United States v. Adonys Lopez-Moreno , 532 F. App'x 567 ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-41031       Document: 00512287934         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/26/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 26, 2013
    No. 12-41031
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ADONYS MISAEL LOPEZ-MORENO,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:12-CR-679-1
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Adonys Misael Lopez-Moreno appeals the sentence of 96 months of
    imprisonment imposed following his guilty-plea conviction of being found in the
    United States after a prior deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Pursuant to
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007), we engage in a bifurcated analysis
    of the sentence. United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 
    564 F.3d 750
    , 752 (5th Cir.
    2009).     Under that standard, we first examine whether the district court
    committed any procedural errors, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-41031     Document: 00512287934      Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/26/2013
    No. 12-41031
    calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
    to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
    facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
    If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then “consider the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard, . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
    Lopez-Moreno raises three procedural challenges to his sentence. He first
    contends that the district court based the sentence on an erroneous assumption
    that Lopez-Moreno received a sentence of 10 years’ probation on a prior
    conviction for attempted sexual battery of a minor because the state court
    determined that he was going to be deported and thus no longer a problem in the
    United States. The first error resulted in a second and related error, Lopez-
    Moreno asserts, because the district court refused to consider the mitigating
    facts he presented. Lopez-Moreno did not raise these issues in the district court
    and we thus review only for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009).
    Lopez-Moreno fails to explain, much less show, how the district court’s
    suggested explanation for the prior sentence is a clearly erroneous fact or that
    it was the basis of his sentence in the instant matter. The record indicates that
    the district court provided numerous reasons for the sentence, from which
    recitation the above statement was only a brief digression. Specifically, the
    district court noted the serious nature of Lopez-Moreno’s prior convictions and
    the potential that Lopez-Moreno would commit future offenses. The district
    court determined that Lopez-Moreno’s criminal history was greatly under-
    represented in light of the severity of his prior offenses, the relatively light
    penalties for those offenses, and the fact that several of the prior convictions
    were not counted in arriving at the advisory guidelines sentencing range.
    Further, the district court determined that those prior sentences had failed to
    provide a deterrent to future criminal conduct and concluded that Lopez-Moreno
    2
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    presented a danger to the public. As to the mitigating facts Lopez-Moreno
    offered in regard to his prior conviction for attempted sexual battery of a minor,
    which consisted of his own statement that there had been no evidence he
    committed the offense and that he had only pleaded guilty in order to be released
    from prison on a sentence of probation, the district court indicated that it
    considered his statement but found the detailed records of the plea and
    conviction more credible than his denials of guilt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
    (setting forth the factors courts must consider in imposing sentences).
    In his third procedural challenge to his sentence, which challenge he
    preserved, Lopez-Moreno contends that the district court failed to adequately
    explain the above-guidelines sentence. “Congress requires the sentencing court
    to state ‘the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.’” United States
    v. Mondragon-Santiago, 
    564 F.3d 357
    , 362 (citation omitted) (quoting § 3553(c)).
    While sentences within the Guidelines require “little explanation,” the district
    court must more thoroughly articulate its reasons when it imposes a non-
    guidelines sentence. United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 
    523 F.3d 554
    , 564-65 (5th
    Cir. 2005); see also Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 357-59 (2007). The
    district court’s reasons “should be fact specific and consistent” with the § 3553(a)
    factors. United States v. Smith, 
    440 F.3d 704
    , 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation
    omitted). We have held that there is no error if the sentencing record reveals the
    reasons for the sentence imposed and permits effective review by the appellate
    court. United States v. Key, 
    599 F.3d 469
    , 474-75 (5th Cir. 2010). As illustrated
    by the discussion above, the district court provided a detailed explanation of how
    it arrived at the sentence and its analysis of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a).
    Because the district court sufficiently articulated its reasons for imposing the
    sentence, Lopez-Moreno has shown no error. See Key, 599 F.3d at 474.
    As to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, Lopez-Moreno argues
    that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that a 96-month
    sentence was the least sentence necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing.
    3
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    No. 12-41031
    The Government argues that Lopez-Moreno’s assertion at sentencing that the
    sentence was “greater than necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of
    3553(a)” was insufficient to alert the court to the specific reasonableness
    challenges he raises in this court and the claim should thus only be reviewed for
    plain error. We need not determine whether plain error review is appropriate,
    however,    because    Lopez-Moreno’s        arguments    fail   even   under    the
    abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Rodriguez, 
    523 F.3d 519
    , 525
    (5th Cir. 2008).
    In reviewing a non-guidelines sentence for substantive reasonableness, we
    consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance
    from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Brantley, 
    537 F.3d 347
    , 349 (5th
    Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review whether
    the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence and give deference to the district
    court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. Id. “A
    sentence is unreasonable if it (1) does not account for a factor that should have
    received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or
    improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the
    sentencing factors.” United States v. Peltier, 
    505 F.3d 389
    , 392 (5th Cir. 2007)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Before imposing the sentence, the district court considered the advisory
    guidelines range, the statutory penalties, the § 3553(a) factors, the facts set forth
    in the PSR, Lopez-Moreno’s statement, and Lopez-Moreno’s arguments at
    sentencing (the Government made no arguments). The district court made an
    individualized assessment and concluded that the guidelines range did not
    adequately take into account the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and
    circumstances of Lopez-Moreno’s offense in light of his criminal history, Lopez-
    Moreno’s history and characteristics, the need to afford adequate deterrence, and
    the need to protect the public. Although Lopez-Moreno’s 96-month sentence is
    39 months greater than the top of the 46-57-month guidelines range, we have
    4
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    upheld variances greater than the increase to his sentence. See Brantley, 537
    F.3d at 348-50 (upholding a variance to concurrent terms of 120 months and 180
    months from a guidelines range of 41 to 51 months); United States v. Jones, 
    444 F.3d 430
    , 433, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming an upward departure to 120
    months from a guidelines range of 46 to 57 months); United States v. Smith, 
    417 F.3d 483
    , 492 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding departure to 120-month sentence where
    maximum of guidelines range was 41 months); United States v. Daughenbaugh,
    
    49 F.3d 171
    , 174-75 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming departure from guidelines
    maximum of 71 months to sentence of 240 months).
    Lopez-Moreno’s arguments do not show a clear error of judgment on the
    district court’s part in balancing the § 3553(a) factors. See Peltier, 505 F.3d at
    392. Instead, they constitute a mere disagreement with the district court’s
    weighing of those factors. Given the significant deference that is due to a district
    court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the district court’s reasons for
    its sentencing decision, Lopez-Moreno has not demonstrated that the sentence
    is substantively unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-53; Brantley, 537 F.3d
    at 349.
    For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    5