United States v. Kindy Romero-Medrano ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-20172      Document: 00514587666         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/06/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-20172                            FILED
    August 6, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                     Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    KINDY STEVEN ROMERO-MEDRANO,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:14-CR-50-1
    Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    A jury found Kindy Romero-Medrano guilty of distributing child
    pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and possessing child
    pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court
    sentenced Romero-Medrano to 135 months’ imprisonment and twenty years’
    supervised release and ordered him to pay $10,397.68 in restitution. On
    appeal, Romero-Medrano challenges: (1) the district court’s denial of his motion
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-20172    Document: 00514587666     Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/06/2018
    No. 17-20172
    for mistrial based on statements made by the Government during closing
    arguments; (2) a condition of supervised release contained in the written
    judgment but not orally specified by the district court at the sentencing
    hearing; and (3) the amount of the restitution order.
    I. The Motion for Mistrial
    18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) prohibits any person from “knowingly . . .
    distribut[ing] . . . any material that contains child pornography.”
    “[D]ownloading images and videos containing child pornography from a peer-
    to-peer computer network and storing them in a shared folder accessible to
    other users on the network” can constitute illegal distribution within the
    meaning of § 2252A(a)(2)(B), but to obtain a conviction under that provision,
    the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
    engaged in such distribution “knowingly.” United States v. Richardson, 
    713 F.3d 232
    , 234, 236 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming conviction under § 2252A(a)(2)(B)
    where the defendant installed peer-to-peer file-sharing software, downloaded
    and stored child pornography through that software, and admitted that he
    “knew that what was in his ‘shared’ folder was made available to others
    through file sharing”).
    At trial, the Government presented evidence that Romero-Medrano
    installed a peer-to-peer file-sharing program called Wirestack on his computer
    and used that software to store files containing child pornography in a shared
    folder, thereby making those files accessible to other users over the internet.
    The Government’s evidence also showed that on several dates during May and
    June of 2013, law enforcement used peer-to-peer file-sharing software to
    download video files containing child pornography that had been made
    available for sharing through a device located at Romero-Medrano’s residence.
    On July 19, 2013, law enforcement searched the apartment where Romero-
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    Medrano lived and seized a laptop computer and external hard drive.
    Examination of those devices uncovered multiple files containing child
    pornography. Review of the devices also revealed that at some point between
    June 30 and July 19, 2013, the settings on Romero-Medrano’s Wirestack
    software had been changed from their default setting—which allows for
    complete file sharing—to permit only partial file sharing.
    Romero-Medrano did not testify or present any witnesses during the
    trial. Instead, defense counsel maintained that the Government had failed to
    meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Romero-Medrano
    “knowingly” distributed any files containing child pornography. To install
    Wirestack on a computer, a potential user must navigate through a series of
    screens that allow for the configuration of various program settings. At each
    step in the installation process, the user can simply click a button labeled
    “next” and proceed to the next step. If the user clicks “next” at each step
    without altering any settings, then the software’s default settings—which
    allow for complete file sharing—remain in place. Defense counsel contended
    that there was “a definite possibility” that when installing the Wirestack
    software on his computer, Romero-Medrano “simply clicked next, next, next,
    next” and therefore did not “knowingly” enable the sharing of the files in
    question. In addition, defense counsel argued that the evidence that the
    program’s sharing setting had been changed in the days prior to the
    Government’s search demonstrated that Romero-Medrano “recognized that
    sharing was on” and “shut it off, or at least tried to.”
    During the Government’s closing argument, the following exchange
    occurred:
    Prosecutor: The judge discussed with you direct and
    circumstantial evidence, and my trial partner discussed direct and
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    circumstantial evidence with you during voir dire. The fact that
    the defendant changed his settings [on the Wirestack software] is
    not evidence of anything other than he changed his settings. I
    believe the defense is going to ask you to speculate about why he
    changed his settings. But the reality is, the only evidence you have
    is that prior to June 30th, at some point they were set to fully
    share; and on July 19th, they were set to partially share. And the
    rules don’t say, and the law doesn’t say you get to speculate as to
    why they were changed. There is no evidence as to why they were
    changed.
    Defense Counsel: Your Honor, she is shifting the burden of proof.
    The Court: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, the burden of proof, as
    I have told you more than once, is with the government. The
    government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
    burden never shifts to the—to the defendant. Everybody
    understands that, I’m sure. Okay.
    Prosecutor: There is no evidence that he did anything other than
    want to share.
    Defense Counsel: Your Honor, again, she has just said the same
    sentence again. She is shifting the burden because she has done it
    twice in a row. I move for a mistrial.
    The Court: Okay. The burden doesn’t shift. The burden doesn’t
    shift. And we can’t—we can’t make allegations about—in any case
    what the defendant did or did not show. That is simply not the
    defendant’s job.
    Prosecutor: Your Honor, I am not saying that.
    The Court: I am not saying you are. I’m just explaining to the
    jury what the rules are.
    On appeal, Romero-Medrano does not argue that the evidence is
    insufficient to support his conviction. Rather, he only argues that the district
    court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. Specifically, he contends that
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    the prosecutor’s statements that “[t]here is no evidence as to why [the settings]
    were changed” and that “[t]here is no evidence that [Romero-Medrano] did
    anything other than want to share” constituted impermissible burden-shifting
    comments on Romero-Medrano’s decision not to testify—particularly when
    construed in light of the prosecutor’s subsequent requests that the jury make
    him “take responsibility” for his actions.
    “This court reviews the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of
    discretion.” United States v. Velasquez, 
    881 F.3d 314
    , 343 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
    curiam) (citing United States v. Zamora, 
    661 F.3d 200
    , 211 (5th Cir. 2011)). “A
    trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view
    of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. at 335
    (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 
    586 F.3d 338
    , 341 (5th Cir. 2009)).
    “A prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on a
    defendant’s failure to testify or produce evidence.” United States v. Wharton,
    
    320 F.3d 526
    , 538 (5th Cir. 2003); accord Velasquez, 881 F.3d at 344. “A
    prosecutor’s . . . remarks constitute a comment on a defendant’s silence in
    violation of the Fifth Amendment if the manifest intent was to comment on a
    defendant’s silence, or if the character of the remark was such that the jury
    would naturally and necessarily construe the remark to be a comment on a
    defendant’s silence.” Velasquez, 881 F.3d at 344; accord Wharton, 320 F.3d at
    538. “[T]he comments complained of must be viewed within the context of the
    trial in which they are made.” Wharton, 320 F.3d at 538 (quoting United States
    v. Dula, 
    989 F.2d 772
    , 776 (5th Cir. 1993)).
    Romero-Medrano does not claim that the prosecutor’s statements were
    “manifestly intended” as a comment on his silence at trial, and we conclude
    that the jury would not have “naturally and necessarily” construed them as
    such. Viewed in context, the jurors would have understood the prosecutor’s
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    statements as arguments regarding the reasonable inferences that they could
    draw from the evidence presented by the Government, not as impermissible
    references to Romero-Medrano’s decision not to testify. See United States v.
    Morrow, 
    177 F.3d 272
    , 299–300 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the prosecution’s
    “generalized comments” regarding “some undisputed points” did not amount
    to improper commentary on the defendant’s failure to testify). Furthermore,
    even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, the district court’s prompt
    reminder to the jury that the burden of proof never shifted to Romero-Medrano
    prevented any prejudice that might have otherwise resulted. See Velasquez,
    881 F.3d at 344 (“[A] curative instruction can militate against finding a
    constitutional   violation,   or   become   central   to    the   harmless   error
    analysis.” (quoting United States v. Ramey, 531 F. App’x 410, 414 (5th Cir.
    2013) (unpublished decision))). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by declining to declare a mistrial.
    II. The Supervised Release Condition
    At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that, as a condition
    of supervised release, Romero-Medrano “shall not view, possess, or have under
    his control any nude depictions of children, sexually oriented or sexually
    stimulating materials.” Following that hearing, the court entered a written
    judgment containing several “special conditions of supervision,” including the
    following:
    The defendant shall not view, possess or have under his control,
    any nude depictions of children, sexually oriented or sexually
    stimulating materials, including visual, auditory, telephonic, or
    electronic media, computer programs or services. The defendant
    shall not patronize any place where such material or
    entertainment is the primary source of business. The defendant
    shall not utilize any sex-related telephone numbers.
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    Romero-Medrano argues that the written judgment’s requirement that
    he “not utilize any sex-related telephone numbers” must be set aside because
    the district court did not orally pronounce that condition during the sentencing
    hearing. In cases such as this, where the defendant “had no opportunity at
    sentencing to consider, comment on, or object to [a] special condition[] later
    included in the written judgment,” we review for abuse of discretion rather
    than plain error. United States v. Franklin, 
    838 F.3d 564
    , 566–67 (5th Cir.
    2016) (quoting United States v. Bigelow, 
    462 F.3d 378
    , 381 (5th Cir. 2006)).
    “[W]here there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the
    written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” United States v. Tang,
    
    718 F.3d 476
    , 487 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381). However,
    “[i]f the written judgment simply clarifies an ambiguity in the oral
    pronouncement, we look to the sentencing court’s intent to determine the
    sentence.” Id. (citing United States v. Warden, 
    291 F.3d 363
    , 365 (5th Cir.
    2002)). Here, the district court’s written restriction on Romero-Medrano’s use
    of sex-related telephone numbers merely clarified the orally pronounced
    condition that he not have “under his control” any “sexually oriented or
    sexually stimulating materials.” Indeed, Romero-Medrano does not object to
    the portion of the written judgment clarifying that “sexually oriented or
    sexually     stimulating       materials”       include     “auditory       [and]
    telephonic . . . services.” Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by including the challenged provision in the written judgment.
    III. The Restitution Amount
    Following the sentencing hearing, the district court held two additional
    hearings concerning restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259, which provides
    for mandatory restitution for various offenses, including possession and
    distribution of child pornography. Two victims featured in the materials
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    possessed by Romero-Medrano sought restitution. One individual with the
    pseudonym “Vicky” requested $10,000, while the other individual, known as
    “Sarah,” requested $15,000. After considering the requests, the evidence
    submitted in support thereof, and the arguments presented by defense counsel
    and the Government at the hearings, the district court issued a written order
    and amended judgment directing Romero-Medrano to pay restitution in the
    amount of $3,944.35 to Vicky, and $6,453.33 to Sarah.
    The district court arrived at those amounts as follows. The court began
    with each individual’s total claimed economic losses—$4,462,040.96 for Vicky
    and $2,753,421.77 for Sarah—and then divided by the number of prior
    restitution orders each had received up to that point, plus one (to account for
    Romero-Medrano)—905 for Vicky and 384 for Sarah. This yielded $4,930.43 for
    Vicky and $7,170.37 for Sarah. The district court then used a 10 percent
    reduction to account for the “larger universe of offenders that includes future
    prosecuted defendants and offenders who are never prosecuted,” and another
    10 percent reduction out of recognition that “a possessor/distributor should not
    be the proportional equivalent to an initial abuser in a child pornography case.”
    In Sarah’s case, the district court applied a 10 percent increase after
    determining that Romero-Medrano, as a distributor, had “a greater
    proportional role in [her] losses than mere possessors” did. Applying a 20
    percent total reduction in Vicky’s case and a net reduction of 10 percent in
    Sarah’s case yielded a final award of $3,944.35 for Vicky and $6,453.33 for
    Sarah.
    Romero-Medrano argues that the restitution order should be vacated
    and the case remanded for further proceedings because the district court’s
    calculations are not based on “reasonably reliable” predictions about the
    number of future offenders. This court “review[s] the propriety of a particular
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    [restitution] award for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jimenez, 692
    F. App’x 192, 200 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished decision) (quoting United States
    v. Sheets, 
    814 F.3d 256
    , 259 (5th Cir. 2016)). 1
    In Paroline v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 1710
     (2014), the Supreme Court
    held that restitution is “proper under § 2259 only to the extent the defendant’s
    offense proximately caused a victim’s losses.” Id. at 1722. While the Court
    acknowledged that a district court’s determination of the proper amount of
    restitution “involves the use of discretion and sound judgment” and often
    cannot be reduced to “a precise mathematical inquiry,” it also identified “a
    variety of factors district courts might consider in determining a proper
    amount of restitution.” Id. at 1728. According to the Court, those factors “could
    include”: (1) “the number of past criminal defendants found to have contributed
    to the victim’s general losses”; (2) “reasonable predictions of the number of
    future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to
    the victim’s general losses”; (3) “any available and reasonably reliable estimate
    of the broader number of offenders involved (most of whom will, of course,
    never be caught or convicted)”; (4) “whether the defendant reproduced or
    distributed images of the victim”; (5) “whether the defendant had any
    connection to the initial production of the images”; (6) “how many images of
    the victim the defendant possessed”; and (7) “other facts relevant to the
    defendant’s relative causal role.” Id. The Court emphasized that “[t]hese
    factors need not be converted into a rigid formula, especially if doing so would
    result in trivial restitution orders,” and that “[t]hey should rather serve as
    rough guideposts for determining an amount that fits the offense.” Id.
    1   Romero-Medrano does not argue that the restitution awards were unauthorized by
    statute.
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    According to Romero-Medrano, the 10 percent reduction applied by the
    district court does not reasonably account for the potentially “larger universe
    of offenders” in this case. He maintains that, at a minimum, the district court
    should have divided each victim’s total economic losses by double the number
    of restitution orders obtained up to that point in time. This approach, he
    asserts, is reasonable because “the past is predictive of the future.” We need
    not assess the relative merits of Romero-Medrano’s alternative approach
    because even assuming that it can produce a permissible award calculation in
    certain circumstances, the district court was not required to adopt it in the
    present case. As the Paroline Court stressed, district courts retain a wide
    degree of discretion in calculating the appropriate amount of restitution in
    individual cases. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the district court’s
    10 ten percent reduction was unreasonable here. Furthermore, this is not a
    case in which the district court failed to make any adjustment based on the
    likelihood of additional future offenders or in which the amount awarded is
    demonstrably excessive in relation to the amount assessed against comparable
    defendants. Nor is this a case in which the number of prior restitution orders
    calls into question the district court’s basic methodology. See United States v.
    Sainz, 
    827 F.3d 602
    , 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing that “the 1/n method [may
    not be] appropriate for all cases because the restitution amount depends so
    heavily on the number of offenders previously sentenced,” and that “[w]here n
    is very small or very large, a more nuanced method may be required”). We
    therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    determining the amount of restitution in this case.
    *     *     *
    AFFIRMED.
    10