United States v. Garcia-Correa ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50493 Document: 00516367426 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/23/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 21-50493 June 23, 2022
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Mario Garcia-Correa,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:20-CR-120-3
Before Davis, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Mario Garcia-Correa appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. He argues
that the magistrate judge’s failure during the rearraignment to (1) personally
explain the exceptions to the plea agreement’s appeal waiver and (2) inform
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50493 Document: 00516367426 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/23/2022
No. 21-50493
him of the right to “appointed” counsel at all stages of the proceedings
violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and rendered his guilty plea
unknowing and involuntary. He further argues that but for the court’s
alleged Rule 11 errors, he would have proceeded to trial.
Garcia-Correa concedes that he did not object on these bases below
and, therefore, that review is for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55, 59 (2002). To show plain error, he must show a forfeited error that
is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v. United
States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes that showing, this court has the
discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. To establish that
his substantial rights were affected by a Rule 11 error, Garcia-Correa must
show that there is a reasonable probability that but for the error, he would not
have pleaded guilty. See United States v. Alvarado-Casas, 715 F.3d 945, 953-
54 (5th Cir. 2013).
For a waiver of appeal to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must
know that he had a right to appeal his sentence, that he was giving up that
right, and the consequences of giving it up. United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d
290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). Rule 11(b)(1)(N) provides that the district court
must instruct the defendant during the plea colloquy regarding the terms of
any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or collaterally attack
the sentence. During the rearraignment, Garcia-Correa acknowledged under
oath that the plea agreement was read and interpreted for him prior to his
signing the document; he accepted and approved of the agreement; he
acknowledged he had the opportunity to review each paragraph in the
agreement with his counsel; and he had no questions. See Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). This record evidence is sufficient to establish
that the appeal waiver was both knowing and voluntary. See United States v.
Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. McKinney, 406
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No. 21-50493
F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). Garcia-Correa therefore has not demonstrated
a clear or obvious Rule 11(b)(1)(N) error. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
Citing this court’s decision in United States v. Mason, 668 F.3d 203,
(5th Cir.), withdrawn and superseded by United States v. Mason, 480 F. App’x
329 (5th Cir. 2012), Garcia-Correa further argues that in contravention of
Rule 11(b)(1)(D), the magistrate judge failed to advise him that he had the
right to representation of “appointed” counsel at each stage of the criminal
proceeding. Garcia-Correa alleges in a conclusional fashion only that his
choice to plead guilty was influenced by an erroneous belief that going to trial
would require him to retain counsel.
Garcia-Correa, however, was appointed trial and appellate counsel on
account of his pauper status. He furthermore acknowledged under oath that
he was voluntarily pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty and that he
was satisfied with appointed counsel’s representation. See Mason, 480
F. App’x at 334. His assertion that he would have otherwise proceeded to
trial is belied by his signed stipulation in the plea agreement that he
“voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly agree[d] . . . that, had the matter
proceeded to trial, the United States would have proven [the factual basis]
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Therefore, he cannot show that any alleged
error in this respect affected his substantial rights. See Alvarado-Casas, 715
F.3d at 953-54.
AFFIRMED.
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