Glover v. Barnhart , 81 F. App'x 513 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 2, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-20469
Summary Calendar
DORRIS N. GLOVER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-01-CV-3843
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Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dorris N. Glover appeals the district court’s summary judgment
affirming the Commissioner’s decision to deny her applications for
a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income pursuant to the Social Security Act.
Glover argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) relied on
defective hypothetical questions in denying her disability benefits
and that consequently the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence; that the ALJ failed to properly consider her
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
subjective complaints of pain; and that the ALJ abused her
discretion in denying Glover’s request for a medical expert to
testify at the hearing.
Contrary to Glover’s contentions, the hypothetical questions
posed to the vocational expert (VE) by the ALJ were not defective,
as the questions reasonably incorporated all of the disabilities
recognized by the ALJ. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th
Cir. 1994). Glover’s counsel was also given the opportunity to
suggest to the VE additional disabilities, including Glover’s pain
and the side effects of her pain medication, not recognized by the
ALJ’s findings. Id.Although Glover contends that the ALJ’s findings based on the
hypothetical questions were not sufficiently supported, record
evidence adequately supports the disabilities recognized by the
ALJ, see id., and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that Glover’s limitations were not totally disabling. See Johnson
v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). The ALJ considered
all of the evidence presented at the administrative hearing. The
ALJ determined that although Glover had severe impairments, she was
still capable of performing substantial gainful activity. These
findings are supported by the medical records Glover submitted in
support of her applications. See Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343-44.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s determination regarding the disabling nature
of Glover’s pain is entitled to considerable deference. Chambliss
v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001). In light of this
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standard, and considering the lack of objective medical evidence
corroborating Glover’s subjective complaints of pain, we must
uphold the ALJ’s conclusion that Glover’s alleged pain was not
sufficient enough to prevent substantial gainful employment. See
id.; Johnson, 864 F.2d at 347.
Finally, although Glover contends that the ALJ abused her
discretion in denying her request for a medical expert to testify
at her hearing, Glover points to no evidence that, had the ALJ
allowed a medical expert to testify, would have been adduced at the
hearing and that could have changed the result of the proceeding.
Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996). Because
Glover fails to show that she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s denial of
her request for a medical expert, her argument that the ALJ abused
her discretion is without merit. See id.Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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