United States v. Hampton ( 1998 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 97-20483
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DOCTORY HAMPTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-96-CR-193-2
    - - - - - - - - - -
    April 01, 1998
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Doctory Hampton appeals his sentence following his
    conviction for armed bank robbery, conspiracy to use and carry a
    firearm during a crime of violence, and using and carrying a
    firearm during a crime of violence.    Hampton argues that the
    district court erred in enhancing his base offense level under
    U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) because that guideline protects law
    enforcement and corrections officers and does not apply to
    victims who are private security guards.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 97-20483
    -2-
    In the alternative to enhancing Hampton’s base offense level
    under § 3A1.2(b), the district court upwardly departed based on
    an aggravating circumstance not considered by the guidelines.
    See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).    Because Hampton
    has not argued on appeal that this upward departure was
    erroneous, this issue has been abandoned.    See United States v.
    Rivas, 
    99 F.3d 170
    , 176 (5th Cir. 1996).    We decline to make a
    determination whether the district court erred in applying
    § 3A1.2(b) and affirm the district court’s upward departure.
    Hampton also contends, for the first time on appeal, that
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(j)), which defines “serious
    bodily injury” is unconstitutionally vague and that his sentence
    should not have been increased four levels under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B)
    on the ground that the victim suffered a serious bodily injury.
    In light of the facts that the victim suffered great pain; the
    wound was in a “critical area” and could very easily have killed
    the victim; the victim was hospitalized for 22 hours; and the
    victim was unable to work for about six weeks, Hampton has not
    demonstrated plain error with respect to his contention that the
    definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutionally vague
    as applied to him.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-20483

Filed Date: 4/24/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014