Starks v. Davis ( 2022 )

Case: 21-11154 Document: 00516576449 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/13/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 21-11154 FILED
December 13, 2022
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Wilbert Norwood Starks,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Robert J. Davis, Attorney,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-CV-2771
Before Clement, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Wilbert Norwood Starks, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or, alternatively, as frivolous and the denial of his motion to alter
or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In
both his petition for a writ of mandamus and in the instant appeal, Starks
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.
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No. 21-11154
challenges a Texas state court judgment ordering him to pay sanctions and
fees. Starks contends that the state court that entered the order lacked
jurisdiction, which he argued rendered the order void.
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion.
See Trevino v. City of Fort Worth, 944 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2019). Because
Starks filed his notice of appeal after the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion, the
denial of that motion merged with the underlying judgment such that we may
consider both the denial and the judgment. See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct.
1698, 1703 (2020). We review the dismissal of a suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008).
Further, we review dismissals as frivolous for abuse of discretion. Berry v.
Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In his federal civil action, Starks requested that the district court grant
the petition for a writ of mandamus and overturn the state court’s sanctions
and fees order. His claims concerning the state court order are barred under
the Rooker–Feldman 1 doctrine because they invite the federal district court’s
“review and rejection” of the state court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “If a state trial court errs
the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and corrected by the appropriate
state appellate court.” Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1994). The district court lacked the power to nullify the state court sanctions
and fees order because federal district courts, as courts of original
jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final
orders of state courts. Id.1
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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No. 21-11154
Starks attempts to sidestep Rooker–Feldman by arguing that the state
court judgment was void from the outset. However, the cases that recognize
the voidness exception indicate that it is presently limited to the bankruptcy
context. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003). Further,
Starks’s claims that the sanctions and fees order was void lack merit.
Accordingly, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by
dismissing Starks’s claims as barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and as
frivolous. See Lane, 529 F.3d at 557; Berry, 192 F.3d at 507. Moreover, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Starks’s Rule 59(e)
motion on the same grounds. See Trevino, 944 F.3d at 570.
AFFIRMED.
3