United States v. Mondragon-Gusman , 168 F. App'x 582 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 February 22, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-40100
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RUFINO MONDRAGON-GUSMAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:04-CR-1349-1
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rufino Mondragon-Gusman (Mondragon) appeals his conviction
    and sentence for illegal reentry after a previous deportation.
    Mondragon argues that the district reversibly erred under United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), by
    sentencing him pursuant to a mandatory application of the
    Sentencing Guidelines.   There was no “Booker” error or Sixth
    Amendment violation because the only enhancement to Mondragon’s
    sentence was for his prior conviction.    See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-40100
    -2-
    756, 769.    Nevertheless, the district court committed “Fanfan”
    error by sentencing Mondragon pursuant to a mandatory guidelines
    scheme.    See United States v. Walters, 
    418 F.3d 461
    , 463-64 (5th
    Cir. 2005).    We have previously rejected Mondragon’s claim that
    such error is “structural” in nature.       See 
    id. at 463.
    The Government concedes that Mondragon preserved his Fanfan
    argument.    As such, this court reviews the claim for harmless
    error.    See 
    id. at 464.
      As the Government further concedes,
    there is no indication in the record that the district court
    would have imposed the same sentence had the guidelines been
    advisory rather than mandatory.    Accordingly, we vacate the
    sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker.
    Because we vacate Mondragon’s sentence due to the mandatory
    application of the guidelines, it is not necessary to address his
    additional claim that the district court committed reversible
    error by assessing a 12-level increase under U.S.S.G.
    § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).    See United States v. Akpan, 
    407 F.3d 360
    , 377
    n.62 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Finally, Mondragon argues that the “felony” and “aggravated
    felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are
    unconstitutional on their face and as applied in his case in
    light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000).
    Mondragon’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-
    Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998).      Although
    Mondragon contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided
    No. 05-40100
    -3-
    and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule
    Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi, we have repeatedly
    rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres
    remains binding.   See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    ,
    276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 298
    (2005).   Mondragon
    properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of
    Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to
    preserve it for further review.   Accordingly, Mondragon’s
    conviction is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.