Bolton v. Apfel ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10240
Summary Calendar
RHONDA L. BOLTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:98-CV-829-Y)
November 3, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rhonda L. Bolton appeals the district court’s judgment
affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of disability
benefits. We must determine whether there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the denial and whether the proper legal
standards were used in evaluating the evidence. Villa v. Sullivan,
895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Hollis v. Bowen, 837
F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Bolton claims the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in
rejecting the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Ouseph,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
that Bolton was disabled by her mental condition. See Newton v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing weight
accorded treating physician’s opinion). Although Dr. Ouseph's
formal evaluation indicates she believed Bolton was seriously
impaired, she did not state that Bolton was disabled by her
impairments. Thus, the ALJ did not expressly reject Dr. Ouseph's
opinion.
Bolton also claims her low IQ, coupled with her depression
and/or schizoid personality traits, met the impairments described
in listing 12.05C. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
§ 12.05. Although the medical records reflect that Bolton did
experience a single episode of severe depression, her depression
responded to treatment and had apparently resolved by the time
Bolton was examined by Dr. Greer. See Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d
340, 348 (5th Cir. 1988) (“If an impairment reasonably can be
remedied or controlled by medication or therapy, it cannot serve as
a basis for a finding of disability.”) (citing Lovelace v. Bowen,
813 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Further, because the term "static encephalopathy" was used in
the medical records to refer to Bolton's borderline intellectual
functioning, it did not constitute an additional work-related
limitation of function under listing 12.05C.
Additionally, although Dr. Greer found Bolton had schizoid
personality traits, he concluded that “her condition appear[ed] to
be stable, and her prognosis for continued psychosocial adjustment
fair”. Thus, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Bolton failed
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to show her impairments met the impairments described in listing
12.05C.
Finally, Bolton claims the ALJ did not properly analyze how
Bolton could perform her past relevant work, given her mental and
physical impairments. However, the ALJ did compare Bolton's
remaining functional capacities with the physical and mental
demands of her previous work as a housekeeper in concluding that
she could perform such work. See Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482,
484 (5th Cir. 1994).
Dr. Greer concluded that “[s]ignificant deterioration or
decompensation [were] simply not evident”. In fact, Bolton
conceded she "worked for many years with her very low IQ, and there
is no indication that the IQ has diminished at any time”. Bolton's
ability to pursue gainful employment for many years, despite her
static encephalopathy, provides substantial evidence that her
condition is not disabling. Johnson, 864 F.2d at 347-48.
AFFIRMED
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