Harvey v. Bennett ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-11128
Summary Calendar
NORRIS RAY HARVEY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NFN BENNETT, Captain, Officer of Texas Department
of Criminal Justice at San Angelo Work Camp, Wallace Unit;
NFN COFFIELD, Sargeant, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, San Angelo Work Camp,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(97-CV-066)
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August 23, 1999
Before POLITZ, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Norris Ray Harvey, Jr. appeals the summary
judgment granted by the magistrate judge, dismissing his claims
against Defendant-Appellee Ted Caufield, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finding no error, we affirm.
At the time of the incident giving rise to his claim, Harvey
was a prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), and was assigned to a
work camp near San Angelo, Texas. Harvey’s eye was seriously
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
injured by a cactus thorn while he was working on a crew removing
brush and cactus. Harvey contends that Caufield violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
because he failed to provide Harvey with safety glasses for the
work. Caufield argues that he did not have immediate access to any
safety glasses and, therefore, he told Harvey to stop cutting the
brush and cactus and assigned him to cleaning up, which he believed
did not require the use of safety glasses. Harvey now appeals the
magistrate judge’s grant of Caufield’s motion for summary judgment.
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
using the same criteria applied by the district court. United
States v. 1988 Oldsmobile Supreme, 983 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir.
1993). The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). See also FED. R. CIV.
P. 56.
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners not only from unjust
physical punishments, but from deliberate indifference to health or
safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). A prison
official violates the Eighth Amendment if he “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
839 (1994). Mere negligence on the part of the prison official
does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. Cain,
864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir. 1989).
2
The evidence below demonstrates that Caufield possessed no
subjective awareness that the cleaning-up task to which he assigned
Harvey posed a risk of eye injury. To the contrary, Caufield’s
affidavit shows that he believed that the work was less dangerous
than the cutting work and did not require the use of eye
protection. Although Harvey contends that there is an issue of
fact as to whether the cutting work and the clearing work included
equal risks of eye injury, that contention presupposes an objective
standard. Farmer, however, teaches that we must focus on the
prison official’s subjective knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839.
Although in hindsight, the better course of action may have been to
obtain protective eyewear for Harvey, this demonstrates nothing
worse than simple negligence. Caufield’s conduct did not
constitute subjective recklessness.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
3