London v. MAC Corp. of America ( 1995 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-30239
Summary Calendar.
Cleveland LONDON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAC CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
Feb. 13, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Cleveland London ("London") appeals the
district court's granting of Defendant-Appellee MAC Corporation of
America's ("MAC") motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
ground that there was no evidentiary basis for the jury to find
that MAC should have reasonably anticipated that the gearbox cover
on the shredder MAC designed and manufactured would be used as a
work station. London also appeals the court's ruling that London's
expert was not qualified to give opinion testimony on the design of
the shredder. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 1989, MAC sold and shipped a Saturn Shredder
consisting of the shredder head and the electrical control panel to
Schuylkill Metals Corporation ("Schuylkill") in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. The construction department at Schuylkill installed the
shredder, using its own equipment to build a platform, frame, feed
conveyor and hopper to go with the shredder. Sometime later
Schuylkill added an access platform and an overhead shed to
facilitate the operation of the shredder.
A service technician from MAC was present at the start-up of
the shredder. No problems were reported at start-up, except for a
broken sprocket on the conveyor belt built by Schuylkill. In
October 1989, Schuylkill contacted MAC's service department about
two hydraulic leaks in the shredder. A service technician from MAC
inspected the shredder and made the necessary repairs.
On April 23, 1991, London, a trained employee at Schuylkill,
was operating the shredder when some of the material he was
shredding clogged in the feed hopper of the shredder and caused the
shredder to jam. London turned the shredder off, climbed over the
motor drive of the shredder and stepped on top of the gear box
cover to reach the clogged material. The shredder was elevated
about ten feet off the ground. While attempting to dislodge the
clogged material, London lost his balance, fell to the ground and
severely injured his back.
London filed suit against MAC under the Louisiana Product
Liability Law for designing the shredder without safe access to
clogged materials and for failure to warn. At trial, the district
court judge ruled that London's expert, a safety consultant, was
not qualified to give an opinion regarding the design of the
shredder because he was not an engineer and refused to allow him to
testify.
At the close of the case, MAC moved for judgment as a matter
of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The
district court granted the motion, concluding that there was no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow the jury to
find that MAC should have reasonably anticipated that the gearbox
cover on the shredder would be used as a work station. The court
subsequently entered judgment in favor of MAC and dismissed the
suit.
EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS
London contends that the district court erred in refusing to
allow his expert witness, Michael Frenzel ("Frenzel"), to be
qualified as an expert or to testify. He argues that in accordance
with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Frenzel had specialized
knowledge with regard to the safety of the shredder itself, whether
the shredder could be operated safely and if it could not be
operated safely, how to make it safe.
The district court is given wide discretion to admit or
exclude expert testimony under Rule 702, and any challenges to the
court's ruling are reviewed under the "manifestly erroneous"
standard. Edmonds v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 910 F.2d 1284,
1287 (5th Cir.1990). The district court found that because Frenzel
was not an engineer he did not have the expertise to address the
design of the shredder, how it operates, or the function and use of
its parts. Additionally, the court found that what Frenzel could
testify to—that it would not be safe to work on top of a gearbox
cover ten feet off the ground—was common knowledge. Our review of
the record supports the district court's finding. Therefore, we
find no manifest error in the court's ruling.
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
London contends that the district court mistakenly decided
factual issues that the Seventh Amendment has decreed should be
decided by the jury which prejudiced him by not allowing his case
to be fairly deliberated by a jury. Specifically, he argues that
the court erroneously decided the issue of fact regarding the
intended use of the gearbox cover and MAC's reasonable anticipation
that the gearbox cover would be used as a work station.
We apply the same standard of review as the district court
did in reviewing the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law
in this case. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d
948, 950 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Crosthwait Equip. Co. v. John Deere
Co., 992 F.2d 525, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114
S. Ct. 549, 126 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1993)). We must consider all the
evidence presented, with all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to London. Id. The motion is properly granted when
the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant
that a rational jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id.
at 950-51. "If there is substantial evidence—that is, evidence of
such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors
might reach a different conclusion—then the motion should have been
denied." Id. at 951.
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that, based on
the evidence presented to the jury, a rational jury could not
arrive at a contrary verdict. The Louisiana Products Liability Act
of 1988 ("LPLA") establishes:
The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant
for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the
product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when
such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the
product by the claimant or another person or entity.
LSA-R.S. 9:2800.54. "Reasonably anticipated use" is defined as:
[A] use or handling of a product that the product's
manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in
the same or similar circumstances.
LSA-R.S. 9:2800.53(7). The inclusion of the phrase "reasonably
anticipated use" conveys the message that the manufacturer is not
responsible for accounting for every conceivable foreseeable use.
See Myers v. American Seating Company, 637 So. 2d 771, 775 (La.App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 631 (La.1994). We find that
although London's use of the gearbox cover as a work station may be
conceivable, MAC could not reasonably anticipate its use in this
fashion. Therefore, we find that London failed to establish that
MAC was liable under the LPLA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.