Lake v. EPA ( 2000 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________
    No. 99-60011
    Summary Calendar
    ____________________
    TOM LAKE,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    GREGG A. COOKE, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 6;
    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Respondents.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Petition for Review of an Action of the
    Regional Administrator, Region 6,
    Environmental Protection Agency
    (33USC1369(b)(1)(d)
    _________________________________________________________________
    August 22, 2000
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Petitioner   Tom   Lake   contests,   pro   se,   the   Environmental
    Protection Agency’s approval, pursuant to § 402(b) of the Clean
    Water Act (CWA), 
    33 U.S.C. § 1342
    (b), of the Texas Pollutant
    Discharge Elimination System (TPDES), administered by the Texas
    Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    A State may apply for EPA approval to implement its own
    permitting program for discharge of pollutants into navigable
    waters within its jurisdiction; the EPA must do so “unless [it]
    determines that adequate authority [to administer the program] does
    not exist”.   CWA § 402(b), 
    33 U.S.C. § 1342
    (b).
    Texas requested approval of TPDES in February 1998. See State
    Program   Requirements;   Application   to   Administer   the   National
    Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program; Texas, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 33,655
     (19 June 1998).   As required by CWA § 402(b), the
    Texas Attorney General submitted a statement that Texas laws
    provide adequate authority to carry out its program, with citations
    to, and descriptions of, that authority.      Id.
    That June, the EPA provided notice of Texas’ application and
    requested public comment.    Id.   Lake was among those commenting.
    He claimed the TNRCC rules, referenced by the Attorney General in
    the application, are invalid under state law because, inter alia:
    TNRCC failed to index the rules to the statutes on which they are
    based; and unconstitutionally promulgated the rules.
    On 27 July 1998, in accordance with its regulations, 
    40 C.F.R. § 123.1
    (e), the EPA held a public hearing in Austin, Texas.        And,
    on 24 September, the EPA Region 6 Administrator signed a notice of
    final action approving TPDES. State Program Requirements; Approval
    of Application to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge
    Elimination System (NPDES) Program; Texas, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 51,164
     (24
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    Sept. 1998).    Responding to Lake’s comments, the EPA stated that,
    because the rules referenced in Texas’ application had not been
    adjudged invalid by a court of law and the Texas Attorney General
    had vouched for their validity, the EPA could rely on the rules as
    meeting the statutory requirements for program approval.              
    Id. at 51188
    .
    Lake asserts the EPA did not provide an adequate explanation
    in rejecting his comments, contending § 402(b) requires the EPA to
    make an     independent    determination   as   to   the   validity   of   the
    statutory and regulatory authority cited by the Texas Attorney
    General, which it neglected to do, for example, by failing to
    discover a relevant state court ruling.              He also maintains the
    EPA’s not including, in its 24 September 1998 published Notice of
    Decision,    information    regarding   procedures     for   appeal   of   the
    decision, does not comport with Congress’ goal of encouraging
    public participation, per 
    33 U.S.C. § 1251
    (e).
    The EPA maintains it did sufficiently explain why it properly
    relied on the Texas Attorney General’s certification: in the
    absence of judicial invalidation of the state laws necessary to
    administer the program, it must defer to the Attorney General’s
    interpretation; and in fact, § 402(b) requires it to approve the
    program. (It also maintains the state court decision referenced by
    Lake did not affect regulations relevant to TPDES.)             EPA further
    asserts that neither the CWA, nor the EPA’s regulations, require it
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    to include notice of the right to judicial review in its final
    notice of program approval; and that, in any event, Lake is deemed
    to have notice of that right because it is in a statute.
    While the parties might appear, on the surface, to disagree as
    to the exact nature of our review, we conclude any difference is
    merely semantical:     Lake and the EPA correctly point to the
    Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2), as the governing
    standard. Pursuant to its deferential standard, we must “set aside
    agency action” which is, inter alia, “arbitrary, capricious, an
    abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”.     
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A); Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 
    161 F.3d 923
    , 933
    (5th Cir. 1998).      “The fundamental precept that permits this
    deferential standard of review is that ‘an agency must cogently
    explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.’”
    Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 
    127 F.3d 365
    , 369 (5th Cir. 1997),
    reh’g & suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, No. 96-60536 (2 Feb.
    1998) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 48, 57 (1983)).
    For starters, we reject Lake’s contention that the EPA’s
    published responses to his comments were legally inadequate.     The
    EPA “cogently explained” that it relied on the Texas Attorney
    General’s certification of authority because that authority had not
    been invalidated by a court of law.    We likewise agree with the EPA
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    that it was not statutorily required to include, in its Notice of
    Decision, information regarding the right to judicial review.
    Lake’s central concern seems to be whether, in the light of
    his comments, the EPA’s review of TPDES was legally adequate.      It
    was.   The EPA was required to defer to, and entitled to rely upon,
    the Attorney General’s interpretation of Texas law, in the absence
    of evidence such law had been ruled unconstitutional or repealed by
    the Texas Legislature.    See American Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA,
    
    137 F.3d 291
    , 294 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Accordingly, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
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