Robinson v. Internal Revenue Service , 77 F. App'x 243 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 7, 2003
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
Summary Calendar
No. 03-60118
_______________________
WILLIE MAE ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Charles Rossotti, Commissioner,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
3:00-CV-643-BN
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Willie Mae Robinson appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) on Robinson’s Title VII race discrimination claim.
Robinson appeals on two grounds: (1) the district court erred in
dismissing the case on summary judgment and (2) the district court
erred when it struck Robinson’s claim for compensatory damages.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Because we find no error in the district court’s judgment, we
AFFIRM.
I. Background
In March 1987, Robinson was hired by the IRS to be a tax
auditor. Starting in 1988, Robinson began receiving poor
performance reports from her supervisor. These poor reviews
continued for the next three years. In 1991, at Robinson’s
request, she was demoted to a clerical position. In this new
position, Robinson’s supervisor was Ron Lively. In 1993, Robinson
filed an internal grievance against Lively contending that he had
not fairly evaluated her. Notably, in this grievance, Robinson did
not allege racial discrimination. As part of the settlement of her
grievance, Robinson took on the duties of the SS-8 coordinator, a
position that had previously been held by a more senior employee.
Robinson received special training to perform the SS-8 coordinator
duties and was also given a temporary promotion.
In March 1995, Robinson received yet another poor
evaluation with scores that all but eliminated the possibility that
she would be promoted to the job she aspired to: revenue agent.
Nonetheless, Robinson applied for a revenue agent position and was
rejected in favor of Don Carter, an outside applicant. Robinson
then filed a complaint with the Department of the Treasury alleging
racial discrimination. After being denied relief internally,
Robinson turned to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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(“EEOC”) and was similarly denied relief. Robinson then initiated
this action in district court. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the IRS.
II. Discussion
Summary Judgment
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. See Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 719 (5th Cir.
2002). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Price, 283
F.3d at 719. Summary judgment must be granted under the Federal
Rules when a party that will bear the burden of proof on an
essential element at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of such an element. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Claims of racial discrimination under Title VII are
evaluated under the burden-shifting framework set forth by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-05 (1973). Under this approach, Robinson must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) she belongs to
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a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position sought;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; (4) the position
remained open and was eventually filled by someone outside the
protected class. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
506 (1993). In this case, the district court found that Robinson
established a prima facie case of discrimination.1 Once Robinson
has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
IRS to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Here, the
district court found that the IRS’s stated reasons for Robinson’s
poor reviews and denial of the revenue agent position - her
inability to complete her work in a timely manner - constituted the
requisite reason for its actions. On appeal, the parties do not
dispute the district court’s finding that the IRS had met its
burden in this regard. Because the IRS has offered a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden shifts back
to Robinson to show that the reasons proffered are a pretext for
unlawful racial discrimination. See Price, 283 F.3d at 720.
This court has repeatedly made clear that on summary
judgment, “the plaintiff must substantiate his claim of pretext
through evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay at the heart
of the employer’s decision.” Id. (citing Rubenstein v. Adm’rs of
1
While there is some disagreement as to Robinson’s
qualifications for the revenue agent position, on appeal the
parties do not dispute the district court’s determination that a
prima facie case had been established.
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the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000)).
However, even where such a showing is made, it will not necessarily
be sufficient to prevent summary judgment if “no rational
factfinder could conclude the action was discriminatory.” See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148
(2000). To determine whether summary judgment was appropriate, we
examine a number of factors, including “the strength of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that
the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that
supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered.”
Id. at 148-49.
In this case, Robinson has completely failed to show that
racial discrimination lay at the heart of her poor performance
reviews or the decision not to hire her for the revenue agent
position. The poor evaluation Robinson received in March 1995 from
Lively was hardly the first time she had been criticized for her
on-the-job performance. Indeed, the subpar reviews that Robinson
received in her prior position were the very reason she requested
a demotion and began working for Lively in 1994. Moreover, early
on during her time working under Lively, Robinson received a poor
review and filed an administrative complaint that did not allege
any form of race-based discrimination. It was only after Robinson
received another poor evaluation and was turned down for the
revenue agent position that Robinson alleged racial discrimination.
As the district court noted, Lively has supervised both black
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and white employees in the past and has given a range of positive
and negative evaluations to his subordinates regardless of their
race. The record below indicates that Lively has only been accused
of racial discrimination once in the past, a claim that was
adjudicated and found to be without merit. The same is true here -
the evidence presented to the district court makes it clear that
Robinson’s substandard performance reviews were not the result of
racial discrimination but were the product of a poor work ethic.
Robinson’s claim that she was denied a promotion as a
result of racial discrimination also fails. Robinson has offered
no evidence that she would have been promoted even if she had
received a positive review from Lively, nor has she offered
evidence that she was clearly better qualified for the revenue
agent position than the person selected. This is particularly
important given Robinson’s voluntary downgrade from a position less
complex than that of a revenue agent. Thus, Robinson has failed to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to her claim of racial
discrimination and the district court’s grant of summary judgment
was proper.2
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
2
Robinson also claims that the district court erred when it
struck her claim for compensatory damages for failing to exhaust
her administrative remedies. We do not reach this issue in view of
the affirmance of summary judgment against Robinson.
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