Joseph-Jack v. Barnhart , 80 F. App'x 317 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 22, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30277
Summary Calendar
ETTA F. JOSEPH-JACK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 02-CV-88
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Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Etta F. Joseph-Jack appeals from the district court’s order
affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s (the Commissioner’s)
denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). She argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred
in determining at Step Four of the sequential evaluation process
that she could perform past relevant work.
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
determining whether substantial evidence in the record supports
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-30277
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the decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standards. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th
Cir. 1994).
We reject Joseph-Jack’s contention that the ALJ failed
to consider her other alleged impairments in combination with
her fibromyalgia in determining whether she had the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to return to past relevant work. Our
review of the record reveals that the ALJ indeed addressed these
alleged impairments in determining her RFC.
We further reject Joseph-Jack’s contention that the ALJ was
unfair and impartial; she has not demonstrated that she was
deprived her right to a fair hearing. See Helena Labs. Corp. v.
NLRB, 557 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1977).
We further hold that it was not error for the ALJ to use
the orthopedic consultative examiner’s report in support of
the disability determination and, moreover, that Joseph-Jack has
shown no prejudice resulting from the fact that the consultative
examination was not performed by a rheumatologist. See Brock v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 1996).
Insofar as Joseph-Jack argues that the ALJ’s credibility
assessment was not supported by the medical evidence, she points
this court to no evidence in the record to support her
contention. Moreover, her contention that the ALJ failed to link
his credibility finding to substantial evidence is refuted by the
record; the ALJ cited to the benign findings of the medical
No. 03-30277
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reports, the absence of hospitalizations or any other treatment
for her alleged chronic pain, negative and/or inconclusive
objective clinical studies, and physical exams which demonstrated
no outward signs of limitations or strength deficits. The ALJ’s
credibility determinations were indeed linked to substantial
evidence. See Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th
Cir. 2001).
We also reject Joseph-Jack’s argument that because the
record was devoid of a residual function capacity (RFC)
assessment by a medical source, the ALJ was not competent to
assess her RFC. It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine a
claimant’s RFC, and such an assessment is not a medical opinion.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.946, 416.927(e).
Joseph-Jack’s argument that it was inappropriate for the ALJ
to consider the opinion of a vocational expert (VE) at Step Four
of the sequential evaluation process is also rejected; we have
never held as such and have condoned the use of a VE to supply
information about the claimant's past work. See, e.g., Shave v.
Apfel, 238 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 2001); Leggett v. Chater, 67
F.3d 558, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1995).
Finally, Joseph-Jack’s contention that the ALJ abdicated his
fact finding and evaluating duties to the VE is wholly
unsupported by the hearing testimony and the thoroughness of his
written determination.
AFFIRMED.