National Brand Licensing, Inc. v. Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. , 89 F. App'x 863 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit                       January 14, 2004
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-10313
    Summary Calendar
    NATIONAL BRAND LICENSING, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
    VERSUS
    WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING CO., Etc; ET AL,
    Defendants,
    WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING CO., A Delaware Corp.,
    Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    (02-CV-663)
    Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Defendant-Appellant,     Williamson–Dickie     Manufacturing,       Co.,
    Inc. (“WD”)    brings   this   appeal   of   a   district   court   decision
    granting summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee, National Brand
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    Licensing, Inc. (“NBL”). WD contends that the district court erred
    in granting summary judgment to NBL, holding that a contract
    between the parties requires it to make royalty payments to NBL.
    Because the district court properly granted NBL summary judgment,
    we affirm its decision.
    NBL is owned and run by Gene and Miriam Summ.               It solicits,
    negotiates,    structures,      and   markets    licenses   of    intellectual
    property on behalf of its clients.               WD manufactures and sells
    workplace apparel, including the Dickie brand.                   In 1980, the
    parties entered into an agreement (“Agreement”) whereby NBL would
    be the exclusive agent of WD for the purpose of selling licenses to
    use the Dickie Brand to third persons.            NBL would receive 15% of
    the proceeds that WD obtained from these licenses.
    In 1998, WD terminated the Agreement pursuant to a non-renewal
    provision contained in the Agreement, but continued to pay NBL
    royalties for licenses that NBL procured while the Agreement was in
    force.     In 2002, WD stopped all payment of royalties to NBL,
    claiming    that   the    Agreement   no   longer   obligated     it   to   make
    payments. NBL brought this suit seeking a declaration that the
    Agreement     obligates    WD   to    continue    royalty   payments.         WD
    counterclaimed for reimbursement of royalty payments made between
    1998 and 2002.     Both parties moved for summary judgment, claiming
    that their interpretation of the Agreement was correct.                     The
    district court granted NBL’s motion for summary judgment, holding
    that the Agreement obligated WD to make royalty payments and WD
    2
    brings this appeal.
    We review the legal determinations in the district court’s
    decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo.    See Travelers
    Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., 
    7 F.3d 1203
    , 1206 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Contract interpretation is a purely legal issue; accordingly, we
    review the district court’s interpretation of a contract de novo.
    See Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Brantley Trucking, Inc., 
    220 F.3d 679
    , 681 (5th Cir. 2000).     We interpret this contract under
    Texas law, which states that an unambiguous contract shall be
    enforced as written, and that a contract is only ambiguous if it is
    reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.       See Lopez v.
    Munoz, Hockema & Reed, 
    22 S.W.3d 857
    , 861 (Tex. 2000).
    Although the Agreement may be unclear in some instances, it is
    not ambiguous in any material sense.    The Agreement provides that
    either party may elect to terminate the Agreement by giving the
    other party notice in writing of such termination 90 days prior to
    the expiration of the Agreement.     The Agreement further provides
    that in the event of its termination by this method, the 15% of the
    proceeds of each existing license provided to WD by NBL shall
    continue to be paid during the life of each license.   The Agreement
    also provides that upon either (1) the termination of all licenses
    and renewals thereof according to their terms, or (2) the cessation
    of being “actively engaged in the business,” as defined by the
    Agreement, by both Gene Summ and Miriam Summ, the Agreement shall
    3
    automatically terminate and be of no further effect.   Because it is
    undisputed that the Agreement was terminated because WD elected to
    do so by giving NBL 90 days notice prior to the expiration of its
    term, and not by the operation of either of the other termination
    provisions, WD continued to be obligated to make payments of the
    assignments of license proceeds to NBL during the life of each
    relevant license and renewal thereof.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-10313

Citation Numbers: 89 F. App'x 863

Judges: Barksdale, Garza, Dennis

Filed Date: 1/14/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024