Rick Rhoades v. Lorie Davis, Director ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 16-70021      Document: 00514811300    Page: 1   Date Filed: 01/28/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 16-70021              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 28, 2019
    RICK ALLEN RHOADES,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Petitioner - Appellant                              Clerk
    v.
    LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
    JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
    Respondent - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
    In 1992 a Texas jury convicted Rick Allan Rhoades of capital murder and
    he received a death sentence. After direct appeals and filing an unsuccessful
    state habeas petition, Rhoades petitioned for federal habeas relief. The district
    court denied his petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability
    (“COA”). We granted a COA on three of Rhoades’s claims, accepted further
    briefing, and heard oral argument. We now affirm the district court’s denial of
    his petition.
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    I.
    On the morning of September 13, 1991, the bodies of brothers Charles
    and Bradley Allen were discovered by a neighbor. Almost a month later,
    Rhoades was arrested leaving the scene of an unrelated school burglary. While
    in custody for the burglary, Rhoades gave the police a written statement
    admitting to killing Charles and Bradley Allen.
    In that statement, Rhoades related his activities on release from prison
    in Huntsville, Texas less than 24 hours before the murders occurred. Instead
    of reporting to his assigned halfway house in Beaumont, Rhoades travelled to
    Houston by bus. After an unsuccessful search for his parents, he went to an
    apartment complex where he had previously lived and proceeded to have
    several beers. In his statement, Rhoades recalled wandering around the
    neighborhood and encountering Charles Allen outside of his home around 2:30
    a.m. After a quarrel, Charles entered his house. Believing he was planning to
    retrieve a gun, Rhoades went into the house after him. Rhoades picked up a
    small metal bar from a weight bench and entered the kitchen, where Charles
    Allen grabbed a knife. The men began fighting and Rhoades recounted hitting
    Charles Allen with the bar several times until he dropped the knife. At that
    point, Rhoades grabbed the knife and stabbed him a number of times. Bradley
    Allen entered shortly thereafter and started trying to punch Rhoades, who
    stabbed Bradley Allen with the knife. Rhoades took some cash and clean
    clothing, because his clothes had been bloodied. He saw on the news later that
    morning that the two men had died. In his statement, Rhoades mentioned that
    he had not told anyone about the murders and it had been “bothering [him]
    ever since.” Rhoades claimed he could have outrun the police officer who
    arrested him for the school burglary, but was “tired of running” so decided to
    tell the police about the murders while in custody.
    2
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    A Harris County jury convicted Rhoades of capital murder on October 2,
    1992. During the punishment phase of the trial, the State presented evidence
    of Rhoades’s Naval court-martial for unauthorized absences and other previous
    criminal convictions including convictions for burglary and auto theft. The
    State also presented Rhoades as a danger to other prisoners, proffering
    evidence that when Rhoades was an inmate in an Indiana prison, prison
    officials had recovered a shank and a razor blade from his cell. Between 1986
    and 1990 Rhoades stacked up various arrests and convictions for auto theft,
    possession of a prohibited weapon, theft, burglary, and carrying a weapon.
    During the punishment phase, Rhoades’s trial counsel presented the testimony
    of Patricia Spenny, Rhoades’s birth mother; Donna and Ernest Rhoades,
    Rhoades’s adoptive parents; Meyer Proler, an assistant professor of physiology
    and neurology at the Baylor College of Medicine; Novella Pollard, Rhoades’s
    teacher in his prison GED program; and Windel Dickerson, a psychologist. On
    rebuttal, the State presented testimony of David Ritchie, the Harris County
    jailer and Roy Smithy, an investigator with the special prosecution unit in
    Huntsville who testified about prison procedures. 1
    On October 8, 1992, the jury answered two requisite questions: (1)
    whether Rhoades “would commit criminal acts of violence that would
    constitute a continuing threat to society” and (2) whether there were “sufficient
    mitigating circumstances or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life
    imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.” The jury
    unanimously answered “yes” to the first and “no” to the second and Rhoades
    1 The testimony of the punishment phase witnesses will be discussed in more detail
    with the first and second issues certified on appeal. Rhoades challenges the trial court’s
    exclusion of childhood photographs during the punishment phase and the admission of
    testimony by Smithy regarding an inmate’s ability to receive a furlough when serving a life
    sentence.
    3
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    received a sentence of death. The trial court denied Rhoades’s motion for a new
    trial in December 1992.
    On direct appeal, Rhoades raised eighteen points of error. The Texas
    Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed Rhoades’s conviction and sentence
    in a published opinion in 1996. 2 Rhoades initiated state habeas proceedings
    the following year, raising thirty-eight grounds of error. Finding that there
    were unresolved factual issues, the state habeas court ordered trial counsel to
    file affidavits responding to Rhoades’s allegations of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. The affidavits of James Stafford and Deborah Keyser were timely filed
    and the State filed its answer to Rhoades’s habeas petition in October 2000.
    Nearly fourteen years later, the trial court entered its findings of fact and
    conclusions of law, denying Rhoades’s state habeas petition. The CCA affirmed
    the denial in 2014. 3 With federally appointed counsel, Rhoades filed his federal
    habeas petition, raising five issues. The State filed a summary judgment
    motion in response and the district court entered an order denying Rhoades’s
    petition, granting the State’s summary judgment motion, and denying
    Rhoades a COA.
    We granted a COA on three of Rhoades’s claims for habeas relief: (1) that
    the convicting court unconstitutionally prevented him from presenting
    mitigating childhood photographs of himself to the jury during the sentencing
    phase; (2) that the convicting court unconstitutionally permitted the jury to
    hear testimony about the possibility of release on furlough for capital
    defendants sentenced to life in prison; and (3) that the State violated Batson
    2   Rhoades v. State, 
    934 S.W.2d 113
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
    3   Ex Parte Rhoades, No. WR-78,124-01, 
    2014 WL 5422197
    (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 1,
    2014).
    4
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    when it exercised racially motivated peremptory strikes against two
    prospective jurors. 4 We address each issue in turn.
    II.
    First, Rhoades argues that the trial court erred in excluding eleven
    photographs from Rhoades’s childhood offered as mitigation evidence during
    the sentencing phase of trial. Before calling Rhoades’s adoptive mother, Donna
    Rhoades, trial counsel sought to introduce photographs of Rhoades as a child
    from the ages of approximately four to ten. 5 Trial counsel argued that the
    photographs were admissible to counteract the dehumanizing photographs of
    Rhoades introduced by the State (e.g., his mugshots), to show the jury the
    defendant’s development through his life and his human side, and to offset the
    effect of the emotional photos of the deceased victims and their families. The
    photographs depict typical childhood scenes such as Rhoades holding a trophy,
    fishing, and attending a dance. The State objected to the admission of the
    photographs as irrelevant, arguing that everyone was a child at one point, and
    that the photos did nothing to lessen his moral blameworthiness. The trial
    court agreed. 6 The CCA affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in excluding the photos as irrelevant. 7 Specifically, the CCA held
    that there was no relationship between photos of Rhoades as a child and his
    moral culpability for the double murder. 8 On habeas review, the state court
    4 Rhoades v. Davis, 
    852 F.3d 422
    , 427–28 (5th Cir. 2017).
    5 There was one more recent photo trial counsel sought to introduce.
    6 Trial counsel offered the photos as a bill of exception, suggesting that the trial court
    had denied Rhoades effective assistance of counsel by impeding trial counsel’s ability to
    humanize Rhoades and show his development as a child.
    7 
    Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 126
    . As we recognized in our decision to grant a COA to
    Rhoades on this issue, the issue of relevancy divided the CCA and Judges Clinton and
    Overstreet filed a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority’s view that mitigating evidence
    is relevant “only if it reflects on the moral culpability of the defendant.” 
    Id. at 130–31
    (Clinton, J., dissenting).
    8 
    Id. (“In our
    view, photographs of appellant which depict a cheerful early childhood
    are irrelevant to appellants moral blameworthiness for the commission of a violent double-
    5
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    summarized the testimony of witnesses who testified on Rhoades’s behalf
    during the punishment phase of the trial 9 and determined that trial counsel
    was able to submit other mitigating evidence that humanized Rhoades. 10 In
    his state habeas petition, Rhoades focused on the special issue of future-
    dangerousness, arguing that the photographs showed his ability to adapt to a
    structured environment. 11 The state habeas court rejected that contention,
    finding that the “childhood photos are not relevant to the issue of whether the
    applicant would be a threat to society while living in a structured environment
    and do not show whether he would or would not commit future acts of violence.”
    The district court concluded that the state courts were not unreasonable
    in determining that the proffered photos were irrelevant to the jury’s
    determination of the special issues 12 and that any error was harmless because
    the photographs would have been “only a small thread in an intricately violent
    mosaic of Rhoades’ life.” 13 The district court found persuasive the State’s
    argument that any mitigating value of the photos would be eclipsed by the
    murder because such evidence has no relationship to appellant’s conduct in those murders.
    That appellant was once a child does not diminish his moral culpability for the act of
    murder.”).
    9 The court summarized evidence of his difficult childhood pre-adoption, including
    “being almost drowned by one of his mother’s boyfriends” and the transition to his adoptive
    family when Rhoades hid food, defecated in the closet and drawers, and had a difficult time
    concentrating at school. The court summarized the evidence of his family life after
    transitioning to his adoptive family, including being “loving to everyone after his adoption”
    and “being ‘gung-ho’ into sports.”
    10 “The Court finds that trial counsel were able to present mitigating evidence and to
    humanize [Rhoades] through punishment testimony concerning his childhood and
    background, rather than a photo that does not adequately inform the jury of his life.”
    11 “These pictures, and evidence on his life while in boot camp and while incarcerated,
    showed the jury that he could adapt and conform in a structured society.”
    12 Rhoades, 
    2016 WL 8943327
    , at *8 (“The state courts could reasonably conclude that
    the childhood photographs bore little, or no, relationship to Rhoades’ character, record, or
    circumstances of the offense. The photographs merely showed that Rhoades had once been a
    child, and possibly a happy one. The photographs, however, were not demonstrative of trial
    testimony, nor did they play a direct role in the decision jurors faced.”).
    13 
    Id. 6 Case:
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    aggravating nature of the photos—essentially that Rhoades committed brutal
    murders despite being adopted into a loving family. 14
    It is our task to assess whether the state court’s determination that the
    proffered childhood photos were irrelevant was an unreasonable application of
    clearly established federal law. 15 The Supreme Court has adopted an
    expansive definition of relevant mitigation evidence. 16 “Relevant mitigating
    evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or
    circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating
    value.” 17 A state court cannot, therefore, exclude evidence from the jury’s
    consideration “if the sentencer could reasonably find that it warrants a
    sentence less than death.” 18 This is a “low threshold for relevance.” 19
    In Lockett v. Ohio, a plurality of the Court concluded that Ohio’s death
    penalty statute was invalid because it did not “permit the type of
    individualized consideration of mitigating factors [the Court held] to be
    required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.” 20 The
    Court determined that the Constitution required that the sentencer “not be
    precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
    character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
    14  
    Id. 15 28
    U.S.C. § 2254(d).
    16 Tennard v. Dretke, 
    542 U.S. 274
    , 284 (2004) (reiterating that when addressing “the
    relevance standard applicable to mitigating evidence in capital cases . . . [the Court speaks]
    in the most expansive terms”).
    17 
    Id. (citing McKoy
    v. North Carolina, 
    494 U.S. 433
    440–41 (1990) (quoting the
    dissenting state court opinion with approval) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    18 
    Id. at 285
    (citing 
    McKoy, 494 U.S. at 441
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    19 
    Id. 20 Lockett
    v. Ohio, 
    438 U.S. 586
    , 606 (1978). It is worth noting, briefly, that in Lockett
    and its progeny, the Court was tasked with considering the constitutionality of state statutes
    that limited the sentencer’s consideration of already admitted evidence. Here, we consider an
    antecedent problem: whether the trial court erred in excluding relevant mitigating evidence
    in the first instance. The Lockett line of cases more generally explain the standard for
    relevant mitigating evidence, and therefore apply with equal force here.
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    defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 21 Four years later,
    the Court endorsed the plurality opinion in Lockett and held that a trial judge
    had erred in concluding that a defendant’s violent upbringing and background
    was not relevant mitigating evidence. 22 Even where mitigating evidence does
    not “relate specifically to [the defendant’s] culpability for the crime he
    committed,” it may still be relevant as mitigation if the jury could draw
    favorable inferences regarding the defendant’s character and those inferences
    “might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’” 23 Lockett, Eddings,
    and Skipper “emphasized the severity of imposing a death sentence and [made
    clear] that ‘the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any
    relevant mitigating factor.’” 24
    Despite the expansive definition of relevant mitigating evidence, trial
    judges still retain their traditional authority to exclude irrelevant evidence
    that does not bear on the defendant’s “character, prior record, or the
    circumstances of his offense.” 25 Furthermore, “gravity has a place in the
    21  
    Id. at 604.
           22  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
    455 U.S. 104
    , 112–14 (1982) (“We find that the limitations
    placed by these courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in
    Lockett. Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any
    mitigating factor, neither may the sentence refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any
    relevant mitigating evidence.”).
    23 Skipper v. South Carolina, 
    476 U.S. 1
    , 4–5 (1986) (quoting 
    Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
    )
    (holding that the exclusion of evidence regarding petitioner’s good behavior in prison while
    awaiting trial deprived him of his right to place before the sentence relevant evidence in
    mitigation of punishment).
    24 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 
    550 U.S. 233
    , 248 (2007) (summarizing rule of those
    cases). While this Court has upheld the exclusion of a singular piece of evidence at the
    punishment phase, distinguishing Lockett and Eddings as “deal[ing] with the exclusion of
    specific types of evidence rather than specific items in evidence,” in that case the court was
    considering a videotape that was excluded as hearsay under Mississippi law. Simmons v.
    Epps, 
    654 F.3d 526
    , 544 (5th Cir. 2011). Here, on the other hand, the trial court excluded an
    item of evidence as irrelevant, in the face of the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
    sentencer be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor.
    25 
    Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
    n.12 (“Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional
    authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's
    character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”).
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    relevance analysis, insofar as evidence of a trivial feature of the defendant’s
    character or the circumstances of the crime is unlikely to have any tendency to
    mitigate the defendant’s culpability.” 26 This court has not accepted that it is
    unconstitutional to define mitigating evidence as evidence that reduces moral
    blameworthiness. 27
    Acknowledging those strictures, Rhoades contends that the state court’s
    finding erroneously defined the universe of evidence relevant to moral
    blameworthiness too narrowly, undermining the rule established in Lockett.
    We agree. The proffered photos are relevant to Rhoades’s character, 28
    humanizing Rhoades in the face of Rhoades’s long criminal history and
    suggestions by the prosecution that Rhoades was a psychopath 29 who viewed
    society’s rules as a joke. 30 While photos of Rhoades as a child do not “relate
    specifically to [Rhoade’s] culpability for the crime he committed,” they are
    “mitigating in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less
    than death.’” 31 We distinguish here between culpability for the specific crime
    26  
    Tennard, 542 U.S. at 286
    –87 (citing 
    Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7
    n.2 (“We do not hold that
    all facets of the defendant's ability to adjust to prison life must be treated as relevant and
    potentially mitigating. For example, we have no quarrel with the statement of the Supreme
    Court of South Carolina that ‘how often [the defendant] will take a shower’ is irrelevant to
    the sentencing determination.”) (internal citation omitted)).
    27 Blue v. Thaler, 
    665 F.3d 647
    , 667 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that Texas trial court’s
    jury instructions were sufficient to allow jury to consider mitigating effect of petitioner’s good
    conduct in prison).
    28 
    Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4
    (“There is no disputing that this Court's decision
    in Eddings requires that in capital cases ‘the sentencer . . . not be precluded from
    considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
    of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
    than death.’” (citing 
    Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110
    )).
    29 “[The defendant’s psychologist] admits that the defendant fits the antisocial
    personality profile, same thing as psychopath.”
    30 “Society the systems’ rules, are a joke to him, a challenge, a game.”
    31 
    Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4
    (quoting 
    Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604
    ). The Court has reminded
    that “a defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance that must be within the
    effective reach of a capital sentencing jury if a death sentence is to meet the requirements of
    Lockett and Eddings.” Johnson v. Texas, 
    509 U.S. 350
    , 367 (1993) (holding that the Texas
    special issues allowed adequate consideration of the petitioner’s youth). While often
    9
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    committed by Rhoades and his moral culpability more generally. In other
    words, although the photos do not relate to the circumstances of the crime, they
    go to his character and distinct identity. While the State is correct in reminding
    us that gravity has a place in the relevance determination, childhood photos
    are not “trivial” in the same way as, for example, personal hygiene practices,
    an inconsequential fact the Court has acknowledged to be irrelevant. 32 Beyond
    evaluating whether the proffered evidence is trivial, “[t]he Court [has]
    emphasized that, in assessing the relevance of mitigating evidence, a
    reviewing court should not weigh the severity or sufficiency of the evidence.” 33
    We cannot reconcile the mandate that a sentencing court may not preclude the
    jury from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
    character that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death
    with the exclusion of the childhood photos by the trial court here. 34
    mitigating evidence regarding a defendant’s youth seeks to remind a jury of the defendant’s
    turbulent background or the impetuousness that often defines bad decisions by younger
    offenders, 
    Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367
    –68, we see no reason why photos highlighting positive or
    humanizing aspects of Rhoades’s youth are any less relevant.
    32 
    Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7
    n.2.
    33 Nelson v. Quarterman, 
    472 F.3d 287
    , 301 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Skipper,
    476 at 7 n.2)).
    34 The State relies on Saffle v. Parks, 
    494 U.S. 484
    , 492 (1990) in its contention that
    “Rhoades did not have an unfettered constitutional right to make such an unbridled appeal
    to the jury’s sympathy” through presentation of the childhood photos. In Saffle, the Court
    held that an instruction telling the jury to “avoid any influence of sympathy . . . when
    imposing sentence” was constitutional. 
    Id. at 487.
    The petitioner in Saffle had argued that
    the Lockett line of cases precluded such an antisympathy instruction. 
    Id. In rejecting
    that
    claim, the Court clarified the holding of Lockett and Eddings: “There is no dispute as to the
    precise holding in each of the two cases: that the State cannot bar relevant mitigating
    evidence from being presented and considered during the penalty phase of a capital trial. . .
    . Lockett and Eddings do not speak directly, if at all, to the issue presented here: whether the
    State may instruct the sentencer to render its decision on the evidence without sympathy.
    Parks asks us to create a rule relating, not to what mitigating evidence the jury must be
    permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, but to how it must consider the
    mitigating evidence.” Id at 490. The State’s reliance on Saffle is unavailing. Here, Rhoades’s
    claim goes to the heart of Lockett and Eddings: what mitigating evidence the jury must be
    permitted to consider.
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    That said, we need not reach the question of whether the Court’s
    precedent speaks with such clarity as to render its application by the trial court
    unreasonable under the strictures of AEDPA. Even assuming that Lockett and
    its progeny “squarely establish” “a specific legal rule” that required the
    admission of these photographs, we agree with the district court that any such
    error was harmless. 35 Although Rhoades’s counsel did not brief the issue of the
    effect of any error on appeal, during oral argument, counsel suggested that a
    trial court’s exclusion of mitigating evidence is structural error, entitling
    Rhoades to a new sentencing. We disagree and find that any error was
    harmless.
    To obtain relief on collateral review, a habeas petitioner must establish
    that a constitutional trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect or
    influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 36 In Brecht, the Court emphasized
    the distinction between trial error and structural defects, making clear that
    “[t]rial error ‘occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury,’ and is
    amenable to harmless-error analysis because it ‘may . . . be quantitatively
    assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine the
    effect it had on the trial.’” 37 On the other hand, structural errors warrant
    automatic reversal because “they infect the entire trial process.” 38 Contrary to
    the assertion during oral argument of Rhoades’s able counsel, the decision of
    the trial judge to exclude the photos as irrelevant, if error, is quintessentially
    a trial error subject to harmless error review. 39 The scope of the error is readily
    35  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
    556 U.S. 111
    , 122 (2009).
    36  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 637–38 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
    States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776 (1946)).
    37 
    Id. at 629–30
    (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 307–08 (1991) (internal
    alterations omitted)).
    38 
    Id. at 630.
            39 See Satterwhite v. Texas, 
    486 U.S. 249
    , 257 (1988) (“We have permitted harmless
    error analysis in both capital and noncapital cases where the evil caused by a Sixth
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    identifiable and we are able to engage in the “narrow task of assessing the
    likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury.” 40
    We agree with the district court that the exclusion of the photos did not
    have a “substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
    verdict.” 41 Even if the photos of Rhoades as a young child had led the jury to a
    positive inference of Rhoades’s character, these photos from over a decade
    earlier would be unable to counteract the aggravating evidence of the previous
    crimes committed by Rhoades or testimony describing his violent behavior
    while incarcerated. And the portrayal of a positive adoptive childhood risks
    cutting against other mitigating evidence presented by trial counsel of
    Rhoades’s difficult childhood—for example, testimony of Rhoades’s biological
    mother that Rhoades had witnessed his mother’s rape by his father. The
    marginal humanizing force of the photos is outweighed by the extensive
    aggravating evidence and, as the district court noted, backfires to the extent it
    highlights that Rhoades committed two brutal murders despite his adoption
    by a loving family. The hard reality is that any positive force of the proffered
    photographs was overrun by what the district court called “an intricately
    violent mosaic” of Rhoades’s life. 42 We need not conclude that they had no
    relevance to conclude that Rhoades has not shown how the exclusion of the
    Amendment violation is limited to the erroneous admission of particular evidence at trial.”);
    see also Simmons v. Epps, 
    654 F.3d 526
    , 539 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying Brecht harmless error
    test to submission of an invalid aggravating circumstance to the jury). This court’s en banc
    decision in Nelson v. Quarterman, 
    472 F.3d 287
    (5th Cir. 2006) does not dictate otherwise.
    The Penry violation there, which involved jury instructions that prevented the jury from
    giving full effect to a defendant’s already-admitted mitigating evidence, is qualitatively
    different. 
    Nelson, 472 F.3d at 313
    . Here, the question is not whether the instructions allowed
    the jury to give effect to the impact of the mitigating evidence, but rather whether the trial
    judge erred in refusing to admit one piece of mitigating evidence as irrelevant.
    40 Holloway v. Arkansas, 
    435 U.S. 475
    , 490 (1978).
    41 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637
    .
    42 Rhoades, 
    2016 WL 8943327
    , at *8.
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    photos had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s deliberations. He has
    not met his burden for habeas relief. 43
    III.
    Rhoades contends that testimony adduced by the State during the
    punishment phase of trial about the possibility of Rhoades’s being released on
    a furlough was constitutional error. In the punishment phase of Rhoades’s
    trial, the State called Roy Smithy, an investigator with the prison system’s
    special prosecution unit. 44 Smithy testified to the classification and housing of
    prisoners, crimes committed within the prison, and the range of weapons
    within the prison. The prosecutor then asked about furlough eligibility:
    [State]: If an inmate is in prison and behaves himself for a
    certain period of time, even if he has been convicted of capital
    murder, and, of course, is there on just a life sentence, is
    there an opportunity for him to get furloughed?
    [Smithy]: If he obtained . . . state approved trustee 3 status,
    then he is eligible for furloughs.
    [State]: Just exactly what does a furlough mean?
    [Smithy]: You have different types. You have emergency
    furloughs. You have other . . .
    At this point, Rhoades’s trial counsel asked for “a running objection to
    all of this,” and the court instructed him to approach the bench. The transcript
    then reads: “Counsel went to the bench for an off-the-record conference; then
    the reporter was called to the bench . . . .” The first part of the bench conference
    was not transcribed by the court reporter.
    43 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637
    (“Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain
    plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based
    on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” (citing United
    States v. Lane, 
    474 U.S. 438
    , 449 (1986)).
    44 The special prosecution unit was established to investigate and prosecute all felony
    offenses that occur inside the prison system. 
    Id. 13 Case:
    16-70021           Document: 00514811300         Page: 14        Date Filed: 01/28/2019
    No. 16-70021
    Back on the record, defense counsel argued that “to allow [the State] to
    go into this stuff and not let me allude to – to let the jury know he is going to
    stay locked up for thirty-five years is a gross miscarriage of justice.” The court
    responded: “I don’t know where your objection is in there. I understand what
    your previous objection was. She has been admonished.” 45 Defense counsel
    objected to “any further questions along this line.” The trial judge stated “I am
    going to allow her to complete her line of questioning. That is all I am going to
    say.”
    After this exchange, the prosecution asked Smithy three additional
    questions about furloughs. Smithy explained:
    [a] furlough is when an inmate is allowed to leave prison
    unescorted to attend whatever reason it is that he has requested
    to leave the unit, things such as funeral, family emergency . . .
    where he, in essence, signs a piece of paper that says that he is
    going to be released [at] a certain time and that he will go to
    wherever this emergency is and that he promises he will be back
    and turn himself back into the unit.
    On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Smithy who was
    responsible for deciding whether an inmate was eligible for a furlough. Smithy
    agreed that it was “basically the decision of the warden for each particular
    unit,” subject to “certain guidelines . . . set by the overall prison system.”
    Defense counsel then asked Smithy to confirm that “technically speaking, a
    person who has been convicted of capital murder and is serving a life sentence
    is technically eligible for a furlough.” Finally, defense counsel asked whether
    Smithy had ever heard of a capital murderer serving a life sentence getting a
    furlough, and Smithy stated “I have not personally, no sir.” In its closing
    argument, the State did not mention furloughs, but did emphasize that
    45   Again, the referenced previous objection was not recorded.
    14
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    No. 16-70021
    Rhoades had been out of prison for less than twenty-four hours when he
    committed the murder. 46
    In a motion for new trial, defense counsel objected to the State’s furlough
    testimony as misleading. Defense counsel pointed to an administrative
    directive from TDCJ which stated that the state classification committee (not
    unit wardens) decide whether an inmate will be released on furlough. Defense
    counsel characterized the directive as “evidence . . . that an individual
    convicted of capital murder assessed life imprisonment is not eligible for
    furlough.” The State responded that the prohibition on furloughs for capital
    murderers only applied to “appropriate reason furloughs,” not emergency
    furloughs. The State then argued that Smithy’s testimony referred only to
    emergency furloughs, and thus “[t]here was nothing misleading or incorrect”
    about the testimony.
    On direct appeal, Rhoades challenged the furlough testimony as
    misleading. The CCA did not reach the merits, instead holding that Rhoades’s
    claim was waived because “he failed to object to the line of questioning with
    ample specificity to notify the trial court of his contention.” 47
    Rhoades again challenged the furlough testimony in his state habeas
    application. He separately raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    with respect to defense counsel’s failure to preserve error related to the
    46  “On the street less than 24 hours, [Rhoades] went in there, he smashed it, and he
    slashed and slashed and slashed till nothing was left but blood and death . . . . “Think about
    it. Less than 24 hours after his release from prison he slaughters two men.”
    47 The court elaborated: “In the instant case, appellant objected only to the trial court’s
    decision to preclude issues of parole eligibility from the trial; appellant did not actually object
    to the State’s question regarding emergency furlough. Indeed, the trial court flatly told
    appellant that it did not comprehend the nature of appellant’s objection. Rather than
    rephrasing the objection in a way that the trial court could fathom, appellant lodged another
    non-specific objection. Appellant failed to effectively communicate his objection . . . We
    therefore hold that appellant’s complaint regarding the State’s questioning is waived for
    failure to object with specificity.”
    15
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    No. 16-70021
    furlough testimony. To help resolve the ineffective assistance claim, the state
    habeas court directed Rhoades’s trial counsel to file affidavits addressing the
    furlough objection. In his affidavit, Rhoades’s trial counsel stated:
    [T]he ‘record’ is not representative of the event at all. To the extent
    that we did not know that the court-reporter was not recording, or
    that conversations at the bench were not properly placed in the
    record, I admit error. However, the record, spotty as it might be,
    certainly reflects our object[ion]s to Roy Smithy’s testimony as a
    whole, and to the furlough issue in particular. 48
    The trial prosecutor later submitted an affidavit stating:
    With regard to the furlough eligibility of Roy Smithy, the
    applicant’s trial counsel objected repeatedly and strenuously to
    such evidence. I was aware of the nature of the applicant’s
    objections to such testimony, and I believe that the trial court was
    also aware of such objections, even if such objections did not make
    it to the written record.
    The state habeas court accepted this version of events when it found that
    “the trial court’s reference to understanding counsel’s ‘previous’ objection is a
    reference to trial counsel’s objection to Smithy’s testimony made during the
    unrecorded portion of the bench conference,” and therefore that trial counsel
    was not ineffective. 49 Yet on substantive challenge to Smithy’s testimony the
    state habeas court found that “the applicant is procedurally barred from
    advancing his habeas claims concerning Roy Smithy’s testimony about prison
    furloughs” because “trial counsel’s complaint . . . was not specific, so the
    complaint was waived.” The state habeas court then found:
    48 The defense’s co-counsel filed an affidavit stating the same recollection.
    49 “The Court finds that, on direct appeal of the applicant’s conviction, the Court of
    Criminal Appeals was bound by the parameters of the appellate record which did not include
    the contents of the unrecorded portion of the bench conference when trial counsel objected to
    Smithy’s furlough testimony. . . . The Court finds that trial counsel are not ineffective for
    allegedly failing to object to Smithy’s admissible testimony, just as trial counsel are not
    ineffective for not moving to strike Smithy’s testimony or requesting a limiting instruction.”
    16
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    In the alternative, based on trial counsel’s habeas assertion that
    counsel specifically objected to the furlough testimony during an
    unrecorded bench conference, the applicant is not procedurally
    barred from presenting his habeas claims, but the applicant fails
    to show that such claims have merit.
    On federal habeas, the district court elected to “bypass [the] procedural-
    bar argument” because the claim could be “resolved more easily by looking past
    any procedural default.” 50 The district court proceeded to the merits and
    concluded that “while not a likely occurrence, Texas law did not preclude life-
    sentenced capital inmates from furlough eligibility” and that “the Supreme
    Court has not precluded [s]tates from presenting factually correct, yet unlikely,
    testimony relating to furlough.” 51
    Rhoades argues on appeal that his furlough claim is not procedurally
    barred and that the state court’s determination that Rhoades had failed to
    show that the furlough testimony was false or misleading was unreasonable.
    With respect to the procedural bar, Rhoades contends that the state habeas
    court’s finding on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that trial counsel
    objected to Smithy’s testimony during the unrecorded bench conference
    (meaning trial counsel was not ineffective), “undid” the CCA’s holding on direct
    appeal that Rhoades had waived his claim by failing to adequately object
    during trial. Essentially he argues that the state habeas court’s finding that
    the objection was sufficient to overcome the ineffective assistance claim
    displaces the earlier CCA opinion finding that the objection was insufficient to
    preserve the issue on appeal. 52 With respect to the state habeas court’s finding
    50 Rhoades, 
    2016 WL 8943327
    , at *10 (citing Busby v. Dretke, 
    359 F.3d 708
    , 720 (5th
    Cir. 2004)). “Given the contested record regarding the defense’s trial objection, the Court will
    address the state habeas court’s alternative merits review.” 
    Id. 51 Id.
    at 11.
    52 In response, the State devotes much of its briefing to a different argument. In its
    decision on the substantive furlough claim, the state habeas court decided the claim was
    17
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    that the substantive furlough claim had been waived, Rhoades contends that
    those decisions are contradictory: the objection can’t be sufficient for one
    purpose and insufficient for another. If the objection was properly made such
    that counsel was not ineffective, it was sufficient to preserve the issue on
    appeal. In response, the State maintains that the issue of the trial counsel’s
    effectiveness with respect to their lodging an objection to the testimony is
    distinct from the issue of whether the objection was sufficient to preserve any
    alleged error for appeal.
    We agree. If a state court is precluded from reaching the merits of a claim
    by a state-law procedural default, that claim cannot be reviewed in federal
    court. 53 “State procedural bars are not immortal, however; they may expire
    because of later actions by state courts.” 54 The Supreme Court has made clear
    that if the last state court presented with a particular federal claim reaches
    the merits, that decision removes the procedural bar to federal court review. 55
    A procedural default will not bar review of the federal claim on direct or habeas
    review “unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly
    and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” 56 The
    procedurally barred and, in the alternative, meritless. The State contends that the court’s
    decision to address the merits of the furlough testimony challenge in the alternative does not
    displace the procedural default decision. As Rhoades makes clear in his reply, he is not
    making that argument and agrees an alternative merits holding does not negate a procedural
    default holding: “Rhoades’s argument is that the CCA’s holding—not alternative holding—
    on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to properly object to the testimony
    about furlough is the holding that controls the question of whether trial counsel properly
    objected.” Because Rhoades does not contend that the alternative holding by the state habeas
    court displaces the procedural default holding, we do not address the argument here.
    53 Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 
    501 U.S. 797
    , 801 (1991) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 
    433 U.S. 72
    , 87–88 (1977)).
    54 
    Id. 55 Id.
    (citing Harris v. Reed, 
    489 U.S. 255
    , 262 (1989)).
    56 
    Harris, 489 U.S. at 263
    .
    18
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    state court is free to reach the merits in the alternative, however, without
    interfering with the procedural bar. 57
    Here, the last state court to consider Rhoades’s claim on the furlough
    testimony clearly and explicitly held that the claim was procedurally barred. 58
    The state habeas court addressed the merits in the alternative, finding that
    the claim was without merit. The fact that the state court found that trial
    counsel’s objection was sufficient to preclude relief on an entirely separate
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not erase the procedural default on
    the substantive claim about the furlough testimony. The Supreme Court in Ylst
    made clear that procedural default must be considered with respect to each
    specific federal claim: “If the last state court to be presented with a particular
    federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court review
    that might otherwise have been available.” 59 Although the question of whether
    an objection was lodged is relevant to both the ineffective assistance claim and
    the substantive furlough testimony claim, a statement about the objection in
    discussion of one claim does not erase the clear and explicit finding of
    procedural default on the other. 60
    57  
    Harris, 489 U.S. at 264
    n.10 (“Moreover, a state court need not fear reaching the
    merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and
    independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is
    a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the state court also relies on
    federal law.”).
    58 “On direct appeal of the applicant’s conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals held,
    based on the appellate record, that trial counsel’s complaint about Roy Smithy’s testimony
    concerning prison furloughs was not specific, so the complaint was waived. Thus, the
    applicant is procedurally barred from advancing his habeas claims concerning Roy Smithy’s
    testimony about prison furloughs.”
    59 
    Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801
    (emphasis added).
    60 Rhoades also fails to establish “cause and prejudice” for the default. Murray v.
    Carrier, 
    477 U.S. 478
    , 493 (1986). He argues that there is cause because the court reporter
    failed to transcribe the bench conference, faulting either the court reporter or the trial court.
    While Rhoades is correct that external impediments can provide “cause” sufficient to
    overcome a procedural default, that is true only where those impediments cannot be ascribed
    to defense counsel. 
    Murray, 477 U.S. at 488
    . Where counsel was not constitutionally
    19
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    Ordinarily, where the last state court to consider a claim finds that there
    is a procedural bar, we are precluded from review as a federal court sitting in
    habeas. But because the distinction made by the state court between the effect
    of trial counsel’s objection as it relates to the ineffective assistance claim versus
    the substantive furlough testimony claim is admittedly a fine one, and the
    internal consistency of the state court’s findings is debatable, we need not rest
    on the procedural bar, and proceed to consider Rhoades’s substantive
    argument.
    Rhoades contends that the state court’s determination that the
    furlough testimony was not false or misleading was an unreasonable
    determination of the facts. He argues that because there was no possibility that
    an inmate convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison would be
    granted a furlough, Smithy’s testimony was false and misleading. The state
    habeas court found that “Smithy’s testimony . . . was not false or misleading”
    and found “unpersuasive the assertion that [Rhoades’s] jury probably
    considered and speculated as to whether the applicant would receive furlough.”
    To succeed on his claim for habeas relief, Rhoades must show that the
    state court’s decision was based “on an unreasonable determination of the
    facts.” 61 It is not enough to demonstrate that the decision was incorrect, rather
    Rhoades must show that the decision was “objectively unreasonable, a
    ineffective, the Supreme Court has held that it “discern[s] no inequity in requiring [counsel]
    to bear the risk of attorney error that results in procedural default.” 
    Id. Here, no
    external
    impediment or interference made compliance with the state’s contemporaneous objection rule
    impractical. Trial counsel acknowledged in her affidavit that such compliance was not
    impractical and her failure to ensure the recording of the objection was her own error. As the
    CCA reiterated on direct appeal, trial counsel could have rephrased the objection and ensured
    that such objection was made on the record. 
    Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 127
    . Rhoades has not
    shown cause to excuse the procedural default.
    61 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
    20
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    substantially higher threshold.” 62 “[A] state-court factual determination is not
    unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
    different conclusion in the first instance.” 63
    To support his contention that the information about the furlough
    testimony was not truthful, Rhoades relies on Simmons v. South Carolina. 64
    In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that “where [a] defendant’s future
    dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on
    parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the
    defendant is parole ineligible.” 65 Future dangerousness was a focus of both
    sides during the punishment phase of Simmons’s trial—the prosecution argued
    that Simmons was a continuing threat and the defense responded that
    Simmons’s dangerousness was limited to elderly women and he would not be
    violent in a prison setting. 66 To show the jury that Simmons would be confined
    to prison for life, his counsel requested an instruction that state law made
    Simmons parole ineligible. 67 The trial judge refused, even after the jury sent a
    note asking whether a life sentence carried the possibility of parole. 68 The
    Supreme Court held that the defendant’s due process rights were violated. 69
    The refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that Simmons was
    parole ineligible led to the jury’s “grievous misperception” that it was choosing
    62  
    Blue, 665 F.3d at 654
    (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 
    550 U.S. 465
    , 473 (2007)
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    63 Wood v. Allen, 
    558 U.S. 290
    , 302 (2010).
    64 
    512 U.S. 154
    (1994).
    65 Id at 156.
    66 
    Id. at 157.
           67 
    Id. at 158.
           68 
    Id. at 160.
    The trial judge answered the jury’s question by instructing that it was
    “not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching [its] verdict. . . . The terms of life
    imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary
    meaning.” 
    Id. 69 Id.
    at 161.
    21
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    between a death sentence and a limited period of incarceration. 70 By allowing
    the prosecution to “raise[] the specter of petitioner’s future dangerousness . . .
    but then thwart[ing] all efforts by petitioner to demonstrate that, contrary to
    the prosecutor’s intimations, he would never be released on parole,” 71 the trial
    court in Simmons sanctioned a death sentence on the basis of information that
    the defendant “had no opportunity to deny or explain.” 72
    In Rhoades’s case, on the other hand, defense counsel was permitted to
    cross-examine Smithy and solicited testimony that he had “never heard of a
    capital murderer serving a life sentence getting a furlough.” The testimony
    elicited by the prosecution was factually true and Rhoades’s trial counsel had
    an opportunity to “deny or explain” the testimony and show the likelihood of
    Rhoades actually being furloughed to the jury. 73 As the Court reiterated in
    Simmons, “nothing in the Constitution prohibits the prosecution from arguing
    any truthful information relating to parole or other forms of early release.” 74
    Rhoades attempts to analogize Simmons, arguing that the state court’s basis
    for not giving an instruction that the defendant was parole ineligible in that
    case was that no statutory law prohibited an inmate from being furloughed or
    given work release. But the Court expressly noted that while no statute
    70 
    Id. at 162.
           71 
    Id. at 165.
           72 
    Id. at 161
    (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 
    530 U.S. 349
    , 362 (1977)) (“The Due Process
    Clause does not allow the execution of a person ‘on the basis of information which he had no
    opportunity to deny or explain.’”).
    73 
    Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161
    (quoting 
    Gardner, 530 U.S. at 362
    (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    74 
    Id. at 168;
    see also California v. Ramos, 
    463 U.S. 992
    , 994 (1983) (upholding a
    California law requiring trial judges to inform the jury in a capital case that a sentence of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be commuted by the Governor to a
    sentence that includes the possibility of parole). Rhoades attempts to distinguish Ramos by
    arguing that California governors had actually commuted sentences of life without parole,
    whereas Texas had never granted a furlough to someone convicted of capital murder. But
    defense counsel was able to elicit testimony from Smithy that he was not aware of any inmate
    convicted of capital murder receiving a furlough.
    22
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    prohibited “petitioner’s eventual release into society,” “state regulations
    unambiguously prohibit[ed] work-release and virtually all other furloughs for
    inmates who [we]re ineligible for parole.” 75 Here, as the state habeas court
    recognized, Rhoades would have been technically eligible for emergency
    furlough had he received a life sentence. 76
    Finally, Rhoades contends that even if the testimony wasn’t
    impermissible when it was given, it later “became false” which entitles him to
    relief. Rhoades points to an amendment to the furlough statute passed by the
    Texas legislature three years after his sentence which would require that all
    emergency furloughs be supervised. Rhoades relies on Johnson v. Mississippi,
    where the Supreme Court considered a death sentence that was predicated on
    the jury’s finding of an aggravating factor—a prior violent felony conviction—
    where that prior conviction was vacated after his capital trial. 77 In Johnson,
    the jury found an aggravating circumstance that the defendant “was
    previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
    person of another.” 78 After sentencing, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
    his prior felony conviction. 79 Nonetheless, the Mississippi Supreme Court
    75 
    Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167
    n.6.
    76 “The Court finds . . . that temporary furloughs were available to prison inmates and
    capital murderers serving a life sentence.” The state habeas court noted that the one piece of
    testimony given by Smithy that was objectively false was his statement on cross-examination
    that prison wardens decide who is furloughed. The TDCJ administrative directive submitted
    as part of Rhoades’s motion for a new trial makes clear that the State Classification
    Committee, rather than the warden, considered inmates for furloughs. The state habeas
    court found that “this administrative difference does not affect the substance of Smithy’s
    testimony about capital murderers serving life sentences being eligible for furlough and is
    not ‘materially misleading.’” We agree. The identity of the decision-maker is irrelevant to
    Rhoades’s complaint: that Smithy’s testimony allowed the jury to speculate as to whether the
    applicant would receive a furlough and caused them to choose the death penalty.
    77 Johnson v. Mississippi, 
    486 U.S. 578
    , 590 (1988).
    78 
    Id. at 581.
           79 
    Id. at 582.
    23
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    denied Johnson postconviction relief. 80 The Supreme Court reversed, finding
    that the “New York conviction provided no legitimate support for the death
    sentence imposed on petitioner” and that “the use of that conviction in the
    sentencing hearing was prejudicial.” 81 The effect of the New York Court of
    Appeals’ decision was that the New York judgment was not valid at the time
    the Supreme Court considered the case and it “was not valid when it was
    entered in 1963.” Here on the other hand, while the furlough testimony would
    not have been accurate if given after the legislative amendment, it was valid
    at the time it was given and a subsequent change to the statute did not make
    the earlier testimony—based on an earlier version of the law—invalid. A
    change in statute is fundamentally different from an invalidated criminal
    conviction: the criminal conviction was never valid whereas the pre-
    amendment statute was. Johnson does not dictate the relief Rhoades requests.
    IV.
    In his last claim for habeas relief, Rhoades argues that the district court
    erred by failing to conduct a comparative analysis with respect to his Batson
    claim. 82 In his application for a COA, Rhoades challenged the district court’s
    80  
    Id. at 583.
           81  
    Id. at 586.
            82 Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    (1986). There is some confusion in Rhoades’s
    briefing on this point. Although his point heading argues that “[t]he district court abused its
    discretion in failing to conduct the comparative analysis,” Rhoades later contends that “[t]he
    failure of the state court to conduct this sort of comparative analysis was an unreasonable
    application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts, or both, and the
    failure of the court below to conduct comparative analysis was error.” In other words,
    Rhoades seems to argue simultaneously that the state court and district court erred in not
    doing a comparative analysis. In response to the State’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter advising
    this panel of the court’s en banc decision in Chamberlin v. Fisher, 
    885 F.3d 832
    (5th Cir. 2018)
    (en banc), Rhoades submitted a letter purporting to clarify his position. See Apr. 11, 2018
    28(j) response. Rhoades states that while Chamberlin declined to hold that Miller-El v.
    Dretke, 
    545 U.S. 231
    (2005) (“Miller-El II”), required a state court to conduct a comparative
    juror analysis, Rhoades was arguing that it was the district court who failed to conduct a
    comparative analysis and therefore Chamberlin was not controlling. See Apr. 11, 2018 28(j)
    response at 2.
    24
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    substantive determination that the state court was not clearly erroneous in
    finding that there was no Batson violation. In his brief, Rhoades has shifted
    ground—arguing that the error was the district court’s failure to conduct a
    comparative analysis. Although Rhoades does not present any comparative
    argument or explain what he expects a comparative analysis to show, he
    contends that the district court’s failure to conduct such an analysis is itself
    error requiring remand. At oral argument, Rhoades’s counsel acknowledged
    that remand may not be necessary because we could engage in our own
    comparative analysis, referring us to the briefing in the district court.
    At the outset, we note that there is some debate about whether the
    district court actually conducted a comparative analysis. During argument, the
    State suggested that because the district court had a comparative analysis
    briefed before it and concluded that the Batson claim was without merit, that
    was sufficient. 83 In the alternative, the State contends we can resolve this
    question without remanding the case back to the district court after conducting
    our own comparative analysis. We agree. 84 So, despite the parties’
    disagreement over whether the district court was required to do a comparative
    83 In Chamberlin, this court held that a Mississippi state court had conducted a
    comparative juror analysis, finding sufficient the state court’s statement that it conducted a
    “thorough review of the record . . . including the jury questionnaires provided by Chamberlin”
    and had found no evidence of “disparate treatment of the struck jurors.” 
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 839
    (citing Chamberlin v. State, 
    55 So. 3d 1046
    , 1051–52). In other words, the court’s
    statement that it had reviewed the record and did not find disparate treatment of the struck
    jurors, without any comparisons of particular jurors, was sufficient to constitute a
    comparative analysis. 
    Id. (“[R]egardless of
    whether it was required to so, the Mississippi
    Supreme Court did conduct a comparative juror analysis in Chamberlin’s case, albeit in a
    postconviction proceeding instead of on direct appeal.”).
    84 See Fields v. Thaler, 
    588 F.3d 270
    , 276–77 (5th Cir. 2009) (determining that the
    court need not resolve the question of whether the Texas court actually engaged in a
    comparative analysis because the decision of the court that the defendant “had not shown
    disparate treatment with respect to the strikes of [the contested jurors] [was] not
    unreasonable”).
    25
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    analysis after Chamberlin, 85 whether the district court actually performed a
    comparative analysis, 86 and whether Rhoades’s brief was adequate for us to
    consider his comparative analysis claim, the answer here is simpler: Rhoades’s
    proffered comparisons do not lead to his desired result. After review of the voir
    dire record, we find that the state courts’ decision that there was no Batson
    violation in the peremptory strikes of Mr. Randle and Ms. Holiday was not
    unreasonable.
    The Batson analysis proceeds in three steps: (1) a defendant must
    present a prima facie case that the prosecution exercised peremptory
    challenges on the basis of race; 87 (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to
    present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question; 88 and (3)
    85   In Chamberlin, this court held that Miller El II “did not clearly establish any
    requirement that a state court conduct a comparative juror analysis at all, let alone sua
    sponte.” 
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 838
    . Rhoades relies on Reed v. Quarterman, 
    555 F.3d 364
    (5th Cir. 2009) for his contention that “a federal district court must perform a comparative
    analysis.” See Apr. 11, 2018 28(j) response at 2. See 
    Reed, 555 F.3d at 373
    (“We recently
    agreed that Miller-El II requires us to consider a ‘comparative juror analysis’ in a Batson
    claim.”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 
    553 F.3d 768
    , 796 (5th Cir. 2008)).
    86 In its decision, the district court considered Rhoades’s argument that the
    prosecutors had questioned Ms. Holiday differently than other prospective jurors by (1)
    probing her views on the death penalty more deeply and (2) focusing on Ms. Holiday’s
    relationship to someone incarcerated despite the fact that other jurors were related to
    incarcerated people. The district court concluded: “Given the numerous race-neutral reasons
    proffered by the State, Rhoades’ weak showing of disparate questioning, and the absence of
    any meaningful evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court finds that Rhoades has not met
    his AEDPA burden with regard to Ms. Holiday.” Rhoades, 
    2016 WL 8943327
    , at *20. With
    respect to Mr. Randle, the district court considered Rhoades’s argument that other
    veniremembers that had family members with a criminal history had been seated on the jury.
    The district court found that the state courts were not unreasonable in determining that
    there was no Batson violation because (1) no other seated juror had a sibling who was
    incarcerated, (2) the State contended that Mr. Randle had not been forthright in his
    discussion of his brother’s incarceration, and (3) Mr. Randle articulated that he would prefer
    that a defendant have a history of violent acts to justify a finding on the future dangerous
    special issue. 
    Id. 87 Batson,
    476 U.S. at 96–97.
    88 
    Id. at 97–98;
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 838 
    (“At the second step, unless a
    discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered should
    be deemed race-neutral. The proffered explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible
    . . . . The issue is the facial invalidity of the prosecutor’s explanation.” (quoting Williams v.
    26
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    the court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving
    purposeful discrimination. 89 In analyzing whether a prosecution’s use of
    peremptory strikes evinces invidious discrimination, the Supreme Court has
    employed a comparative juror analysis. 90 This court has recently provided a
    framework for such an analysis and has made clear that Miller-El II did not
    establish a requirement that the state court employ a comparative juror
    analysis sua sponte. 91
    A state court’s Batson ruling is a finding of fact “accorded great
    deference” on habeas review. 92 In order to prevail here, Rhoades must show
    that “[the] trial court’s determination of the prosecutor’s neutrality with
    respect to race was objectively unreasonable and has been rebutted by clear
    and convincing evidence to the contrary.” 93 Rhoades challenges the peremptory
    strikes of two jurors: Berniece Holiday and Gregory Randle.
    Ms. Holiday
    In its voir dire questioning, the court asked Ms. Holiday about her job as
    a second grade teacher, the occupation of her three children, her prior service
    as a juror in a burglary case, 94 her relationship with a first cousin who had
    Davis, 674 F. App’x 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks
    omitted))).
    89 
    Id. at 98.
           90 Miller-El 
    II, 545 U.S. at 241
    (“More powerful than these bare statistics, however,
    are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white
    panelists allowed to serve. . . . While we did not develop a comparative juror analysis last
    time, we did note that the prosecution’s reasons for exercising peremptory strikes against
    some black panel members appeared equally on point as to some white jurors who served.
    The details of two panel member comparisons bear this out.” (internal citation omitted)).
    91 
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 838
    .
    92 Hernandez v. New York, 
    500 U.S. 352
    , 364 (1991).
    93 Hoffman v. Cain, 
    752 F.3d 430
    , 448 (5th Cir. 2005).
    94 When asked by the prosecutor whether she participated in deciding the penalty in
    the case, Ms. Holiday responded: “We set him free.”
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    been incarcerated, 95 and her views about capital punishment. 96 The State
    followed up with additional questions about Ms. Holiday’s beliefs on the death
    penalty, probing whether her questionnaire accurately reflected her views and
    what she meant by her statement that she had “mixed emotions” about the
    death penalty. 97 The State then asked Ms. Holiday whether her experience as
    a teacher led her to believe that children with turbulent childhood were “less
    responsible” for conduct as adults, to which Ms. Holiday responded that she
    “believe[d] that is one of the problems.” Ms. Holiday informed the prosecutor
    that her religious beliefs would not keep her from imposing the death penalty.
    Shortly after Rhoades’s trial counsel began questioning Ms. Holiday, the
    prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge.
    Rhoades’s trial counsel then challenged the State’s peremptory strike
    under Batson. Trial counsel argued that Ms. Holiday was the first and only
    black venireperson on that particular panel and that her responses could
    reasonably be read as pro-prosecution. Although the trial court did not find
    that Rhoades had made a prima facie case, the judge asked the prosecutor to
    explain the State’s race-neutral reasons for striking Ms. Holiday “[o]ut of an
    abundance of caution.” 98 The trial court acknowledged that by asking the State
    to provide these reasons, the CCA would proceed in its review as though a
    95  Ms. Holiday stated that she believed he was in prison at that time, but was not
    certain because she was not close to the cousin.
    96 Ms. Holiday noted on her questionnaire that she was strongly in favor of the death
    penalty, but wished it wasn’t necessary. She confirmed that her decision on whether the
    death penalty should be assessed would depend on the facts and circumstances of the
    individual case.
    97 Ms. Holiday confirmed that her beliefs tracked what she had written in the
    questionnaire and that although she had “mixed emotions,” she “follow[s] the rules” and
    believed “that there are some cases if you take a life you should give a life.”
    98 Before the prosecutor gave the state’s reasons, the trial judge made clear that he
    thought “the record [wa]s full of information why [Ms. Holiday] would not be a proper . . .
    juror from the State’s standpoint, having nothing to do with her race.”
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    prima facie case had been made. The prosecutor offered several race-neutral
    reasons for striking Holiday, including:
    (1) she “dozed off a couple of times” during earlier
    proceedings;
    (2) her answers were “too succinct” and gave the impression
    that she was “not being open in her answers”;
    (3) she only answered three of seventeen questions on the
    ninth page of the juror questionnaire;
    (4) she answered certain questions with “a little smile” that
    the prosecutor perceived to mean she was going to say what she
    thought she needed to say;
    (5) she works with children and “is very much aware of the
    effect of broken homes and difficult childhood” and thus might “be
    particularly impressed” by evidence about the defendant’s
    background;
    (6) she had a “real tone of pride” when explaining that, while
    serving on a previous jury for burglary, she “set free” the
    defendant; 99
    (7) one of her daughters had a job that “indicates an interest
    in rehabilitation”; and
    (8)     she     had     a     first   cousin     in    prison.
    Defense counsel responded, noting that numerous people on the panel
    had dozed off during the voir dire, Ms. Holiday was not close to her cousin in
    prison, and that the court had seated others on the jury who indicated they
    agreed with the idea that a troubled childhood could explain later behavior.
    The trial court observed for the record that it had noted three people napping,
    one of whom was Ms. Holiday. It proceeded to find that the State’s reasons for
    striking Ms. Holiday were race neutral. On direct appeal, the CCA affirmed,
    “[u]pon review of the record, this [c]ourt is not left with a definite and firm
    conviction that error was committed. [Rhoades’] showing of purposeful
    discrimination was minimal. The State’s race-neutral explanations were not
    99 The prosecutor described this as the “thing that weighed most heavily” in the state’s
    decision to strike Ms. Holiday.
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    whimsical, . . . and the record does not reflect that the State demonstrated a
    disparate pattern of strikes against any suspect class.” 100
    In his habeas petition before the district court, Rhoades argued that the
    State probed Ms. Holiday’s views on the death penalty in an “uncharacteristic
    manner,” questioning her about her family’s feelings and whether her religious
    beliefs would interfere with her ability to impose a sentence of death. Rhoades
    averred that there was an “extreme difference” in the pattern of questioning.
    Finally, Rhoades contended that the race-neutral explanations for the strike
    were not supported by the record because other seated jurors had a family
    member with a criminal conviction and several indicated that they believed a
    turbulent childhood could explain later behavior.
    Mr. Randle
    With respect to Mr. Randle, the trial court questioned him during voir
    dire about his children, his brother’s criminal record, 101 his television
    preferences, and his views on the death penalty. 102 The State then asked more
    questions about his views on the death penalty, whether he would require a
    motive to convict, his family’s views on the death penalty, 103 his interactions
    with his brother, 104 his views on psychologists and expert witnesses, whether
    a difficult childhood reduces someone’s moral culpability as an adult, and
    100  
    Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 124
    .
    101  Randle indicated that he did not know what his younger brother was arrested for,
    though he had visited him once in prison. Randle explained that his brother “ran away from
    home at an early age,” and he only learned of the criminal case when his brother was already
    incarcerated..
    102 The court summarized Randle’s questionnaire responses, stating “it appears you
    are basically opposed to capital punishment, that you think it’s wrong, you really don’t believe
    in it, but you believe it’s necessary for some crimes.” Randle confirmed, “Right.”
    103 The State also asked if Randle’s “family or anybody who is close to [him], anybody
    who matters to [him], . . . who would disapprove if [he] were on a jury that gave the death
    penalty.” Randle answered no, and stated that he is “used to . . . tak[ing] responsibility for
    himself.”
    104 The State asked Randle “[A]re you going to be thinking about: Gee, that could be
    my brother sitting there? What effect do you think that would have on you?”
    30
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    concerns about future dangerousness. Defense counsel then asked Mr. Randle
    questions about his job as a machinist, whether his emotions would lead him
    to automatically choose the death penalty, his views on expert testimony, and
    his views on the death penalty more generally.
    Defense counsel once again raised a Batson challenge, and the court
    asked the State to provide racially neutral reasons for striking Mr. Randle. The
    prosecutor responded that Mr. Randle “ha[d] a brother in prison at the present
    time,” that he “professed not to know what offenses the brother had been
    convicted or what length of sentence the brother was serving” despite having
    visited him in prison, and expressed concern that this appeared to be “one area
    of inquiry” where Randle was not very honest. The prosecutor also noted that
    Randle “wanted a prior criminal act of violence to persuade him that somebody
    was going to be a continuing threat to society,” which the prosecutor could not
    provide in this case. 105 After defense counsel responded, the trial court found
    that the strike was exercised for racially neutral reasons.
    Again, the CCA affirmed on direct appeal, stating “[g]iven the utter lack
    of any real evidence that the State purposefully discriminated against Randle
    in the record, and the relative strength of the State’s explanations, we are not
    left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed.”
    In his habeas petition, Rhoades contends that the trial court was
    unreasonable in denying his Batson challenge because of the disparate
    questioning of Mr. Randle. Rhoades argues that five other seated jurors had
    been convicted of a crime or had someone close to them convicted but the
    prosecutor asked only Mr. Randle if he would be putting his brother in the
    105The prosecutor also mentioned that Randle “didn’t seem to be too conscientious”
    about paying child support, but stated “[t]hat certainly didn’t rise to the level of the other two
    things [he] mentioned.” The court gave “[no] weight whatsoever to any of the child support
    comments.”
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    place of the defendant when they considered the special issues. Trial counsel
    disputed the prosecutor’s determination of Mr. Randle’s truthfulness and
    pointed to at least two occasions where Mr. Randle confirmed he would answer
    the first special issue based solely on the facts of the capital murder case,
    attempting to refute the prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Randle would require
    prior acts of violence.
    At the outset, both parties acknowledge that the record on appeal is
    incomplete. We do not have a racial breakdown of the entire venire. In terms
    of numbers, here is what the record tells us: of the prosecution’s fourteen
    peremptory strikes, twelve of the individuals were white and two were black;
    at the time Ms. Holiday was struck, the prosecutor noted that of the more than
    64 veniremembers that had been questioned, Ms. Holiday was the first black
    veniremember that the State had peremptorily challenged; 106 the seated jurors
    included ten white individuals and one Hispanic individual; and the race of the
    final seated juror is not clear from the record. In Miller-El II, the Court took
    account of juror comparisons, statistical data, contrasting voir dire questions,
    the prosecutor’s office policy of systematic exclusion of black jurors, and the
    prosecutors’ use of a “jury shuffle.” 107 Here, because of the incomplete record,
    Rhoades can present only limited juror comparison. 108 As the Supreme Court
    106 Again, we do not know the racial composition of the roughly 64 prospective jurors
    who were questioned before Ms. Holiday.
    107 Woodward v. Epps, 
    580 F.3d 318
    (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Miller-El 
    II, 545 U.S. at 261
    –63). A “jury shuffle” is a practice by which either side may reshuffle the cards bearing
    panel members’ names to rearrange the order in which veniremembers are questioned. 
    Id. at 253.
    The Court noted that “the prosecution’s decision to seek a jury shuffle when a
    predominant number of African-Americans were seated in the front of the panel, along with
    its decision to delay a formal objection to the defense’s shuffle until after the new racial
    composition was revealed, raise a suspicion that the State sought to exclude African-
    Americans from the jury.” 
    Id. at 254
    (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    , 346 (2003)
    (Miller-El I) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    108 See e.g., Lewis v. Horn, 
    581 F.3d 92
    , 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Without information about
    the number and racial composition of the entire venire, we cannot calculate the exclusion
    rate and we lack the ‘contextual markers’ to analyze the significance of the strike rate.”).
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    has acknowledged, however, “side-by-side comparisons of some black venire
    panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve” can be “[m]ore
    powerful than . . . bare statistics.” 109 “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for
    striking a panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is
    permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination
    to be considered at Batson’s third step.” 110 In conducting this qualitative
    analysis, we need not “compare jurors that exhibit all of the exact same
    characteristics. If the State asserts that it struck a black juror with a particular
    characteristic, and it also accepted nonblack jurors with that same
    characteristic, this is evidence that the asserted justification was pretext for
    discrimination, even if the two jurors are dissimilar in other respects.” 111 The
    narrow focus in the Batson inquiry is on “the actual, contemporary reasons
    articulated for the prosecutor’s decision to strike a prospective juror” and when
    a prosecutor gives a facially race-neutral rationale for striking a black juror, “a
    reviewing court must ‘assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all
    evidence with a bearing on it.’” 112 Reviewing courts therefore are tasked with
    testing “the veracity” of “timely expressed neutral reasons.” 113 After
    considering Rhoades’s proffered comparisons, we conclude that the state court
    was not unreasonable in rejecting his Batson challenge.
    109 Miller El 
    II, 545 U.S. at 241
    .
    110 
    Id. 111 Reed,
    555 F.3d at 376 (citing Miller-El 
    II, 545 U.S. at 247
    n.6).
    112 
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 841
    (quoting 
    Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 251
    –52). In
    Chamberlin, this court determined that the district court erred in its conclusion that there
    had been a Batson violation where a white venire member who was seated answered three
    questions identically to two black venire members who were struck. 
    Id. at 840.
    The district
    court there did not account for other pro-prosecution responses on the white juror’s
    questionnaire, failing to test the veracity of the race-neutral rationale in light of all evidence
    bearing on it and conflating the assertion of a post-hoc rationale for striking one juror
    (impermissible) with the explanation for keeping another (permissible). 
    Id. at 840–42.
           113 
    Id. 33 Case:
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    Rhoades primary complaint is that Ms. Holiday and Mr. Randle were
    questioned differently than the seated jurors. With respect to Ms. Holiday,
    Rhoades contends that because Ms. Holiday offered no opposition to the death
    penalty in her written questionnaire or during questioning, the prosecutor
    “prodded and probed to find a hidden difficulty or conscientious reservation.”
    Rhoades alleges that the prosecutor questioned her about her family’s beliefs
    on the death penalty and religious beliefs. But as Rhoades acknowledges, the
    State questioned nine of the twelve seated jurors about their friends’ or
    families’ views on the death penalty 114 and two of the seated jurors about the
    teachings of their religious beliefs on the death penalty. 115 Far from evincing
    an “extreme difference” in the pattern of questioning, the prosecutor’s
    questions about the beliefs of Ms. Holiday’s family on the death penalty and
    her religiosity track closely the questions posed to other jurors. The record
    simply belies the notion that Ms. Holiday was subjected to disparate
    questioning. Tasked with testing the veracity of the contemporaneously given
    race-neutral reasons, 116 we note that Rhoades offers no sincere challenge to
    most of the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons, including the rationale
    the prosecutor identified as the “thing that weighed most heavily”—the fact
    114  For example, several seated jurors, including Mr. Harvill, Mr. Garcia, and Ms.
    Wilkinson, were asked whether any members of their families held different views about the
    death penalty, whether anyone close to them would disapprove if they served on a jury that
    gave a death penalty verdict, and whether they would feel any pressure in that regard.
    Similarly, Ms. Holiday was asked whether she had talked with her children about their
    beliefs about the death penalty and if anyone in her family disagreed with her beliefs.
    115 Mr. Garcia was asked whether his Catholicism would prevent him from “being a
    part of a death penalty verdict,” to which he replied “No, I don’t think so.” To Ms. Holiday,
    the prosecutor posed a virtually identical question: “I am always concerned to know whether
    there is anything, any teachings in your church or your religious beliefs that would keep you
    from giving the death penalty?” Ms. Holiday responded “no.”
    116 
    Chamberlin, 885 F.3d at 842
    .
    34
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    that Ms. Holiday described the result of her previous jury service as “setting a
    man free” “with a real tone of pride.” 117
    With respect to Mr. Randle, Rhoades points to five seated jurors who had
    been convicted of a crime or had someone close to them convicted and asserts
    that the prosecutor engaged in disparate questioning because she asked only
    Mr. Randle whether he would put his incarcerated family member in the place
    of the defendant. As the district court recognized, none of the five seated jurors
    Rhoades points to had a sibling who was incarcerated. 118 Instead, of the five
    jurors Rhoades mentions, only three were actually connected to someone who
    served time in prison—and the connections were remote: Ms. Duane had a
    third cousin who was incarcerated when she was a child, 119 Mr. Harville had a
    friend from high school who had gone to prison, 120 and Ms. Wilkinson’s friend
    of her fiancé was incarcerated for a drug offense. 121 A prospective juror’s family
    member’s carceral status has been credited as a race-neutral rationale for a
    peremptory strike and when comparing seated jurors who a defendant argues
    were similarly situated, this court has countenanced distinguishing between
    the crimes of those related to veniremembers. 122 In sum, the state court was
    not unreasonable in rejecting Rhoades’s Batson challenges.
    117 United States v. Thompson, 
    735 F.3d 291
    , 297 n.14 (“This court has routinely
    found demeanor to be a race-neutral justification.”).
    118 Rhoades, 
    2016 WL 8943327
    at *20.
    119 Ms. Duane stated that she had not seen her third cousin since she was
    approximately 12 years old.
    120 Mr. Harville indicated that he did not know what offense his high school friend was
    convicted of. He stated: “I have never spoken to him about it, but it seems like it was some
    kind of an oilfield theft of some kind.”
    121 Ms. Wilkinson stated that she thought her fiancé’s friend had been incarcerated for
    a drug offense but “didn’t even really know him very well.”
    122 United States v. Jimenez, 
    77 F.3d 95
    , 100–01 (5th Cir. 1996) (accepting prosecutor’s
    distinction between a Hispanic juror who was struck due to potential bias against the
    prosecution because a close relative was convicted by federal prosecutors and two seated
    jurors with DWI convictions where those convictions did not involve federal prosecutors).
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    V.
    We conclude that Rhoades is not entitled to habeas relief and the decision
    of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    36