Dupont v. Linden ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-50519
Summary Calendar
THOMAS M DUPONT
Plaintiff-Appellee
VERSUS
ROBERT LINDEN, Individually and in his official capacity
as Chief of Police of the City of Leander, Texas
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(A-94-CV-828)
February 27, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Thomas M. Dupont sued Leander, Texas, Chief of Police Bolton
Linden, individually and in his official capacity, for false arrest
and unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and
Fifteenth Amendments and pendant state law claims of malicious
prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Linden moved for summary judgment claiming that: (1) as an
individual, he was entitled to qualified immunity from the
constitutional claims and official immunity from the state-law
claims; and, (2) the claims against Linden in his official capacity
were actually claims against the City of Leander (City). The
magistrate judge denied Linden’s motion without a hearing and
without supplying reasons.2 We reverse and remand in part and
dismiss in part.
Denial of Qualified Immunity
28 U.S.C. § 1291, grants jurisdiction to review denial of a
claim of qualified immunity only if there are no genuine issues of
material fact concerning the immunity claim. While we do not here
recite the facts, the record is clear that no material fact
relative to immunity is in issue.
Since the violation of a clearly established constitutional
right is alleged, we must decide whether Linden’s conduct was
objectively reasonable, because “even if an official’s conduct
violates a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified
immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.” Rankin v.
Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal punctuation
and citations omitted).
A claim for wrongful arrest arises under the Fourth Amendment,
2
This Court has vacated and remanded for written findings
where it determined that it could not effectively review the
district court’s summary judgment ruling without the benefit of the
district court’s reasoning. See Farrar v. Cain, 642 F.2d 86, 87
(5th Cir. 1981). Remand appears unnecessary in this case only
because the parties do not dispute the material facts.
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but not the Fourteenth. See Eugene v. Alief Independent School
Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1995). “There is no cause of
action for false arrest under § 1983 unless the arresting officer
lacked probable cause.” Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 67 F.3d
1174, 1180 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 5, 1996)
(No. 95-1100); Fields v. City of South Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d
1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991). An evaluation of probable cause must
consider “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
arrest.” Brown, 67 F.3d at 1180.
Dupont’s argument that Linden was not objectively reasonable
because he swore out the complaint based on statements that the
victim made to others lacks merit. Linden properly relied on the
collective knowledge of all of the police officers involved in the
investigation. Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 724 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). A defendant is “entitled to
qualified immunity [from a claim of false arrest] unless, on an
objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer
would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Pfannstiel v.
City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). “Only where the warrant
application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of
immunity be lost.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986)
(internal citation omitted). Such is not the case here.
Allegations of malicious prosecution in a criminal case are
actionable under § 1983. Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162-
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64 (5th Cir. 1992). “The essence of a malicious prosecution claim
is groundless prosecution.” Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178,
1183 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 965 (1992). A police
officer can be liable for malicious prosecution if he “maliciously
tender[s] false information to the prosecutor which leads him to
believe probable cause exists where there is none.” Sanders, 950
F.2d at 1163 (quotation and citation omitted).
The facts clearly show that Linden’s conduct was objectively
reasonable and that there is no evidence that he acted maliciously;
thus, the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied
his motion for qualified immunity. Rankin, 5 F.3d at 105.
Official-Capacity Constitutional Claims
The defense of qualified immunity does not apply to the
constitutional claims against Linden in his capacity as Chief of
Police because those claims are actually claims against the City.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985); Sanders, 950 F.2d
at 1159 n.3. The denial of summary judgment on those claims is
therefore not a final appealable order, and this Court lacks
jurisdiction. Swint v. Chambers County Com’n, 115 S. Ct. 1203,
1205 (1995); see 21 U.S.C. § 1291.
Individual-Capacity State Law Claims
Linden asserts the state-law defense of official immunity
against the state-law claims of malicious prosecution and false
arrest made against him as an individual. He argues that the
denial of immunity under this theory is immediately appealable
under § 1291.
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“Appealability under § 1291 . . . is clearly a matter of
federal law; state procedural law is not directly controlling.”
Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 62 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1995)
(quotation and citation omitted). However, we look to state
procedural rules “for what they reveal about the state’s view on
the substantive issue of whether qualified immunity is an immunity
form suit or merely a defense to liability.” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). Under Texas law, a state officer sued in his
individual capacity is entitled to an immediate appeal of the
denial of his motion for summary judgment based on the defense of
official immunity. See Gallia v. Schreiber, 907 S.W.2d 864, 867
(Tex. App. 1995); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(5)
(West Supp. 1996). Section 51.014(5) is not merely a defense to
liability; it confers immunity from suit. Boozier v. Hambrick, 846
S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. App. 1993).
To be entitled to this protection under Texas law, the
defendant must establish as a matter of law (1) that his action was
discretionary, and thus, quasi-judicial; and (2) that he acted in
good faith within his authority as a quasi-judicial employee.
Boozier, 846 S.W.2d at 597.
To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution under Texas
law, the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant
lacked probable cause to prosecute him. Coniglio v. Snyder, 756
S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App. 1988); see also Martin v. Thomas, 973
F.2d 449, 455 (5th Cir. 1992). To prevail on a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law, the
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plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly and that his conduct was extreme and
outrageous. Turner v. Roadway Express, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 224, 227
(Tex. App. 1995).
Because the material facts are not disputed, the denial of
Linden’s claims of official immunity would be immediately
appealable in a state court. We, therefore, consider them. The
undisputed facts show that the district court erred by denying
summary judgment on this issue; Linden is entitled to official
immunity from Dupont’s state-law claims because he acted in good
faith in the performance of a discretionary function. Boozier, 846
S.W.2d at 597.
Official-Capacity State Law Claims
Dupont concedes that he is not entitled to maintain state-law
claims against Linden in his official capacity. This issue is
moot.
We reverse the denial of summary judgment on federal
constitutional and state-law claims against Linden as an individual
and remand with instructions to grant his motion for summary
judgment as to those claims; dismiss appeal of denial of summary
judgment on constitutional claims against Linden in his official
capacity for lack of jurisdiction; and dismiss appeal of denial of
summary judgment on state law claims against Linden in his official
capacity as moot.
REVERSED and REMANDED in part and appeal DISMISSED in part.
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