Scott v. Smith ( 2000 )


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  •                             No. 99-60663
    -1-
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-60663
    Summary Calendar
    AMARRIUS SCOTT, a minor by and through his mother and next
    friend, Jimmie Scott,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ELVIN SMITH, individually and in his official capacity; CARDEL
    WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the
    Claiborne County Schools; CLAIBORNE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 5:97-CV-100-BrS
    --------------------
    April 27, 2000
    Before JONES, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Amarrius Scott appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    federal due process claims and the dismissal of his state law
    claims without prejudice.   Scott’s argument that he has a due
    process claim for excess corporal punishment is controlled by our
    decision in Fee v. Herndon, 
    900 F.2d 804
    , 808-09 (5th Cir. 1990).
    We agree with the district court that Mississippi provides
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 99-60663
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    adequate state law remedies such that neither substantive nor
    procedural due process rights are implicated.   See id.; see also
    Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 
    702 F.2d 74
    , 76 (5th Cir.
    1983).   Our decision in Doe v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 
    153 F.3d 211
    (5th Cir. 1998), on which Scott relies, is inapposite.
    Doe did not deal with corporal punishment and due process rights,
    but with allegations of sexual molestation under § 1983 and Title
    IX.   Further, we would be bound by Fee regardless of Doe’s
    holding absent an intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision.
    See Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 
    932 F.2d 458
    , 465 (5th Cir.
    1991).
    We also reject Scott’s claim that the district court abused
    its discretion by dismissing his claims without prejudice rather
    than remanding them.   Scott argues that he will be forced to
    incur additional costs for refiling and will have to have the
    defendants served anew.   He also contends that the statute of
    limitations will be affected by a dismissal.
    Although Scott moved the district court to remand rather
    than dismiss his state law claims, he failed to articulate in the
    district court the specific reasons that he now asserts on
    appeal, nor does he cite to any authority on appeal in support of
    his position.   Thus, we may decline to address this issue.     See
    Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 
    183 F.3d 339
    , 342 (5th Cir.
    1999) (court will not entertain theory raised for first time on
    appeal), cert. denied, -- U.S. –-, 
    120 S. Ct. 982
    (2000); Cinel v.
    Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (failure to brief an
    issue adequately on appeal results in abandonment of that issue).
    No. 99-60663
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    Moreover, Scott has failed to demonstrate that the district court
    abused its wide discretion in dismissing the claims without
    prejudice rather than remanding them.     See Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
    v. Cohill, 
    484 U.S. 343
    , 351-53 (1988).    In addition, Scott’s
    concern regarding the statute of limitations is unfounded.     See
    28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (providing for tolling of state statute of
    limitations during pendency of federal action); Norman v.
    Bucklew, 
    684 So. 2d 1246
    , 1256 (Miss. 1996) (holding that statute
    of limitations is tolled when state claims are brought with
    federal claims and that dismissal without prejudice does not
    affect tolling).
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED.