Foster v. Capshaw , 72 F. App'x 192 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 August 20, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-41605
    Summary Calendar
    CAROLYN FOSTER; MURRELL FOSTER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    DONALD W. CAPSHAW, Individually; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    DONALD W. CAPSHAW, Individually; BILL PEEK, Individually;
    BILLY DALE MOYE, Individually; RAYMOND W. JORDAN, Individually;
    VALERIE FARWELL, Individually; BILLY FOX BRANSON, Individually;
    LANNY RAMSEY, Individually; WILLIAM J. CORNELIUS, Individually;
    CAROLINE CRAVEN; Individually; MARGARET J. REEVES, Individually;
    STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
    Defendants-Appellees
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:02-CV-148
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The Fosters appeal the dismissal of their Federal Racketeer
    Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint for
    failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).      They
    first contend that disqualification of the district judge was
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    mandated because he was a member of the State Bar of Texas, a
    defendant.             A district judge, however, does not have a substantial
    interest            in        the   success   of   a    suit   simply     because   of   his
    identification with a defendant bar association.                           See Parrish v.
    Bd. of Comm’rs of Alabama State Bar, 
    524 F.2d 98
    , 104 (5th Cir.
    1975).            The refusal to recuse was therefore not an abuse of
    discretion.               See Trevino v. Johnson, 
    168 F.3d 173
    , 178 (5th Cir.
    1999).
    Furthermore, the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was
    not erroneous.                  To state a RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege,
    inter alia, a “pattern of racketeering activity,” demonstrating
    that at least two predicate acts of racketeering are related and
    pose a threat of continued criminal activity.                           Tel-Phonic Servs.,
    Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 1134
    , 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1992).
    The Fosters complaint alleges only a closed-ended scheme to deprive
    them of their property rights.                         RICO, however, is not concerned
    with short-term criminal conduct.                        
    Id. at 1140
    .     “Predicate acts
    extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future
    criminal conduct do not satisfy [the continuity] requirement.” 
    Id.
    (internal quotations omitted) (quoting H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
    Bell Tel. Co., 
    492 U.S. 229
    , 241 (1989)).
    AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED.
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