Carr v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International , 866 F.3d 597 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-20578      Document: 00514071129         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/13/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 13, 2017
    No. 16-20578
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    MICHAEL A. CARR; GREGORY KATHAN; PERRY MEIER; KELLY L'ROY;
    CHARLES MULHALL; SCOTT MUND,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
    Defendant - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:14-CV-451
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and WIENER and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiffs-Appellants, Michael Carr, Gregory Kathan, Perry Meier, Kelly
    L’Roy, Charles Mulhall, and Scott Mund (“Appellants”), formerly pilots for
    Continental Airlines (“Continental”) but now pilots for United Airlines
    (“United”), sued their collective bargaining agent, Defendant-Appellee Air Line
    Pilots Association International (“ALPA”), on behalf of themselves and all
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-20578     Document: 00514071129      Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/13/2017
    former Continental pilots. Appellants alleged that ALPA breached the duty of
    fair representation by interfering with the process of creating an integrated
    pilot seniority list (“seniority list”) for all pilots of the two merging airlines,
    Continental and United Airlines. The district court granted ALPA’s motion for
    a summary judgment and dismissed the Appellants’ suit. We affirm.
    I.
    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
    A.    Factual Background
    In 2010, United and Continental merged, operating thereafter as United.
    ALPA represented the pilots of both airlines as their collective bargaining
    agent before and during the merger.
    ALPA had a preexisting Merger Policy which required it to “provide the
    process” when two airlines whose pilots it represented merged. That process
    included the integration of the two seniority lists into one. ALPA’s
    representation structure before and during this merger included Master
    Executive Councils (“MECs”) elected to represent each airline’s pilot group.
    ALPA’s role during a merger is limited to providing the Merger Policy and
    facilitating the merger in accordance with that policy. In this case, each MEC
    appointed a three-member “Merger Committee” to create the seniority list.
    Pursuant to ALPA’s Merger Policy, the Merger Committees had “complete and
    full authority” to negotiate and, if necessary, arbitrate a “fair and equitable”
    and “final and binding” seniority list. ALPA Merger Policy permitted the MECs
    and Merger Committees to “fashion their own process” for integrating the
    seniority lists, while observing specified “fundamental requirements.”
    Ultimately, the MECs and Merger Committees were unable to agree on
    a seniority list. ALPA’s Merger Policy specifies that if the pilots are unable to
    agree on a seniority list, arbitrators would merge the existing lists. The Merger
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    Committees voluntarily agreed to select the arbitrators from a list proffered by
    ALPA.
    During the course of the arbitration, two discovery disputes arose, and
    the Merger Committees chose a separate arbitrator to referee those two
    disputes. First, Continental requested that United provide specific W-2 data
    showing each pilot’s earnings for a period. The discovery arbitrator ruled that
    Continental could discover earnings information from the W-2s, subject to
    confidentiality procedures designed to prevent disclosure of the pilots’ seniority
    numbers. Second, the arbitrator granted United’s request for Continental
    pilots’ defined-benefit plan records and did not subject that request to any
    restrictions, even though he acknowledged that the parties had agreed to
    protect the confidentiality of the information with respect to those records.
    Following 16 days of hearings, during which both sides submitted
    extensive testimony, expert witness reports, and documents, each side
    presented its proposal for integrating the seniority lists. The arbitrators
    subsequently issued an award that integrated the seniority lists into one list.
    The arbitrators included a thorough explanation of how they incorporated the
    factors required by the ALPA Merger Policy. The arbitrators rejected various
    parts of Continental’s and United’s proposals in coming up with the seniority
    list. Thereafter, United implemented that list, and the combined groups of
    pilots have been working under it ever since.
    B.    Procedural Background
    Appellants filed the instant complaint, alleging that ALPA breached its
    duty of fair representation by acting in bad faith. Appellants requested that
    the court vacate the arbitration award and order ALPA to start a new seniority
    list integration process.
    ALPA filed a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The district court
    denied that motion and converted it to a motion for summary judgment,
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    allowing “tailored discovery” on the issue of ALPA’s alleged breach. ALPA
    renewed its motion for summary judgment following preliminary discovery.
    The court granted that motion and Appellants timely appealed.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo under the same
    standard applied by the district court.” 1 Summary judgment is appropriate
    when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 2 We consider the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
    its favor. 3
    “Once a movant who does not have the burden of proof at trial makes a
    properly supported motion” for summary judgment, “the burden shifts to the
    nonmovant to show that [the motion] should not be granted.” 4 To do so, the
    nonmovant must “identify specific evidence in the record and . . . articulate the
    precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.” 5 Neither we
    nor the district court have a duty to “sift through the record in search of
    evidence to support” the nonmovant’s opposition to summary judgment. 6
    1 Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 
    416 F.3d 382
    , 392–93 (5th Cir. 2005).
    2 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
    3 See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P., 
    739 F.3d 848
    , 856 (5th Cir.
    2014).
    4Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 
    136 F.3d 455
    , 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
    5Id.; accord RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 
    612 F.3d 851
    , 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
    6 Forsyth v. Barr, 
    19 F.3d 1527
    , 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,
    Inc., 
    953 F.2d 909
    , 915 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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    III.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
    1. Applicable Law
    The duty of fair representation requires a union “to serve the interests
    of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
    discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
    conduct.” 7 The fact that a union decided a dispute in a way that favored one
    group’s interests over another is not sufficient to show a breach of that duty. 8
    Unions have broad discretion in resolving internal disputes, and their
    actions are judged by a “wide range of reasonableness.” 9 A breach of fair duty
    occurs only when the union’s conduct is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
    faith.” 10 Here, Appellants allege only bad faith.
    Bad faith occurs when a union acts with a “motive to harm” a particular
    group, and turns on the subjective motivation of the union officials. 11 Bad faith
    is a “demanding standard” met only by “sufficiently egregious” union action. 12
    To prove that ALPA violated its duty to fairly represent all members by acting
    in bad faith, Appellants must show that the union acted intentionally to harm
    them by “seriously undermin[ing] the integrity of the arbitral process.” 13 Even
    if a member shows that his union breached its duty, he must also show that
    the breach “contributed to the erroneous outcome of the . . . proceedings.” 14
    7  O’Neill v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 
    939 F.2d 1199
    , 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Vaca
    v. Sipes, 
    386 U.S. 171
    , 177 (1967)).
    8 
    Id. 9 Id.
    at 1204 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 
    345 U.S. 330
    , 338 (1953)).
    10 
    Id. (quoting Vaca,
    386 U.S. at 190).
    11 
    Id. at 1204
    .
    12 
    Id. at 1203
    (quoting Alicea v. Suffield Poultry Inc., 
    902 F.2d 125
    , 130-31 (1st Cir.
    1990)).
    13 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 
    424 U.S. 554
    , 567 (1976).
    14 
    Id. at 568.
         Case: 16-20578       Document: 00514071129         Page: 6     Date Filed: 07/13/2017
    2. Analysis
    Appellants allege that underlying ALPA’s bad faith was its preference
    for United pilots. 15 We address Appellants’ supporting contentions in turn.
    a. Richard Harwood’s Participation
    Appellants assert that ALPA acted in bad faith by not barring – and
    allegedly encouraging – the participation of Delta Airlines pilot Richard
    Harwood (“Harwood”) in the merger proceedings. Harwood was hired by the
    United Merger Committee as a consultant and testified in the arbitration
    proceeding on the longevity factor. Then, after the hearings ended, Harwood
    worked as a member of the arbitration panel’s technical assistance team. That
    team consisted of technical experts designated by both Merger Committees to
    help the panel members obtain data required to generate the seniority list.
    Appellants focus on the fact that ALPA rules state that an MEC is
    prohibited from hiring “active member pilots” as consultants and that Harwood
    was an active member pilot. However, a separate ALPA rule in the Merger
    Policy gives the Merger Committees “complete and full authority” to act on
    behalf of the pilots they represent. That authority would include the hiring and
    paying of consultants of its choice, thereby making Harwood’s participation
    completely consistent with ALPA policy. It is unclear how these provisions are
    meant to interact, but a union’s interpretation of its own governing documents
    is entitled to deference unless the interpretation is “patently unreasonable,” 16
    which ALPA’s interpretation is not. The Merger Policy vests broad discretion
    in the Merger Committees to create seniority lists, and the provisions of ALPA
    15 After the two airlines merged, the United pilots were in the majority and could vote
    to decertify ALPA as its collective bargaining agent. This would significantly decrease
    ALPA’s membership and thus membership dues it would receive.
    16 
    O’Neill, 939 F.2d at 1206
    (quoting Newell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
    789 F.2d 1186
    , 1189 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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    policy that prohibit active member pilots from consulting specifically limits
    this prohibition to MECs: It does not apply to Merger Committees.
    Appellants also allege that ALPA encouraged – or at least did not
    discourage – Harwood’s participation in the arbitration process. However, it
    was the United Merger Committee, not ALPA, that had the authority to hire
    Harwood as a consultant and did so. Appellants adduced no evidence to show
    that bad faith motivated ALPA’s decision not to prevent Harwood’s
    participation.
    Appellants further claim that they were misinformed as to the nature of
    Harwood’s participation in the arbitration proceedings. They claim that they
    were led to believe that Harwood would work only in a technical capacity, yet
    he also testified on longevity. Appellants did not object to Harwood’s testimony
    or service at any point during the arbitration. Moreover, the arbitrators had
    full authority to exclude Harwood if they believed that his testimony was
    inappropriate or that he lacked credibility, but they did not do so.
    Appellants finally insist that ALPA violated its policy by paying
    Harwood. ALPA policy provides that “ALPA shall not, under any
    circumstances, pay any legal or consulting fees incurred by pilot groups
    involved in merger activity between any two ALPA represented carriers.”
    Rather, such fees must be paid from a fund maintained by the MEC, and
    ALPA’s annual report for 2012 reflected a payment to Harwood. However, the
    record clearly shows that checks to Harwood were drawn on United’s Merger
    Assessment Fund, strictly in accordance with ALPA policy: ALPA insists that
    the inclusion of this payment on the 2012 annual report was a mistake. Thus,
    Harwood’s participation, testimony, and payment does not constitute a breach
    of the duty of fair representation by ALPA.
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    b. Discovery Disputes
    Under its Merger Policy, ALPA was required to obtain discoverable
    records from both United and Continental and to provide those records to the
    pilot groups during arbitration. Appellants contend that ALPA helped United
    win discovery disputes. This claim relates to the arbitrator’s denial of
    Continental’s request for United pilots’ W-2s and the arbitrator’s grant of
    United’s request for the dates on which Continental pilots joined the airline’s
    defined benefits plan.
    Appellants maintain that ALPA’s decision to send a representative to the
    hearing on Continental’s request for United pilots’ W-2s supports this
    contention. Appellants allege that inappropriate ex-parte communications took
    place between the arbitrator and ALPA’s representative at the hearing,
    ultimately leading the arbitrator to deny Continental’s request. However, the
    record shows that the ALPA representative engaged only in pleasantries with
    the arbitrator and did not discuss any substantive matters. In addition, the
    arbitrator’s award at least partially favored Continental’s position because he
    concluded that parts of the W-2s were necessary and appropriate. He simply
    ordered that the request for pay data must be subject to narrow restrictions to
    address privacy concerns.
    On the other hand, ALPA did not send a representative to the hearing
    on United’s discovery request, which was granted. Appellants contend that this
    too is evidence of bad faith. As stated by the district court, however, “[t]he
    differences between the discovery sought in each of the two production requests
    and the limits on the documents produced to protect individual pilot privacy
    while allowing each side to obtain needed information, are amply
    demonstrated in the record.” ALPA’s duty to facilitate and obtain discovery
    between the parties is not as sensitive when requesting for the date a defined
    benefits plan started as it is when requesting specific pilot income and tax
    Case: 16-20578         Document: 00514071129   Page: 9   Date Filed: 07/13/2017
    information from a pilot’s W-2. Appellants have adduced no evidence that
    ALPA acted with bad faith regarding the discovery disputes.
    c. Ex Parte Communications
    Appellants also assert that ALPA’s director of representation, Bruce
    York, engaged in ex parte communications with one of the arbitrators. These
    communications include: (1) an email from York to the arbitrator stating “we’ll
    soon see all three photos on the wall in the U.S. Post Office,” (2) an email from
    the arbitrator to York stating “Will call you when I can give you a progress
    report on how things are going,” (3) a statement by the arbitrator to York that
    the panel was on schedule to issue the award and that he had “more later” to
    say, and (4) a statement by the arbitrator two days before the award was issued
    that “one of these days I’ll tell you some stories.” Such utterances might be
    unprofessional, but Appellants adduced no evidence to support their claim that
    ALPA was acting in bad faith with regard to these statements. Appellants only
    speculate that there is an underlying scheme in which the arbitrators are
    concerned about political consequences for ALPA because they want to
    continue to serve as ALPA arbitrators in future disputes. As Appellants fail to
    make a connection between these statements and bad faith on the part of
    ALPA, they do not meet the standard necessary to avoid summary judgment.
    Appellants have also failed entirely to show that any of ALPA’s conduct
    “contributed to the erroneous outcome of the . . . proceedings.” 17 The seniority
    list created by the arbitrators contains a full explanation of the factors that
    were considered in creating that list, including all of the factors that were
    required by the ALPA Merger Policy. The panel’s seniority list is supported by
    ample evidence and by testimony that the way in which the arbitrators
    considered various factors to create the list is the best approach. Appellants
    17   
    Hines, 424 U.S. at 568
    .
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    have raised no material fact issue that any alleged breach of the duty of fair
    representation on the part of ALPA affected the arbitrator’s award in any way.
    The district court did not err in granting ALPA’s motion for summary
    judgment.
    B. The District Court’s Focus on Fairness Versus Bad Faith
    Appellants also contend that the district court erred by improperly
    focusing on the establishment of “a fair process for determining seniority” in
    the creation of a seniority list which, they argue, is to be limited to cases in
    which there is an alleged to be breach of the duty of fair representation through
    discrimination. The district court did discuss fairness in its opinion, but
    Appellants are completely wrong in asserting that the court did not adequately
    analyze ALPA’s conduct in light of the allegation of bad faith. To the contrary,
    the court’s opinion is replete with analyses of bad faith.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellants’ action
    with prejudice.