Williams v. Edwards ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-30835
HAYES WILLIAMS, ET AL
Plaintiffs-Appellees;
versus
EDWIN W. EDWARDS, GOVERNOR,
STATE OF LOUISIANA AND RICHARD
L. STADLER, SECRETARY, LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District Of Louisiana
June 19, 1996
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is the latest chapter in a saga involving
Defendants-Appellants, the Governor of Louisiana and the Secretary
for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
(Department), and Plaintiffs-Appellees, four Louisiana prison
inmates. This particular chapter begins with the Department’s
contending that a consent decree governing Louisiana prisons, which
was entered by the district court in 1983, terminated automatically
in 1989. As a result, the Department concludes, the district court
in 1995 lacked jurisdiction to modify that consent decree. For the
reasons assigned, we close this chapter by affirming the district
court’s 1995 modification order in all respects.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the beginning (1971), four Louisiana inmates brought this
suit against the Department. The inmates sued under § 1983,
alleging, inter alia, that the inmate housing conditions at Angola
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a trial on
the merits in June 1975 , the district court entered injunctive
relief designed to improve the conditions at Angola and
decentralize the Louisiana prison system. In February 1977, we
affirmed, but remanded the case for a determination of appropriate
inmate population limits and security staffing requirements both
for Angola and for other state prisons which had been built to
decentralize Angola.1
This case then moved into its remedial phase. Following the
remand, the Department prepared a plan outlining proposed staffing
patterns and population limits throughout the state. This
1
Will. v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
2
document, entitled “Stipulation and Consent Decree,” was signed by
various state officials and state prison officials, but was not
signed by the inmates themselves. In 1983, this document was
approved by the district court and entered in the record in the
form of an order (1983 Order or Consent Decree).2 Paragraph 5 of
the 1983 Order reads as follows:
[T]his Stipulation and Consent Decree may be modified as
provided hereafter. Additionally, the Court retains
jurisdiction to modify the terms and conditions of this
Stipulation and Consent Decree upon motion of the parties
or upon its own motion.
The 1983 Order also contained a “sunset” clause purporting to
terminate the order on one of two specified future dates:
This Stipulation and Consent Decree shall be in effect as
of November 1, 1983, and shall remain in full force and
effect for a period of three years from November 1, 1983.
If the Court finds an imminent threat of violations of
the Eighth Amendment, then this Court shall have the
right to extend the duration of this Stipulation and
Consent Decree for up to an additional three years.
On November 26, 1986, the district court issued an order
extending the 1983 Order because the “current crisis in Louisiana’s
state and parish jails prevents this court from terminating the
Consent Decree at this time.”3 In January 1988, the district court
2
We are forced to use both “1983 Order” and “Consent Decree.”
Despite a decade of calling the order entered by the district court
in 1983 a consent decree, there seems to be some disagreement in
this appeal whether that order is in fact a consent decree. Thus,
for the sake of clarity and objectivity, we refer to the “1983
Order” in our recitation and throughout the opinion, but are forced
periodically (because we quote the district court) to designate it
a “Consent Decree.”
3
Neither party contested this extension, even though it was
entered 25 days after the first termination date (November 1, 1986)
set forth in the “sunset” clause. Presumably, both parties
3
extended the 1983 Order again, stating that “[w]hile the Court
believes the Court’s orders remain in effect until actually
terminated by the Court, the Court will extend the order for an
additional year to avoid confusion and uncertainty.”
By 1989, conditions in Louisiana prisons had so deteriorated
that the district court declared a “state of emergency” and
appointed an expert to assist in resolving these problems. In
November 1989, neither the Department nor the inmates moved to
enforce the “sunset” clause or otherwise terminate this litigation.
To the contrary, from 1989 to 1993 the Department filed innumerable
requests for relief (e.g., requests to modify population caps,
staffing patterns, program procedures, administrative remedy
procedures, and disciplinary rules). Among other orders, on
January 28, 1991, the district court certified the case to proceed
as a class action.4
In 1993, the district court informed the parties that it was
convinced that an agreement had been reached by all the parties to
extend the 1983 Order beyond 1989. Unable to locate an order
extending the 1983 Order beyond the November 1989 date,5 the court
issued another order (‘93 Extension Order) which reads in pertinent
part:
acquiesced in or consented to this initial extension.
4
At oral argument, Williams asserted that the Department had
acquiesced in the certification of the class, and the Department
did not dispute this statement.
5
As this case began in 1971, there are at present 212 volumes
of record and over 7,500 documents involved.
4
The Consent Decree and other judgments previously entered
in this case are hereby extended indefinitely . . . This
order is retroactive to November 1, 1989 . . . It is
clear that the State of Louisiana and the other parties
to this litigation were fully aware of the Court’s intent
to extend the order because the State of Louisiana was
not in full compliance with the Court’s original order or
subsequent consent decrees.
The ‘93 Extension Order was not appealed. The Department continued
to seek periodic relief in the form of motions for modifications of
the 1983 Order.
Between 1992 and 1994, the Department filed eleven motions to
“partially terminate” the court’s supervision at institutions
covered by the 1983 Order. The district court granted nine and
denied two.6 Essentially, each of these nine orders (Modification
Orders) modified the 1983 Order by setting a population cap for the
institution named in the particular Modification Order and by
relieving that institution of the other requirements under the 1983
Order. Each Modification Order ended with the following sentence:
[A]s long as this civil action remains pending, the
Court, the Plaintiffs or Defendants may move to modify or
reimpose the previous orders of this Court if conditions
at [the institution] violate guaranties afforded inmates
under the Eight Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In short, each of the Modification Orders was conditional.
In February 1995 and again in March 1995, the district court
6
The Consent Decree was conditionally modified with respect
to the following institutions: Wade Correctional Center, Allen
Correctional Center, Work Training Facility/North, Elayn Hunt
Correctional Center, Winn Correctional Center, Avoyelles
Correctional Center, Dixon Correctional Institute, Louisiana
Correctional Institute for Women, and Washington Correctional
Institute. Similar motions requesting the partial termination of
the consent decree were denied for Phelps Correctional Center and
Angola.
5
issued an order requiring the Department to file a motion
identifying (1) each facility that was to be used to house state
inmates; (2) the number of beds available in the state prisons; and
(3) whether any additional beds could be made available. The
court’s expert was directed to conduct a similar inventory.
In May 1995, the district court issued the following findings
of fact: (1) State prisons were at or near capacity authorized by
the Consent Decree; (2) less that 1000 vacancies existed in all
local facilities; (3) a crisis existed with respect to housing the
Department’s inmates; (4) inmates were being released prematurely
due to lack of jail space; and (5) there was no plan to construct
additional bed space. Before concluding, the district court
specifically stated:
The Court also places all parties on notice of the
following, should such action be necessary:
* * * *
(5) it may be necessary to vacate orders which
previously removed certain state prisons from
the Court’s order because of the need to
expand the number of prisoners held at those
prisons.
In June 1995, the Department submitted a supplemental response
which confirmed the district court’s preliminary findings of fact.
Additionally, the court’s expert issued a report which also
confirmed the district court’s preliminary findings of fact.
In July 1995, the district court and the parties met to
discuss these findings, responses, and reports.7 At the conclusion
7
The Department characterizes this as a status conference.
The “conference” was held in court and on the record with the
6
thereof, the district court entered an order (‘95 Reinstatement
Order) referencing the expert report, the Department’s responses,
and other evidence concerning the inmate crisis in Louisiana
prisons. The ‘95 Reinstatement Order vacated each of the seven
Modification Orders:
It now appears to the Court that additional hearings are
required to determine if additional inmates can be housed
in the various state prisons . . . however, in order for
the Court to conduct hearings and determine if these
state prisons . . . can hold additional inmates, the
warden of these prisons which were conditionally released
from the Court’s order and the prison itself need to be
included in the hearing which the Court will hold . . .
.
Thus, the district court reinstated the nine released institutions.
In response, the Department then sought a Petition for
Mandamus, asking this court to vacate the ‘95 Reinstatement Order,
to which petition the plaintiffs filed an opposition. The district
court also filed with this court a formal response to the
Department’s mandamus petition because of what it labeled “the
serious misrepresentations and misleading statements set forth in
the [Department’s] petition and the glaring omissions of relevant
portions of the record . . . .” On July 24, 1995, we denied that
petition and the motion for rehearing en banc which followed. The
Department timely appealed the ‘95 Reinstatement Order.
II
DISCUSSION
A. WHAT ARE WE DEALING WITH?
Secretary, all wardens, and other Department personnel present.
Both parties were represented by counsel.
7
Initially, we must establish the character of the 1983 Order
which, at least until now, has always been referred to and treated
as a consent decree. Although we are not sure why, we understand
that, at this very late date and for the first time, the inmates
are urging that the “sunset” clause is unenforceable because it
lacks their signatures. Essentially, this is a contractual
argument to the effect that without their signatures the “sunset”
clause is unenforceable.8 We find this newfound identity crisis
meritless. The Supreme Court has described a consent decree as
"an agreement between the parties to a case after careful
negotiation has produced agreement on [its] precise terms."9
Moreover, we have noted that "[o]nce the district court enters the
settlement as a judicial consent decree ending the lawsuit, the
settlement takes on the nature of a judgment."10 Thus, irrespective
8
The inmates have this exactly backwards. What they should
be arguing is that the 1983 Order is valid in general, but for some
legal or factual reason the “sunset” clause in particular is
invalid. Instead, they advance a sweeping contractual argument
that because the 1983 Order was not signed by the inmates, the
“sunset” clause may not be enforced against them. This argument
would fly only if the absence of signatures somehow rendered the
1983 Order invalid in general, and thus, by extension, the “sunset”
clause in particular would also be invalid. This cannot be the
result the inmates seek.
9
Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).
10
Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 547 (5th
Cir.1988); see also 1B James WM. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice ¶ 0.409[5], at III-151 (2d ed. 1993) ("The judgment is
not, like the settlement agreement out of which it arose, a mere
contract inter partes. The court is not properly a recorder of
contracts; it is an organ of government constituted to make
judicial decisions, and when it has rendered a consent judgment it
has made an adjudication." (emphasis added)).
8
of whether the inmates signed the document, the facts remain that
at the time of negotiation the inmates were represented by counsel,
the Department of Justice intervened to assist in protecting the
inmates’ rights, and the district court entered the 1983 Order.
By all indications, the parties intended to settle the case.
The document, signed by John T. King, Secretary of the Department
of Correction, his attorney, and P. Raymond Lamonica, Executive
Counsel for and on behalf of Governor David C. Treen, was labeled
“Stipulation and Consent Decree.” The courts and the parties (at
least until recently) treated the 1983 Order as a consent decree,
a final judgment in which the district court retained jurisdiction
to issue interim orders necessary for relief and supervision until
such time and as the terms are complied with by the Department. We
are not persuaded that the parties and the courts have
misapprehended the nature of the 1983 Order. Accordingly, we hold
that the 1983 Order has had the full force and effect of a judicial
resolution of a dispute since it was entered by the district court.
B. The “Sunset” Clause
We turn now to the issues “if” and “when” the 1983 decree
terminated. The Department contends that on November 1, 1989 the
“sunset” clause was activated and, as a matter of law, terminated
the court’s jurisdiction. As a result, the Department concludes,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 1995
Reinstatement Order, breathing life into what it viewed as a
deceased decree. We conclude otherwise. The Department may not
now assert issues which have long expired.
9
In 1993, the district court stated, on the record, that it was
convinced that all the parties had agreed to extend the consent
decree beyond any “sunset” provision, but that the court had been
unable to locate the order memorializing this extension. To
clarify what it found to be either a clerical error or an
administrative oversight, the court entered another order, the ‘93
Extension Order. That order expressly extended the “Consent
Decree”--retroactively from November 1, 1989 and indefinitely into
the future. Neither party objected; neither party appealed. The
matter ends there except for the court’s inherent and continuing
jurisdiction to enforce its decree -- essential to the court’s
constitutional function.
C. Modification of the 1983 Order
The Department nevertheless urges that the district court had
no authority to modify the 1983 Order by entering the ‘95
Reinstatement Order. The Department errs. For the reasons
assigned, we affirm the ‘95 Reinstatement Order.
1. The District Court Reserved the Right to Modify
A consent decree may be judicially modified, over a party's
objection, when the court has reserved the power to modify and
articulates the long-term objective to be accomplished.11 The It
cannot be gainsaid that the district court expressly reserved the
11
See Walker v. U.S. Dept. Of Housing & Urban Development, 912
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1990); See United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1968) (parties in antitrust
consent decree may petition court to exercise the reserved power of
modification in order to remain faithful to decree's goal of
increased competition); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,
114 (power of modification may be reserved).
10
power to modify sua sponte both the 1983 Order in general and each
of the Modification Orders in particular.
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,12 the Supreme Court
explained that modification of a consent decree is governed by the
same standards as those governing modifications of judgments, as
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).13
Additionally, when the modification relates to the vindication of
a constitutional right, the modification must be "suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance."14 The decision to modify or not to
modify a consent decree lies within the discretion of the district
court.15
Recent developments in Louisiana prisons have once again at
least raised the specter of Eighth Amendment violations. In light
of these apparent developments, on which we, perforce, express no
opinion, the district court exercised its reserved right to revisit
12
502 U.S. 367 (1992)
13
Id. at 379-81. Rule 60(b) provides, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a
final judgement, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it was based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
14
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383; see also id. at 383 n. 7, 393-95.
15
Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1987)(per
curiam)(citing Neely v. City of Grenada, 799 F.2d 203, 207 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
11
the ‘93 Modification Orders. Neither the reservation of this right
nor the exercise thereof under these circumstances was an abuse of
discretion.
2. The Court’s Inherent Power To Modify
In addition, it is well settled that consent decrees once
entered remain dynamic.16 When a court is using a consent decree
to supervise a case involving continually changing conditions, the
court is deemed to retain the power to modify that decree.17
Indeed, “there is little question that the district court has wide
discretion to interpret and modify a forward-looking consent
decree”18 such as the one at issue here. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "'sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of
the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether law
or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new
16
Id. (citing Systems Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642, 650 (1961); Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166, 172
(5th Cir. 1981)). See also 11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2961 (1995).
17
Id. (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114
(1932)).
18
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995);
see also United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1506 (11th
Cir. 1993)("[N]otwithstanding the parties silence or inertia, the
district court is not doomed to some Sisyphean fate, bound forever
to enforce and interpret a preexisting decree without ever
occasionally pausing to question whether changing circumstances
have rendered the decree unnecessary, outmoded, or even harmful to
the public interest."); In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 658 (1st Cir.
1993)("[A] court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify
its mandate, if satisfied that what it has been doing has been
turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of
wrong.").
12
ones have since arisen.'"19 In like manner, the district court has
the discretion to modify a decree when the court is made aware that
the factual circumstances or the law underlying that decree has
changed--regardless of the parties' silence or inertia.20
When we advert to the facts of this case, we note that, as a
technical matter, the ‘95 Reinstatement Order is the vacature of a
prior modification to the 1983 Order. Rather than a modification
of the 1983 Order--the original agreement reached by the parties
and endorsed by the court--the ‘95 Reinstatement is a return to the
terms of the 1983 Order. As a result, on this appeal we do not
address whether the court’s changes may have gone beyond the intent
of the parties. Rather, the legal posture presented to us is a
return by the district court to the constraints originally
established by the parties and the court, a return motivated by the
apparent re-emergence of potentially unconstitutional conditions in
Louisiana prisons. The court did not err in doing so.
This case was brought initially to protest and remedy
unconstitutional housing conditions in Louisiana prisons. In 1995,
the district court found that conditions in Louisiana prisons
appeared to have returned to a constitutionally precarious state.
It did so after considering evidence from the parties and from the
19
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380 (quoting System Fed'n No. 91, Railway
Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961)). The
Court also noted that "[t]he experience of the district and circuit
courts in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated
that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals
of reform litigation." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380.
20
Alberti, 46 F.3d at 1365-66.
13
court appointed expert. Concerned about a potential crisis in the
Louisiana prison system, the district court had instructed the
parties and the court’s expert to investigate. When the responses
of the parties and the report of the expert reflected support for
the concerns of the court, it vacated the Modification Orders so
that a more detailed examination of the status of Louisiana prisons
could be accomplished. We conclude that the district court had the
authority to enter the ‘95 Reinstatement Order; and that, in doing
so, it did not err or abuse its discretion. For this reason also,
we affirm the ‘95 Reinstatement Order.
C. The Due Process Issue
Finally, the Department complains that the ‘95 Reinstatement
Order should be reversed because the Department was denied due
process. Specifically, the Department argues that the district
court (1) did nothing to suggest that it might vacate the
Modification Orders and (2) denied the Department an opportunity to
be heard on this issue. The record does not support these
contentions. In May 1995, the district court informed the
Department that the court was concerned about the bed space
situation in Louisiana prisons, and that the court was considering
vacating the ‘93 Modification orders and conducting a full
investigation. The Department was put on notice. In addition,
both the Department and the court’s own expert submitted reports
and responses on the relevant bed space conditions. After
discussing this evidence with the parties the district court
entered the ‘95 Reinstatement Order. That the Department had an
14
opportunity to be heard cannot be questioned, and its due process
rights were not violated.
D. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
On April 26, 1996, three days before we heard arguments in
this case, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Act) became
law. As a result, we requested the parties to submit additional
briefing on the applicability of the Act to the instant appeal.
After reviewing the Act and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
that the Act does not affect the outcome of this appeal.
Essentially, the Act codifies the standards governing a
district court’s grant of prospective relief in prison reform
litigation. In pertinent part, the Act reads as follows:
The court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right.21
In other words, when a district court fashions prospective relief
in prison litigation, the relief must meet the standards set forth
in the Act. In this case, however, the district court has yet to
fashion any prospective relief. Instead, we understand the 1995
Order to have brought the nine previously released institutions
back within the court’s continuing jurisdiction so that it may
examine whether prospective relief is necessary to avoid
constitutional violations from occurring in those institutions.
21
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). The limitations codified in the Act
do not depart from pre-existing law of this circuit. See, e.g.,
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986); Ruiz
v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1982).
15
The district court has fashioned no prospective relief and the
provisions of the Act have yet to be triggered in this case. In
the future, however, if the district court should undertake this
examination and if it should find a violation of a “Federal right,”
then any remedy it might fashion must conform to the standards set
forth in the Act. But for now, the Act does not affect this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the ‘95 Reinstatement Order is, in
all respects, affirmed, and the matter is returned to the district
court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
16