United States v. Pereida , 75 F. App'x 213 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                     August 21, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No. 02-41314 & 02-41321                          Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ANDY PEREIDA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (C-97-CR-224-1 & C-97-CR-289-1)
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Andy Pereida appeals the revocation of his supervised release
    and the forfeiture of his appearance bonds.          Primarily at issue is
    whether the district court properly forfeited those bonds to the
    mothers of Pereida’s children.           The forfeiture is VACATED; the
    remainder   of   the    judgments   is   AFFIRMED;   and   these    cases    are
    REMANDED.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    I.
    In 1998, Pereida pleaded guilty in one case to possession with
    intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C); in a second case, he was convicted by a jury
    of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) & 924(a)(2).       Pereida was sentenced to two
    concurrent 57-month prison terms, followed by three years of
    supervised release.
    Pereida was released in January 2002.        That April, he was
    arrested for reckless driving and his vehicle impounded; during the
    inventory search, a bulletproof vest (body armor) was found in the
    trunk. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Garza, Pereida’s uncle,
    testified that:   the bulletproof vest was his; Pereida borrowed
    Garza’s vehicle and Garza did not want the vest in his vehicle
    while Pereida drove; and, therefore, Garza placed it in the trunk
    of Pereida’s automobile but forgot to remove it.           Contradicting
    Garza’s testimony,    Pereida’s   ex-wife,   Wilburn,    testified   that
    Pereida had bragged to her about owning the vest.
    At the time of the revocation hearing, Pereida was in the
    process of divorcing his wife, Mirna Pereida.     She is the mother of
    two of his children and was expecting a third.          According to the
    separation agreement, Pereida was to pay $1,000 a month in child
    support.   From March through June 2002, Pereida had not done so;
    Mirna Pereida sued in family court and recovered those payments.
    2
    Pereida paid his July support on 18 or 19 July (it was due the
    first of the month).   At the time of the revocation hearing in late
    August and early September 2002, he had paid only $700 of the
    $1,000 August payment and was late on his September payment.
    Pereida also paid child support to Wilburn, the mother of
    another of his children.    He was obligated to pay $300 per month,
    together with $29,000 plus interest for prenatal care. At the time
    of the revocation hearing, he had not paid for the prenatal care.
    Upon Pereida’s mother’s death, he received an annuity yielding
    $1,200 a month.   In May 2002, several months before the revocation
    hearing, Pereida converted the annuity for approximately $152,000.
    (He will receive another lump sum distribution of $652,000 in 2004
    and a final distribution of approximately $1 million.)    That same
    day, he purchased a new automobile for $56,990 from a dealership in
    San Antonio.   (Pereida gave the dealership a check for $67,948 to
    pay for both the new vehicle and the negative equity on the vehicle
    he was trading in.)    Under the terms of his supervised release, he
    was prohibited from traveling to San Antonio; he instructed the
    sales manager to tell whomever called that the new vehicle had been
    delivered to Corpus Christi.       The sales manager did so when
    Pereida’s probation officer called.
    In early June 2002, a police officer stopped at a party at
    Pereida’s residence because it appeared minors were consuming
    alcohol.   Pereida informed the officer he was on parole.       The
    3
    officer asked whether Pereida was allowed to drink alcohol on
    parole and whether he was doing so.    Pereida answered no to both
    questions.    Although Pereida was required to inform his probation
    officer of police questioning within 72 hours, Pereida did not do
    so.
    On 27 June (for cocaine conviction) and 1 July 2002 (for
    felon-in-possession conviction), the Government filed petitions to
    revoke Pereida’s supervised release.     It alleged Pereida:     (1)
    violated Texas Penal Code § 46.041 (felon in possession of body
    armor); (2) failed to truthfully answer his probation officer
    regarding police questioning in May and June; (3) failed to pay
    child support for January through June 2002; and (4) failed to
    notify the probation officer within 72 hours of police questioning.
    At Pereida’s initial appearance on 2 July 2002, the magistrate
    judge ordered him to post a $50,000 appearance bond in each case.
    On Pereida’s motion, the magistrate judge reduced each bond to
    $25,000.     In doing so, the magistrate judge wrote on the order:
    “Bail set at $25,000.00 cash, with electronic monitoring and curfew
    set by Probation.    Confirm payment of all child support”.    United
    States v. Pereida, No. C-97-CR-224 (S.D. Tex. 10 July 2002); United
    States v. Pereida, No. C-97-CR-289 (S.D. Tex. 10 July 2002).
    Pereida executed two cash appearance bonds on 12 July.    They
    did not include language regarding the “confirm payment of all
    4
    child support” term written in the earlier order.            In pertinent
    part, each bond states:
    If the defendant appears as ordered or
    notified and otherwise obeys and performs the
    foregoing conditions of this bond, then this
    bond is to be void, but if the defendant fails
    to obey or perform any of these conditions,*
    [*Any violation of law shall constitute a
    violation of conditions of release] payment of
    the amount of this bond shall be due
    forthwith.
    On 16 July, the magistrate judge signed an order setting
    conditions of release in both cases; Pereida also signed them.
    They included:    “Defendant is to submit confirmation of resolution
    of all child support matters”.
    On 13 August, the district court granted an order assigning
    $25,000 of the appearance bond to Pereida’s attorney.                   On 21
    August, the revocation hearing began.          The court vacated the bond
    assignment and stated it would assign the money to Pereida’s wife
    and former wife because he was late paying his August child
    support.    Pereida was also remanded to custody.         The hearing was
    continued until September.
    When the hearing resumed, the district court ruled that
    Pereida    had   violated   the   supervised    release   terms   for    each
    conviction, as alleged by the Government.           The court also found
    that Pereida traveled to San Antonio without permission and             urged
    the car dealer and his uncle (Garza) to lie.
    5
    The district court revoked Pereida’s supervised release and
    sentenced   him   to    22   months   in     prison   in    each    case,    to   run
    consecutively, followed by 14-months supervised release.                     It also
    ordered the two appearance bonds forfeited to Pereida’s wife and
    former wife:       $40,000    to   Mirna     Pereida;      $10,000   to     Wilburn.
    Defense counsel objected to the forfeiture, contending the court
    did not have authority to order it because Pereida made all his
    appearances.      (Earlier in the proceeding, however, Pereida had
    consented to the allocation of $40,000 to Mirna Pereida.) Judgment
    was entered in both cases on 2 October 2002.
    II.
    Pereida appeals the revocation, sentences, and forfeiture. He
    contends:      (1) he was denied a fair and impartial revocation
    hearing;    (2)   the   evidence      was    insufficient      to    support      the
    revocation; (3) he was unlawfully sentenced; (4) he did not violate
    the purported child support bond condition; (5) the bond forfeiture
    was excessive and should have been set aside; and (6) the court
    lacked authority to assign the bond money to Mirna Pereida and
    Wilburn because the money can only be paid to the United States
    Attorney only on the Government’s motion.
    A.
    The district court ordered Pereida’s bond forfeited because he
    failed to timely pay $300 of his $1,000 August child support to
    Mirna Pereida, failed to timely pay the September payment, and
    6
    failed to reimburse Wilburn $29,000 for prenatal care.     Pereida
    contends:   he did not violate the bond condition; and ordering the
    money forfeited was improper.     An order of bond forfeiture is
    reviewed for arbitrariness or capriciousness.     United States v.
    Parr, 
    594 F.2d 440
    , 443-44 (5th Cir. 1979).
    Although bond forfeiture may be ordered for violations other
    than non-appearance, the terms of the bond are strictly construed.
    United States v. Terrell, 
    983 F.2d 653
    , 655 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
    Brown v. United States, 
    410 F.2d 212
     (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    396 U.S. 932
     (1969)).     Restrictions or conditions not within the
    express language of the standard appearance bond form should be
    recited in its body or, if attached, should be expressly referred
    to.   United States v. Clark, 
    412 F.2d 885
    , 886 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969)
    (citing United States v. Egan, 
    394 F.2d 262
    , 267 (2nd Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    393 U.S. 838
     (1968)).
    Although the order modifying the appearance bonds (signed
    before the bonds) and the conditions of release (signed four days
    after the bonds) contained terms requiring Pereida to confirm
    paying child support, the bonds did not contain such a condition.
    On the other hand, the bonds did contain a term requiring Pereida
    to appear “in accordance with any and all orders and directions
    relating to the defendant’s appearance....”
    In Terrell, the appearance bond contained the same condition.
    Our court concluded that this term integrated conditions of release
    7
    that related to defendant’s appearance.              
    983 F.2d at 655
    .        The
    conditions requiring defendant in Terrell to report weekly to the
    pretrial service officer, stay within a certain geographic area,
    and not possess controlled substances were held to relate to
    defendant’s appearance and were, consequently, bond conditions for
    which forfeiture was appropriate.          
    Id.
     Our court reasoned that all
    of these conditions either made it more likely defendant would
    appear or less likely he would abscond.            
    Id.
    Obviously, unlike the conditions in Terrell, the condition of
    release requiring Pereida to confirm child support payment does not
    relate to his appearance.      This confirmation condition does not
    make it more likely that Pereida will appear, nor does it reduce
    the costs of locating him if he fails to do so.                 Thus, it is not
    integrated as a bond condition through the “orders ... relating to
    appearance” language.       Further, no other language within the
    appearance   bonds      arguably   incorporates          the     child    support
    confirmation condition.      Therefore, the district court erred by
    ordering the bonds forfeited.         (Accordingly, we need not address
    whether the district court erred by declaring the money forfeited
    to Mirna Pereida and Wilburn and not the United States.)
    B.
    Concerning   the    revocation       of   supervised      release,   Pereida
    contends:    (1) he was denied due process; (2) the evidence was
    insufficient; and (3) his sentences were illegal and plainly
    8
    unreasonable.     In district court, Pereida did not object on any of
    these grounds.
    1.
    Pereida contends his due process rights were violated because
    the district court was biased, did not objectively evaluate the
    evidence, put undue emphasis on the child support issue, and
    interrupted     his    counsel    during      cross-examination.      Pereida’s
    failure to object results in this claim being reviewed only for
    plain error.      E.g., United States v. Ayers, 
    946 F.2d 1127
    , 1131
    (5th Cir. 1991).       For such error, there must be a clear and obvious
    error affecting Pereida’s substantial rights; even then, we have
    discretion whether to reverse and, generally, will not do so unless
    that    error   also    impugns    the       fairness,   integrity   or   public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.              
    Id.
    The record does not support Pereida’s contention that the
    district court acted with bias or did not objectively evaluate the
    evidence.       There is no absolute confrontation right during a
    revocation proceeding, United States v. Grandlund, 
    71 F.3d 507
    , 510
    (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
    516 U.S. 1152
     (1996); in any event,
    his counsel was allowed to sufficiently cross-examine witnesses.
    There is no clear or obvious error affecting Pereida’s substantial
    rights.
    9
    2.
    Next,    Pereida     contends     the   evidence      was   insufficient    to
    support finding he violated his supervised release conditions.
    Where   a   defendant     fails   to   object     in     district   court   to   the
    sufficiency of evidence, we review only to determine whether the
    record is devoid of evidence supporting the judgment. E.g., United
    States v. Herrera, 
    313 F.3d 882
    , 885 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
    cert. denied, 
    123 S. Ct. 1375
     (2003).
    The    record   is    not    devoid     of   such    evidence.     Pereida’s
    probation officer testified that Pereida failed to truthfully
    answer questions regarding police questioning during his party or
    report such questioning.           For the body armor violation:                 the
    bulletproof vest was found in Pereida’s car; and his former wife
    testified that he bragged about owning it. Finally, as for failing
    to pay child support, it was shown Pereida:                   was sued by Mirna
    Pereida to collect child support; was consistently late in making
    payments; and had not paid September’s support at the time of the
    revocation hearing.
    3.
    Finally, Pereida asserts his sentence was illegal or plainly
    unreasonable because the aggregate of the consecutive 22-month
    prison terms followed by 14 months of supervised release (58
    months) is greater than the original 36-month term of supervised
    release.     Again, because Pereida failed to object in district
    10
    court, this issue is reviewed only for plain error.                United States
    v. Sias, 
    227 F.3d 244
    , 246 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Concerning     this     issue,   a    court   can    impose    “a     term   of
    imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release, so long as
    the aggregate of these two terms is less than or equal to the
    defendant’s original term of supervised release”. United States v.
    Bewley, 
    227 F.3d 343
    , 344 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted); 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (h)      (when   supervised    release        revoked,    term   of
    imprisonment can be ordered, followed by supervised release term,
    as long as aggregate does not exceed original term of supervised
    release).    A district court, however, has the authority to impose
    consecutive sentences upon the revocation of concurrent terms of
    supervised release.        United States v. Gonzalez, 
    250 F.3d 923
    , 926
    (5th Cir. 2001).        Each consecutive sentence is for 22 months, plus
    14-months supervised release.              This totals 36 months for each
    sentence, which does not exceed the original supervised release
    term of 36 months.        There is no error, let alone plain error.
    III.
    The forfeiture of the two appearance bonds is VACATED; the
    remainder    of   the    judgments    is   AFFIRMED;     and    these     cases   are
    REMANDED to district court for such further proceedings, consistent
    with this opinion, as may be necessary.
    VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED
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