Clark v. La Marque Indep Sch ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 4, 2002
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-40217
Summary Calendar
TREV CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LA MARQUE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; RUSSEL E. WASHINGTON, JR.,
Chief of Police, Individually and in his official capacity as
Chief of Police for La Marque, ISD; BEN CAVIL, Individually and
in his official capacity as Assistant Superintendent of
Administration for La Marque, ISD,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. G-99-CV-668
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Trev Clark appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as under
Texas law, against the La Marque Independent School District
(LMISD), Russel Washington, and Ben Cavil. The action stems from
Clark’s dismissal from his position as a teacher and coach and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-40217
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his subsequent acquittal on criminal charges that he engaged in
sexual relations with a minor female student.
Clark has abandoned any arguments relating to the district
court’s dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,
as well as his state law malicious prosecution claim against
LMISD, by failing to brief them on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993)(issues not adequately argued
in the body of the brief are deemed abandoned).
To establish the liability of a municipality under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an official policy or
custom caused the constitutional violation. See Piotrowski
v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1995). A
plaintiff raising a constitutional claim against a municipality
must identify the policy, connect the policy to the municipal
body, and show that the particular injury occurred because of the
execution of the policy. See Bennett v. City of Slidell,
728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc). Clark has failed to
show that he identified the policy or custom at issue in the
district court. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of this
claim. See id. Because Clark’s allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct against LMISD are identical to his allegations
regarding Washington and Cavil, the district court properly
dismissed claims against Washington and Cavil in their official
capacities. See Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355
(5th Cir. 2001).
No. 02-40217
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Clark’s Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim
against Washington and Cavil in their individual capacities fails
because such a claim is not actionable. See Kerr v. Lyford, 171
F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court dismissed
Clark’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against the
individual defendants because Clark had failed to make a
sufficient showing that Washington and Cavil lacked probable
cause. To prevail, Clark “must demonstrate that either (1) the
record affirmatively establishes that probable cause was lacking
or (2) enough genuine, material factual disputes exist regarding
the elements of probable cause that the ultimate finding of
probable cause is the subject of a genuine, material factual
dispute.” See id. at 340. After a thorough review of the record
and the arguments of counsel, we have determined that Clark has
failed to make the required showing.
Finally, because the elements of a claim of malicious
prosecution under state law are coextensive with the elements of
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453,
455 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 725-
26 (discussing Taylor and holding generally that the elements of
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 malicious prosecution claim are coextensive
with the elements of a claim under state law), we affirm the
dismissal of Clark’s state law claim against Washington and
Cavil.
The district court’s judgment is in all respects AFFIRMED.