. Herbert,
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860 F.2d 620, 621-22 (5th Cir 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070
(1989), and reh’g denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989).
C. The Validity of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(c)(1) and
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)
Dupaquier, relying on United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), argues that his convictions on all three
counts must be reversed. In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that
18 U.S.C. section 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (the Gun-Free Schools
Act) exceeded the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. By failing to raise this issue
below, however, Dupaquier is barred from raising it here for the
first time unless the district court committed plain error.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Plain error, including error with respect
to purely legal questions, “is synonymous with ‘clear’ or
‘obvious’” error and, “‘[a]t a minimum,’ contemplates an error
which was ‘clear under current law’ at the time of the trial.”
United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (quoting United States v. Olano, ___ US ___, 113 S. Ct. 1770,
1777 (1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). Because Lopez
was not yet decided at the time of Dupaquier’s trial and
sentencing, we cannot say that the district court committed plain
error in failing to consider the validity of these statutes under
the Commerce Clause.
We therefore reverse Dupaquier’s conviction on count one and
affirm on counts two and three. Because the sentences imposed by
the district court on the three counts were intertwined, we vacate
the sentences on counts two and three and remand for resentencing.
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REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, and VACATE and REMAND for
resentencing.
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