Chandler v. City of Dallas ( 1992 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 91–1580.
Lyle S. CHANDLER and Adolphus A. Maddox, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
The CITY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants,
The City of Dallas, Defendant–Appellant.
April 9, 1992.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before GOLDBERG, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Although the multiple causes of action brought by the
Appellees involved the driver safety program instituted by the City
of Dallas in 1978, on appeal this case is about Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
I.
Through Administrative Directive 3–3, the City of Dallas
("City") instituted a driver safety program in 1978.1 The driver
safety program basically disqualified any City employee with one of
the specified health conditions from certification as a primary
1
We have gleaned this factual framework primarily from the
district court's judgment entered April 29, 1991 and memorandum
opinion and order entered November 4, 1986 denying the City's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denying in
part and granting in part the City's motion for summary judgment.
driver.2 Without certification as a primary driver, an employee
was ineligible for any City job classified as a "primary driver
position." A job classified as a primary driver position involved
driving as an integral part of carrying out the duties of the job.
Two physical conditions precluded employees from certification as
primary drivers eligible for primary driving positions: 1)
diabetes mellitus that required insulin for control; and, 2) poor
eyesight—distant visual acuity uncorrectably worse than 20/40
Snellen in each eye or worse than 20/40 Snellen in both eyes, a
field of vision of less than 70 degrees in the horizontal meridian
in each eye, or the inability to recognize the colors of standard
traffic signals.
In 1977, Lyle Chandler was diagnosed as having diabetes
mellitus severe enough to require insulin for control. The Dallas
Water Utilities division of the City of Dallas ("DWU") hired
Chandler in 1981 as a T–9 Electrical Repairer. The City classified
the T–9 as a primary driving position in 1984. In 1985, however,
Chandler failed a driver's physical administered by the City's
doctor, although he had driven in the position for about three
years. Presumably because Chandler could not qualify as a primary
driver, DWU would not allow him to take a promotional exam for the
position of Electrical Repair Supervisor T–10. Chandler continued
as a T–9, with other employees driving him as demanded by his job
2
AD3–3 has been amended numerous times since its adoption.
After the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, the City changed AD3–3
to allow employees with specified conditions (other than
substandard vision, alcoholism or drug use) to obtain a waiver
that allows their certification as primary drivers.
duties. DWU demoted Chandler to Electrical Repairer T–7 in 1986.
DWU traces the demotion to Chandler's violations of City personnel
and safety rules. Chandler was later denied the opportunity for
promotion to the position of Water Maintenance Supervisor 13.
Chandler contends that the City's failures to promote him and its
demotion of him constituted discrimination based on his physical
impairment and retaliation for his opposition to the AD3–3 driver
safety plan.
Since childhood, Adolphus Maddox has had visual acuity
uncorrectably worse than 20/40 in his left eye. DWU hired Maddox
in 1982 and, from 1983 through early 1985, employed him as a Plant
Mechanic T–7. The City classified the T–7 as a primary driving
position in 1984. In 1985, Maddox, like Chandler, failed a
driver's physical, although he had driven for two years in the T–7
position. Maddox continued as a T–7, with other employees driving
him when needed. Presumably because Maddox could not qualify as a
primary driver, he has not been eligible for a promotion to Plant
Mechanic T–9. Maddox argues that the City discriminated against
him based on his physical impairment and retaliated against him for
his opposition to the City's driver safety program.
In late 1985, Chandler and Maddox sued the City of Dallas on
behalf of themselves and all others adversely affected by the AD3–3
driver safety program ("Plaintiffs") under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, the Revenue Sharing Act of 1982, the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act, the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs claimed that the AD3–3 discriminated against employees
with diabetes requiring insulin and visual deficiencies by barring
them from jobs designated as primary driving jobs, and, further,
that the City retaliated against them for their opposition to the
driver safety plan. The district court denied the City's motion to
dismiss, and denied the City's motion for summary judgment, except
with respect to claims barred by the statute of limitations. The
district court certified a class of City employees who failed the
driver's physical and defined two narrow subclasses of persons with
the same medical conditions as Chandler and Maddox for injunctive
relief.
After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the
Plaintiffs, holding that the City discriminated against them in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act, the free speech clause of the first amendment (as to
Chandler and Maddox only), the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and § 1983. The court awarded
Chandler retroactive repeal of his demotion, and awarded Chandler
and Maddox retroactive promotions, lost back pay and benefits
(including interest), and compensatory damages. The court awarded
the class injunctive relief requiring the City to: 1)
retroactively certify all class members as primary drivers unless
their medical conditions actually interfered with their driving
abilities; and, 2) abstain from discriminating against any class
member unless the City showed that the employee's medical condition
interfered with the employee's ability to drive safely. The
Plaintiffs were awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs of
litigation.
The City presents six issues on appeal: 1) Whether the
district court failed to make specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a); 2) Whether the City's driver safety program violated the
Rehabilitation Act; 3) Whether the City's driver safety program
violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act; 4) Whether the
City's driver safety program violated the Plaintiffs' free speech,
equal protection, and due process rights; 5) Whether the district
court properly certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23; and, 6) Assuming the district court properly
resolved the liability issues, whether the Plaintiffs were entitled
to remedies under § 1983 on their first amendment, due process and
equal protection claims.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that "[i]n all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury ..., the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon." On August 10, 1990, at the end of a five-day trial,
the district court verbally announced certain findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The court stated that it
had hoped at this point to be able to state [its] findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and [it] simply d[id] not have
enough time to go through all the evidence and make the notes
that [it] needed to do that.... [The court] hoped to be able
to do that before the end of the month. All that will take
place at that hearing w[ould] be [the] dictating of [the
court's] findings and conclusions.... but [the court would]
tell [the parties] what [it was] going to find today.3
On April 29, 1991, the court entered an order declaring that
supplementation of the findings and conclusions announced in court
was unnecessary because they "adequately state[d] the factual and
legal basis" for the court's decision. So, based on the verbal
findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment in favor of
the Plaintiffs. In its order, however, the court invited the
parties to submit additional proposed findings and conclusions.
The Plaintiffs later filed forty-eight pages of proposed amended
and additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The docket
sheet reflects that the City did not respond, nor did the court act
on the proposed findings and conclusions.
The City argues that the findings of fact and conclusions of
law are not sufficiently detailed to adequately state the factual
or legal basis for the district court's decision. This deficiency,
according to the City, is not a mere technicality—it prevents
effective review because this Court cannot understand the issues on
appeal. The City urges this Court to vacate the judgment and
remand for proper findings and conclusions.
Plaintiffs contend that the district court's findings of fact
3
We gained access to this statement through the City's
Record Excerpts. We note, however, that the district court's
verbal announcements following closing argument at trial have not
been included in the record on appeal. Neither the City nor the
Appellees has moved to supplement the record with these final
pages of the trial transcript.
and conclusions of law satisfy the requirements of Rule 52(a).
Plaintiffs argue that this Court can engage in "meaningful
appellate review" based on multiple rulings made by the district
court, colloquies with counsel at the class certification hearing
and trial, and oral findings of fact and conclusions of law issued
at the class certification hearing and the bench trial. Plaintiffs
essentially maintain that the totality of findings and conclusions
throughout the protracted, five-year course of this litigation
meets the underlying requirement of Rule 52(a): providing the
appellate court with a full understanding of the issues.
The requirement found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) that courts "shall find the facts specially" exists to serve
several aims: 1) aiding the trial court's adjudication process by
engendering care by the court in determining the facts; 2)
promoting the operation of the doctrines of res judicata and
estoppel by judgment; and, 3) providing findings explicit enough
to enable appellate courts to carry out a meaningful review. Texas
Extrusion Corp. v. Palmer, Palmer & Coffee (In re Texas Extrusion
Corp.), 836 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir.) (citing Ramirez v. Hofheinz,
619 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir.1980) (citations omitted)), order aff'd,
844 F.2d 1142, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109 S. Ct. 311, 102
L. Ed. 2d 330 (1988); Lopez v. Current Director of Tex. Economic
Dev. Comm'n, 807 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Ratliff v.
Governor's Highway Safety Program, 791 F.2d 394, 400 (5th Cir.1986)
(footnotes omitted)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) advisory
committee's note. Fifth Circuit cases interpreting the rule have
long recognized that "failure to meet the technical requirements of
Rule 52 does not warrant reversal or remand"—"so long as the
purposes behind the rule are effectuated." Ramirez, 619 F.2d at
445 (citations omitted). The rule " "exacts neither punctilious
detail nor slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue and witness
by witness.' " Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Center, 937
F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting Lopez, 807 F.2d at 434
(quoting Ratliff, 791 F.2d at 400) (footnote omitted)), cert.
denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 112 S. Ct. 968, 117 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1992).
Moreover, nothing in the rule precludes verbal announcement of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 52(a) expressly
permits the district court to orally proclaim its findings and
conclusions in open court.4
Under the rule, of course, we subject the district court's
findings of fact to a deferential standard of review—we will not
"set aside [findings of fact] unless clearly erroneous."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). This translates into a need for findings,
however, that " "provide a sufficiently definite predicate for
proper appellate review.' " Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v.
City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir.1989) (citations
omitted). Indeed, "when the trial court's decision turns in part
upon factual determinations," findings of fact are crucial to a
court of appeals engaging in the process of review. Texas
4
"It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Extrusion, 836 F.2d at 220. A prior opinion of this Court
eloquently captures our view of the interplay between the roles of
the district and appellate courts:
Fact finding is the trial court's province.... We do remain
responsible, however, for the ultimate justness of trial
determinations drawn before us. Since this is so, we must
know the basis of the trial court's decisions: "this Court
cannot be left to second-guess the factual basis for the
district court's conclusion.' ... Review is our
responsibility, and we cannot review bare conclusions.... In
short, our duty to respect the trial court's factual
determinations gives rise to a reciprocal one on its part to
tell us the reasons for them.... [A] mere statement of
result—cannot stand.
Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 734–35
(5th Cir.1986) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Quite
simply, a district court's failure to detail its findings or the
evidentiary basis for its findings "negates our ability to apply
the clearly erroneous standard of review." Lopez, 807 F.2d at 434.
Rule 52(a) also obligates the district court to "state
separately" its conclusions of law. We do not minimize the
district court's task of detailing its conclusions of law. Courts
of appeal subject a district court's conclusions of law to a de
novo review—we are not constrained by the deferential standard of
reviewing only for clear error. Despite this distinction, the duty
of the district court to "state separately its conclusions of law
thereon" becomes particularly important when the case, like this
one, involves complex legal issues. For when the district court
carefully enunciates and explains its resolution of questions of
law, we know that it has thoughtfully and diligently decided the
legal issues. Moreover, the preparation of sufficiently complete
conclusions of law augments our comprehension of the legal issues
on appeal. We must understand not only the factual, but also the
legal reasoning of the district court to enable us to conduct a
"just, orderly review of the rights of the parties before us."
Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir.1991).
The touchstone of our Rule 52(a) analysis has remained the
same over the years: Whether we, as an appellate court, can obtain
a "full understanding of the issues on appeal." Texas Extrusion,
836 F.2d at 221 (citations omitted). Here, the district court did
not completely fail to make findings of fact or conclusions of law.
We do detect, however, an insufficiency "in detail and exactness"
to demonstrate the factual and legal basis "for the ultimate
conclusion[s] reached by the court." See Acme Boat Rentals, Inc.
v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 407 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir.1969). The
district court did not make findings on each issue of fact, nor did
it disclose the factual basis for the findings verbally stated at
the end of trial5 or reveal its determination of each issue of law.
The court did not—at any point—articulate its resolution of many of
the factual and legal issues necessary to support the judgment for
Chandler, Maddox, and the certified class on their numerous causes
of action. For example, the portion of the judgment rendering the
City liable on the Plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claim alone
5
If we accepted Plaintiffs' invitation to locate factual
findings in the district court's pre-trial rulings and colloquies
with counsel, the need for a trial would disappear because the
district court would have essentially decided the case before
trial.
required multiple findings of fact: Whether the Plaintiffs were
"handicapped" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act;
whether the Plaintiffs were "otherwise qualified" for their jobs at
DWU; whether the Plaintiffs worked for a "program or activity"
that received "federal financial assistance"; and whether the
Plaintiffs were discriminated against solely because of their
handicaps. Without findings on these and other issues of fact, we
cannot obtain a complete understanding of the issues on appeal and
shoulder our responsibility to review for clear error. Cf. W.F.
Dev. Corp. v. Office of U.S. Trustee (In re W.F. Dev. Corp.), 905
F.2d 883 (5th Cir.1990) (professing a "full understanding of the
issues on appeal even absent findings of fact" only because the
"case [wa]s not fact specific"), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 111
S. Ct. 1311, 113 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1991). In terms of conclusions of
law, for instance, we cannot determine the district court's reasons
for deciding, as a threshold legal issue in its First Amendment
analysis, that Chandler and Maddox proved that their speech
involved matters of public concern. For these reasons, we hold
that the district court did not satisfy the requirements of rule
52(a).
We do observe, however, that the district court patiently
heard all of the evidence, allowed the parties to present their
cases in full, and sought to resolve the case in a responsible
manner. The record in this case is massive and the issues
complicated, which makes the task of articulating the findings of
fact and conclusions of law quite burdensome. But that is exactly
why we need detailed findings of fact and thorough conclusions of
law.
Our resolution of this threshold issue flows from our
inability to ascertain the factual and legal bases for the district
court's decision. This inability prevents our review of the
remaining issues raised by the City in this appeal. Our precedents
teach that we must, therefore, vacate the judgment of the district
court and remand for the district court to fully articulate its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Utley v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 906 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting
Texas Extrusion, 836 F.2d at 221); Cities Serv. Co. v. Ocean
Drilling and Exploration Co. (In re Incident Aboard the D/B Ocean
King), 758 F.2d 1063, 1072 (5th Cir.1985) (citations omitted).
III.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law play a duet; the
district court tunes one to the other. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a), the district court must record appropriate
portions of the musical selection for us to hear on appeal. When
we hear a blank tape, however, we cannot evaluate the tenor of the
melody.
We are thus compelled to VACATE the judgment of the district
court and REMAND the case for detailed findings of fact and
concomitant conclusions of law consistent with this opinion.