Erica, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 200 F. App'x 344 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       September 19, 2006
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-60706
    ERICA, INC., GENERAL PARTNER,
    d/b/a FOOD BASKET PARTNERS LP,
    Petitioner-Cross-Respondent,
    versus
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent-Cross-Petitioner.
    Appeals from the National Labor Relations Board
    (Docket No. 28-CA-17521)
    _________________________________________________________
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Erica, Inc. (“Food Basket”) petitions to set aside a Decision and Order of the
    National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) adopting the administrative law judge’s
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
    not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
    5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    decision that Petitioner violated the National Labor Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 151
     et seq. (West 1998) (“NLRA”), by refusing to bargain with the union
    representing the employees of petitioner’s predecessor. The NLRB has cross-
    petitioned to enforce the order. We review the NLRB’s findings for substantial
    evidence, and its conclusions of law de novo, to determine if those conclusions are
    reasonably defensible. Brown & Root, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    333 F.3d 628
    , 633 (5th Cir.
    2003). We deny the petition and enforce the order of the NLRB for the following
    reasons:
    1.     Former employees of Furr’s, Food Basket’s predecessor, made up a
    majority of Food Basket’s workforce, which created an obligation for
    Food Basket to bargain with the union. See Fall River Dyeing &
    Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 
    482 U.S. 27
    , 40–41, 
    107 S.Ct. 2225
    , 2234
    (1987). Food Basket argues that one employee, Ruben Lucero, was a
    supervisor, and did not count as an employee for collective bargaining
    purposes. See 
    29 U.S.C.A. §§ 152
    (3), 164(a) (West 1998). Thus,
    Food Basket claims that former Furr’s employees were a minority of
    Food Basket’s new workforce. However, other than conclusory
    testimony by one store manager, Food Basket provided no evidence of
    Lucero’s status as a supervisor, and no evidence that Lucero exercised
    2
    supervisory powers. The Board is not required to defer to conclusory
    testimony about the position of an employee. Central Freight Lines v.
    NLRB, 
    653 F.2d 1023
    , 1025 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). See also
    Beverly Enterprise-Mass., Inc., v. NLRB, 
    165 F.3d 960
    , 962–63 (D.C.
    Cir. 1999). The NLRB produced a witness who testified that Lucero
    performed work similar to that of a produce clerk. Therefore, the
    NLRB’s finding that Lucero was not a supervisor was supported by
    substantial evidence, and the former employees of Furr’s made up a
    majority of Food Basket’s employees, triggering the duty to bargain.2
    2.    The union made a valid demand for recognition on September 12,
    2001. Food Basket argues that because the union’s demand letter did
    not define the bargaining units sought, the letter was insufficient as a
    demand. However, “a valid request to bargain need not be made in
    any particular form, or in haec verba, so long as the request clearly
    indicates a desire to negotiate and bargain on behalf of the employees.”
    Peters v. NLRB, 
    153 F.3d 289
    , 299 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
    2
    Because the Court holds that Lucero was not a supervisor for purposes of
    the NLRA, it is unnecessary to decide the status of Brandi Yniquez in order to
    determine whether former Furr’s employees make up a majority of Food Basket’s
    employees.
    3
    See also NLRB v. Williams Enters., Inc., 
    50 F.3d 1280
    , 1286 (4th Cir.
    1995); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    185 F.2d 732
    , 741 (D.C. Cir.
    1950); Case Concrete Co., 
    220 NLRB 1306
    , 1309 (1975). The
    union’s letter was unmistakably a request to be recognized as the
    employee’s bargaining representative, and should have shifted the
    burden to Food Basket to contact the union and seek clarification of the
    demand. See Hydrolines, Inc., 
    305 NLRB 416
    , 420 (1991). Food
    Basket argues that Hydrolines requires that a valid demand letter
    include descriptions of the bargaining units sought. However,
    Hydrolines merely declared a union’s letter with unit descriptions
    attached to be a valid demand. 
    Id.
     In this case, although the union’s
    letter did not include unit descriptions, the letter was sufficiently clear
    to notify Food Basket that the union wished to bargain on behalf of the
    employees.3
    3.    Finally, Food Basket argues that a bankruptcy court order, which
    3
    Moreover, because testimony demonstrated that the stores in question were
    up and running by the time the demand letter arrived on September 12, 2001, the
    NLRB’s finding that Food Basket employed a substantial and representative
    complement of employees at that time was supported by substantial evidence. See
    Penn. Transformer Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    254 F.3d 217
    , 225 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    4
    limited the liability of third party purchasers of Food Basket’s
    predecessor, shielded Food Basket from liability under the NLRA. We
    disagree.
    Food Basket had a duty to bargain with the union under the
    NLRA because of its conduct after the purchase of Furr’s
    Supermarkets. A new employer is not necessarily bound by a
    predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement; however, “[i]f the new
    employer makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the same
    business and to hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor,”
    then the new employer must bargain with the union that represented the
    predecessor’s employees. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
    NLRB, 
    482 U.S. 27
    , 41, 
    107 S.Ct. 2225
    , 2234 (1987). Bankruptcy
    courts lack jurisdiction to determine successorship obligations under
    federal labor law. See NLRB v. Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
    CIO, 
    882 F.2d 949
    , 955 (5th Cir. 1989). A Bankruptcy Court order
    might discharge duties that arose before the bankruptcy petition, but a
    successor’s post-sale conduct can create a new duty to bargain. See In
    re Carib-Inn of San Juan Corp., 
    905 F.2d 561
    , 563–64 (1st Cir.
    1990); In re Goodman, 
    873 F.2d 598
    , 602 (2d Cir. 1989). As a result,
    5
    the Bankruptcy Court’s order here does not shield Food-Basket from
    the NLRA’s requirements. Because Food Basket’s post-sale conduct
    meets the test for successor liability, Food Basket acquired the
    obligation to bargain with the union of its predecessor.
    PETITION DENIED, ORDER ENFORCED.
    6