Magic Carpet Limousines v. DFW International Airport ( 2003 )

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                                                       United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         August 22, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT             Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-11169
Summary Calendar
MAGIC CARPET LIMOUSINES,
Plaintiff,
EUGENE R. HAFKE,
Appellant,
versus
DFW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; ROBERT L. MCAFEE; THOMAS M. DUNNING;
RON KIRK; KENNETH L. BARR; DAVID DYBALA; JEFFREY P. FEGAN; JIM
CRITES; PAUL TOMME; SANDRA PERKINS; JOHN CORNYN,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:01-CV-997-N
--------------------
Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Eugene R. Hafke appeals the district court's granting of the
defendants' FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) motions for dismissal and the
granting of a summary judgment motion.    In his suit, Hafke, doing
business as Magic Carpet Limousines, alleged various claims,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

, 1983, 1985,

15 U.S.C. § 1

, and state
law, against the defendants.   An examination of the record and
briefs shows that the district court did not err, and we affirm.
Afforded liberal construction, Hafke argues that the
district judge was biased and should have recused himself.    Hafke
has not shown that a reasonable and objective person, knowing all
of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge's
impartiality.   Levitt v. University of Texas at El Paso,

847 F.2d 221

, 226 (5th Cir. 1988).
Hafke failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat the summary judgment motion.     See Little
v. Liquid Air Corp.,

37 F.3d 1069

, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc).
Hafke's

18 U.S.C. § 2724

 and TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 731.005 claims
fail because he has not shown that DFW or the individual
defendants violated the statutes.    Hafke has not shown that John
Cornyn, as the Texas Attorney General, may be liable under the
statutes, or that Cornyn, in his individual capacity, was
personally involved in a constitutional violation.     See

18 U.S.C. § 2725

(2); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 730.003(5); Oliver v. Scott,

276 F.3d 736

, 741 (5th Cir. 2002).   Hafke's

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 claims
fail because Hafke has not shown the deprivation of a federal
right.   See Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635

, 640 (1980); Randolph
v. Cervantes,

130 F.3d 727

, 730 (5th Cir. 1997).     Hafke's

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

 and 1985(2) claims fail because Hafke has not
alleged a conspiracy with a nexus to a proceeding in federal
2
court or that the defendants discriminated against him based on
race or other class-based animus.    See Green v. State Bar of
Texas,

27 F.3d 1083

, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994); Bradt v. Smith,

634 F.2d 796

, 800 (5th Cir. 1981).   Hafke's antitrust claims fail
because Hafke did not allege facts that would support the
elements of the claim.   See Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc.,

964 F.2d 465

, 469 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,

429 U.S. 477

, 488 (1977).
The dismissal of the supplemental state law claims was not
an abuse of discretion because all of the federal claims were
properly dismissed.   See Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral
Products Co.,

906 F.2d 1059