United States v. Goujil ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 28, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-40031
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MOHAMMED GOUJIL,
Defendant-Appellant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Consolidated with:
No. 03-40032
Summary Calendar
UNITES STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MOHAMMED GOUJIL, also known as Ramiro Munoz,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. C-02-CR-215-1
USDC No. C-01-CR-41-1
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Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
No. 03-40031
c/w No. 03-40032
- 2 -
PER CURIAM:*
Mohammed Goujil appeals the revocation of his supervised
release term imposed in connection with his conviction for passport
fraud. Goujil was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 months
for the violation. Goujil also appeals his conviction following a
jury trial for assault of a federal employee, for which he received
a sentence of a term of imprisonment of 36 months, to run
consecutive to his sentence imposed for the violation of the terms
of his supervised release. Goujil argues that the district court
judge plainly erred in both cases in failing to sua sponte recuse
herself based on judicial bias and prejudice. A review of the
record of all proceedings did not raise any type of inference that
would have led a reasonably objective person to doubt the
impartiality of the district court judge. See Levitt v. Univ. of
Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. §
455. There was no indication that any of the district court’s
rulings were the result of a deep seated favoritism or antagonism.
The district court did not plainly err in not recusing itself from
presiding over the proceedings. See Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 550-55.
The judgments in both cases are AFFIRMED.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.