Cedar Lodge Plantation, L.L.C. v. CSHV Fairway View I, L.L.C. , 768 F.3d 425 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 14-30735   Document: 00512783989    Page: 1   Date Filed: 09/26/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 26, 2014
    No. 14-30735
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    CEDAR LODGE PLANTATION, L.L.C.; PHILLIPS C. WITTER, Individually
    and on behalf of all similarly situated persons,
    Plaintiffs – Appellees
    v.
    CSHV FAIRWAY VIEW I, L.L.C.; CSHV FAIRWAY VIEW II, L.L.C.;
    CAMPUS ADVANTAGE, INCORPORATED,
    Defendants – Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiffs-Appellees (collectively, “Cedar Lodge”) first brought their
    proposed class action against a group of apartment-owning and managing
    entities (“Fairway Defendants”) in Louisiana state court.          The Fairway
    Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness
    Act (“CAFA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Cedar Lodge then amended the complaint
    to add Sewer Treatment Specialists, L.L.C. (“STS”), a Louisiana citizen, as a
    defendant. With the addition of STS as a “significant local defendant,” Cedar
    Lodge moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the “local
    controversy exception” to CAFA jurisdiction applied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
    Case: 14-30735       Document: 00512783989          Page: 2     Date Filed: 09/26/2014
    No. 14-30735
    The district court 1 agreed and remanded. We granted the Fairway Defendants
    permission to appeal the remand order. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). We now hold that
    the application of the local controversy exception depends on the pleadings at
    the time the class action is removed, not on an amended complaint filed after
    removal. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court and REMAND the case
    for further proceedings in federal court.
    Cedar Lodge purports to represent a class of individuals and entities who
    are living or have lived at the Fairway View Apartments in Baton Rouge, or
    who work or own property or a business in the immediate vicinity of the
    apartment complex. In its initial complaint, Cedar Lodge alleged that the
    Fairway Defendants exposed them to harm caused by underground sewage
    leaks that discharged higher than permitted levels of contaminants and
    hazardous substances.          The amended complaint asserts that the Fairway
    Defendants hired STS to maintain the apartment complex’s water treatment
    system in 2009, and that STS’s negligence caused injuries to the class.
    The issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred when it
    remanded on the basis of the post-removal addition of STS, a Louisiana citizen.
    This court reviews the district court’s remand order, which turns on an
    interpretation of the statute, de novo.             Under CAFA, federal jurisdiction
    extends to class actions alleged under federal or state law with minimal
    diversity of citizenship 2 and at least $5,000,000 in controversy. 28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(d)(2). The parties do not dispute that there is federal jurisdiction over
    1  Before issuing its remand order, the district court referred Cedar Lodge’s motion to
    the magistrate judge, whose written opinion recommended remand based on the addition of
    STS. The district court adopted the magistrate’s report without further comment. For the
    sake of simplicity, we refer to the magistrate and the district judge together as “the district
    court.”
    2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10), the defendant L.L.C.’s are citizens of Delaware
    and Illinois; the district court incorrectly applied a non-CAFA standard to the L.L.C.’s.
    Campus Advantage is a citizen of Texas and Delaware.
    2
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    No. 14-30735
    the original complaint.        Nevertheless, CAFA’s local controversy exception
    states that the district court “shall decline to exercise jurisdiction” if, inter alia,
    the alleged conduct of at least one local defendant “from whom significant relief
    is sought” “forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed
    plaintiff class.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). 3 Cedar Lodge contends that the
    district court properly declined to exercise federal jurisdiction because the
    addition of STS in the amended complaint triggered the local controversy
    exception and required the federal court to remand. The Fairway Defendants
    respond that the amended complaint does not invoke the local controversy
    exception because, under the statutory language which embraces the “time-of-
    removal” rule, the local controversy exception must be determined at the time
    of removal and is not affected by subsequent events. Cf. Grupo Dataflux v.
    Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 
    541 U.S. 567
    , 570-71, 
    124 S. Ct. 1920
    , 1924 (2004)
    (recognizing that the time of filing rule is “hornbook law”). 4
    It is well-established that the time-of-removal rule prevents post-
    removal actions from destroying jurisdiction that attached in a federal court
    under CAFA. See State of Louisiana v. American National Property & Casualty
    Co., 
    746 F.3d 633
    , 639-40 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing “overwhelming and
    unanimous authority” among the circuit courts for the position that post-
    removal events do not oust CAFA jurisdiction). In State of Louisiana, the state
    brought a post-hurricane Katrina class action in state court against several
    insurers to recover on homeowner policies that were purchased by Louisiana
    3 The parties do not dispute that the other criteria of the local controversy exception
    are satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) and (III).
    4Alternatively, the Fairway Defendants maintain that even if the amended complaint
    were considered, the allegations against STS are not sufficient to deem it a “significant
    defendant”. Because we conclude that the local controversy exception is determined by the
    pleadings when the case was removed, we do not reach this argument. Cf. Opelousas Gen.
    Hosp. Auth. v. FairPay Solutions, Inc., 
    655 F.3d 358
    , 360-63 (5th Cir. 2011).
    3
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    citizens but later assigned to the state. 
    Id. at 634.
    Following removal of the
    case to federal court on the basis of CAFA, the insurers sought to dismiss
    plaintiff’s claims on the ground that the assignments were prohibited under
    Louisiana law.    
    Id. at 634-35.
    A Fifth Circuit panel certified the relevant
    question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which ruled that each policy must
    be evaluated individually to determine whether the assignment is permissible.
    
    Id. at 636.
    In response to this ruling, plaintiff severed the claims from the class
    action into individual actions, and filed a separate amended complaint—1,504,
    altogether—for each individual policy. 
    Id. Following severance,
    the federal
    district judges assigned to the individual actions held that CAFA no longer
    supported jurisdiction and remanded the severed claims.           
    Id. This court
    reversed.
    The State of Louisiana opinion described its analysis as a choice between
    two competing jurisdictional principles: the time-of-removal rule, which
    prohibits post-removal actions from affecting federal court jurisdiction, and
    “the rule that an action severed from the original case must have an
    independent jurisdictional basis, which in turn calls for jurisdictional facts to
    be determined post-removal, at the time of severance.” 
    Id. at 636-37.
    The text
    of CAFA supplied the answer. The statute, the court explained, “defines class
    action as any civil action filed under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 23
    or a state class action statute.” 
    Id. at 639
    (emphasis in original). Thus, what
    matters for the purpose of determining CAFA jurisdiction is “the status of an
    action when filed—not how it subsequently evolves.” 
    Id. The court
    cited the
    relevant legislative history bolstering this interpretation.            The Senate
    Judiciary Committee’s Report on the bill dismissed concerns that post-filing
    events might destroy jurisdiction by clarifying that once a complaint is
    properly removed to federal court, its jurisdiction cannot be ‘ousted’ by later
    events. 
    Id. (internal citation
    omitted). Finally, the court declined to contradict
    4
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    the “overwhelming and unanimous authority” of the other circuit courts. 
    Id. at 640.
    Five other appellate courts have considered whether post-removal
    actions defeat CAFA jurisdiction and have unanimously ruled that they do not.
    
    Id. at 639
    (citing cases).
    As Cedar Lodge correctly asserts, the issue here is not identical to the
    question presented in State of Louisiana. In that case, the plaintiff sought
    remand because after severance, no class action remained for disposition under
    CAFA. Here, Cedar Lodge added a defendant post-removal and relies on
    CAFA’s local controversy exception, whereby the district court “shall decline to
    exercise jurisdiction” over a class action that meets the exception's
    requirements.       28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(emphasis added).                Cedar Lodge
    maintains that this declination must occur whenever, during the litigation and
    assuming no purposeful forum manipulation, the class action falls within the
    parameters laid out by the exception. This is not, it asserts, a case where the
    basis for jurisdiction was “destroyed” but one where Congress commanded
    abstention and forbade federal courts to step in. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Home
    State Mut. Ins. Co., 
    654 F.3d 564
    , 570 (5th Cir. 2011) (referring to the local
    controversy exception as the “mandatory abstention provision of CAFA”);
    Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp.,
    
    636 F.3d 971
    , 973 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the local controversy
    exception operates as an abstention doctrine). Congress’s evident purpose was
    to remove purely local controversies from the otherwise broad scope of CAFA.
    Cedar Lodge thus distinguishes all of the prior caselaw—and mysteriously fails
    even to cite State of Louisiana—as being concerned solely with preventing
    “jurisdiction-destroying” post-removal actions. 5
    5Cedar Lodge cites no supporting on-point authority for its position. Our research
    indicated that the Third Circuit, while ruling on another aspect of the local controversy
    exception, determined that the exception “requires consideration of the defendants presently
    5
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    Despite its superficial appeal, we reject this argument for several
    reasons. Foremost, as with all cases involving statutory interpretation, is that
    Cedar Lodge’s argument runs into a similar textual problem that existed in
    State of Louisiana. Under the statute, the local controversy exception applies
    to the district court’s jurisdiction “over a class action.”                     28 U.S.C.
    § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i). The term “class action” has the same definition here as it
    does in the portion of the statute that sets the initial requirements for federal
    jurisdiction over class actions. 
    Id. § 1332
    (d)(2). In both cases, “class action”
    refers to the “civil action filed.” 
    Id. § 1332
    (d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Thus,
    when Congress provided that district courts are to decline to entertain
    jurisdiction over “class actions,” it meant that the courts are to look at the
    action when it is filed in order to determine whether the conditions for
    abstention are present.
    As State of Louisiana has definitively construed the relevant statutory
    language, we are bound by its holding insofar as the same language controls
    the local controversy exception. Additionally, if we were to accept Cedar
    Lodge’s interpretation, it would result in the very odd situation that while post-
    removal events could eliminate the class status of the case yet not “destroy”
    CAFA jurisdiction, see, e.g., State of Louisiana, the post-removal addition of a
    “significant” local defendant would require remand. Congress, however, was
    well aware of the potential for forum manipulation in class actions by the
    addition of local, non-diverse defendants. According to the Senate Judiciary
    Committee Report, this was one of the most common tactics used to guarantee
    a state court tribunal.           S. Rep. 109-14, at 26 (2005), reprinted in
    in the action [i.e., not three defendants who had been dismissed].” Kaufman v. Allstate New
    Jersey Ins. Co., 
    561 F.3d 144
    , 153 (3d Cir. 2009)(emphasis added). We are not persuaded by
    the court’s inapt analogy to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7), but we are bound, in any event, by State
    of Louisiana.
    6
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    2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 26.    CAFA’s local controversy exception reduces the
    possibility of this manipulation somewhat and increases the likelihood that a
    “significant” local defendant will be added at the outset of a case to defeat
    removal. Consequently, a post-removal attempt to add a local defendant may
    raise doubts about that party’s “significance.” In any event, consistent with
    CAFA’s overarching purpose to curb class action abuse, the Judiciary
    Committee described the local controversy exception as “a narrow exception
    that was carefully drafted to ensure that it does not become a jurisdictional
    loophole.” 
    Id. at 39
    (emphasis added).
    In sum, the language, structure, and history of CAFA all “demonstrate
    that Congress contemplated broad federal court jurisdiction with only narrow
    exceptions.” Evans v. Walter Indus., 
    449 F.3d 1159
    , 1164 (11th Cir.
    2006)(citation omitted). Allowing Cedar Lodge to avoid federal jurisdiction
    through a post-removal amendment would turn the policy underlying CAFA
    on its head.
    For these reasons, the district court’s order of remand is REVERSED,
    and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accord herewith.
    7