Fernon v. Smajstrala ( 1999 )


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  •               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 97-11395
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    LEE PRICE FERNON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ROBIN SMAJSTRALA, ET AL.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________
    No. 98-10276
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    LEE PRICE FERNON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ROBIN SMAJSTRALA, ET AL.,
    Defenants-Appellees.
    No. 98-10464
    Summary Calendar
    LEE PRICE FERNON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    ROSENDO RODRIGUEZ, JR.,
    Appellant,
    versus
    ROBIN SMAJSTRALA ET AL.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    -2-
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:97-CV-25-X
    - - - - - - - - - -
    July 15, 1999
    Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Before the court are three consolidated appeals.    In No. 97-
    11395, Lee Price Fernon appeals from the district court’s summary
    judgment in favor of the defendants in his civil rights complaint
    brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   Fernon, an attorney,
    brought the suit against Baylor County Judge Robin Smajstrala;
    Dick Wirz, the mayor of Seymour, Texas; Floyd Burke, the police
    chief in Seymour; Mike Griffin, a Seymour police officer; Jo Ann
    Farr, a neighbor of Fernon’s; and Lynn Fernon, his ex-wife.
    Fernon alleged in his complaint that the defendants conspired to
    encourage Fernon’s children to accuse him falsely of physical
    abuse so that false criminal charges would be brought against him
    which would destroy his career as the county attorney.
    We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties,
    and we hold that the district court did not err in construing the
    defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6) as one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
    See Young v. Biggers, 
    938 F.2d 565
    , 568 (5th Cir. 1991).    Nor was
    the rule’s ten-day notice requirement violated by the court’s
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    -3-
    construction because, prior to the hearing on the motions, Fernon
    had submitted an affidavit to be considered by the court.     See
    Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    901 F.2d 1281
    , 1284 (5th Cir.
    1990).   Because there was no genuine issue of material fact, only
    the conclusional allegations of Fernon, the district court did
    not err in thereafter granting the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment.   See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 
    37 F.3d 1069
    , 1075
    (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
    In No. 98-10464, we uphold the district court’s award of
    attorneys’ fees and its imposition of a monetary sanction against
    Fernon and his attorney, Rosendo Rodriguez, Jr.   See Thomas v.
    Capital Security Services, Inc., 
    836 F.2d 866
    , 872 (5th Cir.
    1988) (en banc); Vaughner v. Pulito, 
    804 F.2d 873
    , 878 (5th Cir.
    1986).   Nor did the district court err in imposing a sanction
    barring Fernon from filing any pleading in the Northern District
    of Texas without the prior permission of the district court.     See
    Pressey v. Patterson, 
    898 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 and n.2 (5th Cir.
    1990).
    Because Fernon fails to make the required showing of
    judicial partiality, his challenge to the district court’s denial
    of his recusal motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) fails.
    See United States v. Couch, 
    896 F.2d 78
    , 82 (5th Cir. 1990).
    Similarly, the district court did not err by denying Fernon’s
    motion to disqualify defense attorneys.   See In re: American
    Airlines, Inc., 
    972 F.2d 605
    , 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1992).     Finally,
    in No. 98-10276, Fernon fails to show that the district court
    erred by imposing a $5000 bond pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 7 in
    -4-
    order to proceed with his appeal.    See Ehm v. Amtrack Bd. of
    Directors, 
    780 F.2d 516
    , 517 (5th Cir. 1986); Sckolnick v.
    Harlow, 
    820 F.2d 13
    , 15 (1st Cir. 1987).
    Because they are without arguable merit, Nos. 97-11395 and
    98-10464 are DISMISSED as frivolous.    See Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.   The district
    court’s decision in No. 98-10276 is AFFIRMED.