United States v. Buchanan ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 23, 2003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
_____________________
No. 03-40136
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HAROLD ROGER BUCHANAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(1:01-CR-228-1)
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Before JOLLY AND WIENER, Circuit Judges, and WALTER*, District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Defendant-Appellant Harold Buchanan appeals the district
court’s ruling that evidence seized by the police in his home was
admissible. Buchanan argues, on appeal, that although the police
were acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, the fact that they
failed to knock on his door and announce their presence, then wait
a sufficient amount of time before entering, renders the search
*
District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting
by designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
unconstitutional. Because of the circumstances surrounding this
search —— the apparent efforts of the police to make their presence
known before entering, and the ability of the police to see the
interior of the house and see the occupants therein through the
entranceway —— we conclude that the search was legal and the
evidence seized properly admitted at trial.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In August 2001 city police officers executed a search warrant
at Buchanan’s home in Beaumont, Texas. None question that the
officers were acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, which
authorized the officers to search Mr. Buchanan’s home for
narcotics. Although no drugs were discovered, police did find two
firearms, which Buchanan admitted belonged to him. Because
Buchanan is a felon, his possession of those guns violated 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to
suppress that evidence, Buchanan pleaded guilty to a one-count
indictment charging him with a violation of § 922(g)(1), although
he expressly reserved his right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of the guns.
Buchanan contends that the warrant at issue did not allow for a
“no-knock” entry, so that the actions of the police do not fall
within the limits of acceptability set by the Supreme Court for
executing a search warrant at an occupied residence.
II. Analysis
2
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a decision whether to suppress evidence, we
review conclusions of law de novo,1 assessing the contested
evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in
the district court.2
B. The Knock-and-Announce Requirement
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court stated that “in some
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”3 Buchanan contends that
because these officers did not actually knock on his door and were
not refused entry, but rather, in his words, “simply burst into the
residence,” their actions were unreasonable under the standard laid
down in Wilson as we have since interpreted it. A review of the
record demonstrates, however, that the circumstances surrounding
the police entry into Buchanan’s home render his argument
untenable.
While advancing up the walk leading to Mr. Buchanan’s front
door, the police noticed that the inner wooden door was open and
the outer screen door was closed but transparent. Because the
screen door had a see-through upper half, it was reasonable for the
officers to believe that the individuals whom they saw inside the
1
See United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1998).
2
See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir.
1994).
3
514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
3
residence could likewise see them as they lined up on the walkway
in formation to execute the warrant. Testimony at the suppression
hearing reflected that when the officers advanced toward the home
(or immediately before starting) in close proximity to the door,
the police “point man” yelled “Beaumont Police, Search Warrant.”
Approximately five seconds elapsed between this announcement and
the officers’ entry into the home. Additional evidence adduced at
the hearing indicated that the police who executed this warrant
were wearing bulletproof vests with three-inch day-glow lettering
on the fronts (and four-inch lettering on the backs) reading
“police.” The officers also wore black shirts under their vests
with “police” written in white on each sleeve. Finally, there was
testimony that, through the front door, the officers could see
individuals inside the home moving about, apparently after they
realized that the officers were approaching to enter. The police
did not use force to enter the home; instead, they simply opened
the screen door and walked in past the open wooden door.
Under these discrete circumstances, we are convinced that the
police actions were reasonable. Wilson itself explains that the
knock-and-announce requirement is not “rigid,” that “not...every
entry must be preceded by an announcement,” and that “law
enforcement interests” should be considered in the reasonableness
calculation.4 In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
4
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934-36.
4
reaffirmed these principles and gave specific examples of
situations in which an unannounced entry might be reasonable:
In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must
have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presence, under the particular circumstances, would
be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example,
allowing the destruction of evidence.5
We expressly embraced these principles in United States v. Cantu.6
Inasmuch as (1) the police announced their presence as they
approached the home, (2) the persons inside appeared to notice,
through the screen door, the arrival of the police, and (3) the
officers could see movement inside the home after those inside
appeared to notice them, the police had a legitimate, reasonable
concern for the preservation of evidence. And, the officers’
clothing itself made clear that they were police.
We do not apply the knock-and-announce rule in a rote fashion;
its purpose is to allow residents of a home an opportunity to
respond to and cooperate with the police presence in lieu of having
to face an unexpected and threatening intrusion. The facts in this
case make clear that the police afforded Buchanan that opportunity,
albeit under a factual variation necessitated by the circumstances
encountered by the officers at the scene. We will not require the
meaningless formalism of a knock and an additional delay under
these circumstances.
5
520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)(emphasis added).
6
230 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2000).
5
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court
denying Buchanan’s suppression motion is
AFFIRMED.
6