Houser v. Wathen , 80 F. App'x 363 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                November 12, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-10235
    Summary Calendar
    BRUCE WAYNE HOUSER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    RICHARD E. WATHEN; WILLIAM L. BOND; JOSEPH C. BOYLE;
    HOWARD W. ISAACS; CATHERINE M. MILLORENES;
    DOUGLAS J. WILKINSON; SUSAN SCHUMACHER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    (7:01-CV-222-R)
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Wayne Houser, Texas prisoner number
    460890, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights
    suit as frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
    Houser argues that the district court erred in determining that his
    claims were frivolous and in dismissing his suit without giving him
    notice that it intended to do so.   We review such dismissals for
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    abuse of discretion.       See Martin v. Scott, 
    156 F.3d 578
    , 580 (5th
    Cir. 1998).
    Houser contends that the district court erred in dismissing
    his conspiracy claim.           Houser did not, however, allege that the
    purported conspiracy against him was motivated by improper bias, or
    that he was a member of a protected class.                 See Holdiness v.
    Stroud, 
    808 F.2d 417
    , 424 (5th Cir. 1987).              Even if he had made
    such    an   allegation,        his    conclusional   assertions    would     be
    insufficient to set forth a viable claim.                  See Brinkmann v.
    Johnston, 
    793 F.2d 111
    , 113 (5th Cir. 1986).           Houser has not shown
    that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
    this claim was frivolous.
    Houser likewise has not shown that the district court abused
    its discretion in dismissing his claim of denial of access to
    courts on the ground that he did not allege that he suffered any
    specific prejudice as a result of the defendants’ alleged improper
    acts. See Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 349-51 (1996); Henthorn v.
    Swinson, 
    955 F.2d 351
    , 354 (5th Cir. 1992).           Houser has waived the
    issue whether the district court erred in determining that his
    retaliation claim was untimely by failing to brief it.              See Yohey
    v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    The   district    court    properly    determined   that    Houser   was
    required     to   show   that    his   disciplinary   convictions    had    been
    overturned before he challenged both the convictions and the
    resulting punishments in a civil rights action.              See Edwards v.
    2
    Balisok, 
    520 U.S. 641
    , 646-48 (1997).          To the extent that Houser is
    attempting to raise an Eighth Amendment claim for the first time in
    this   appeal,   we   decline   to    consider    it.      See      Leverette          v.
    Louisville Ladder Co., 
    183 F.3d 339
    , 342 (5th Cir. 1999).                       Houser
    has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
    dismissing his claims challenging his disciplinary convictions and
    the resulting punishments.           Because Houser has not briefed the
    issue whether the district court erred in determining that his
    claim related to the disciplinary charge that did not result in
    conviction was time-barred, this issue is waived.                 See Yohey, 
    985 F.2d at 224-25
    .
    Houser has not shown that the district court abused its
    discretion in dismissing his claim that the defendants improperly
    seized his personal property.              Texas law provides an adequate
    remedy for claims of wrongful deprivation of property, so that
    claim is not cognizable in this action.          See Parratt v. Taylor, 
    451 U.S. 527
    , 541-44 (1981), overruled in part not relevant here,
    Daniels v. Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
     (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 533 (1984); Cathey v. Guenther, 
    47 F.3d 162
    , 164 (5th
    Cir. 1995).
    Finally, Houser has not shown that the district court abused
    its discretion in dismissing his myriad other claims. Accordingly,
    the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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