EEOC v. Royer Homes of MS ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-60039
Summary Calendar
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
LISA PETTIS,
Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
ROYER HOMES OF MISSISSIPPI, INC.,
Defendant - Intervenor Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:00-cv-229GR
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September 16, 2002
Before JOLLY, JONES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In September 1999, the EEOC filed a complaint against
Defendant-Appellant Royer Homes (“Royer”) alleging that Royer
violated Title VII by discriminating against Lisa Pettis
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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(“Pettis”), on the basis of sex and by retaliating against her
because she engaged in protected conduct. In August 2000, Pettis
intervened in the case and made the same allegations.
In June 2001, the case was tried to a jury. The jury found
for Pettis and the EEOC on the retaliation claim and awarded
$75,000 in damages, but found for Royer on the discrimination
claim. Royer subsequently filed a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, or in the alternative, for new trial because of the jury
verdict against it on the retaliation claim. The district court
denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of Pettis in the
sum of $75,000. Royer now appeals from the district court’s order
denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law and from the
district court’s order entering judgment in favor of Pettis on the
retaliation claim.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Stokes v. Emerson Elec. Co., 217 F.3d
353, 356 (5th Cir. 2000). Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate only if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for [a] party on [an] issue.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Reviewing all of the evidence in the
record, a “court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations
or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). In so doing, the court “must disregard
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all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not
required to believe.” Id. at 151.
Royer argues that the district court erred in denying its
judgment as a matter of law because (1)there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury finding of retaliation; (2) Pettis’
filing of her charge with the EEOC was untimely; (3) the $75,000
damages amount is not supported by the evidence; and (4) the
$75,000 is above the statutory cap on damages set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3).
We find each of Royer’s arguments to be unpersuasive for
several reasons. First, the district court’s November 26, 2001
order clearly sets forth the testimony which provides sufficient
evidence for the jury to find unlawful retaliation and award the
sum of $75,000 to Pettis. Thus, we adopt the district court’s
findings on these two points as our own. Second, we find it beyond
peradventure that Pettis’ EEOC charge was timely filed with respect
to her retaliation claim. Finally, Royer waived any “statutory
cap” argument it may have had by not arguing it at the district
court level. See Stephens v. C.I.T. Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 955
F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1992).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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