Bonner v. St Martin Parish School Board , 93 F. App'x 612 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 10, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30837
Summary Calendar
_____________________
RALPH BONNER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
versus
ST MARTIN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant/Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division
District Court Cause No. 02-CV-2052
_________________________________________________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
PRADO, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from an employment discrimination
lawsuit. In his complaint, Appellant Ralph Bonner (Bonner)
asserted that his employer, Appellee St. Martin Parish School
Board (the school board), failed to promote him twice, as
principal of a junior high and high school, because of his race.
In response to Bonner’s complaint, the school board moved for
summary judgment. After considering the motion, the district
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
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court determined that Bonner had failed to present evidence that
raised a genuine question of material fact about whether the
school board’s stated reasons for not promoting him was a pretext
for racial discrimination and granted the motion. Bonner
challenges the summary judgment in this appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s summary judgment
decision de novo. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246
F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Consequently, this Court will
uphold a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of
material fact. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c).
In deciding whether a question of material fact exists, a
court must view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Daniels,
246 F.3d at 502. A genuine issue of material fact exists if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Mason v. United Air Lines, Inc., 274
F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears the burden
of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact. “To satisfy this burden, the moving party may either
submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some
material element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or, if
the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear
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the burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the
evidentiary documents in the record contain insufficient proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or
defense.” Lavespere v. Niagra Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910
F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 325 (1986). On the other hand, if the alleged fact in
issue is one for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proof, the movant may merely point out that the evidentiary
documents in the record contain insufficient proof of an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. Once the
moving party has proven no genuine issue of material fact exists,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that summary
judgment is not appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Burden Shifting in an Employment Discrimination Case
In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden and must first establish a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,
530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). To meet this burden, the plaintiff
must show: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was
qualified to do the job, (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action, and (4) others outside the protected group were treated
more favorably than he was. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). That Bonner met this burden is
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not disputed in this appeal.
If the plaintiff meets his initial burden and establishes a
prima case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to
produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
the treatment of the plaintiff. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
This burden is one of production, not persuasion, and involves no
credibility assessment. See id. If the defendant-employer meets
its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
reason for the disparate treatment is pretextual. See id. at
143.
To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must present
documentary evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact
about whether the employer’s reason for the employment action.
See Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 42 (5th Cir.
1996). In proving pretext, the plaintiff retains the burden of
persuading the fact-finder. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). It is not enough for the
plaintiff to show that the defendant-employer’s stated reason was
false. The plaintiff must show that discrimination was the
actual reason for disparate treatment. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516-517 (1993). The actual reason,
however, may be inferred to be discrimination by the falsity of
the employer’s explanation. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Thus,
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a genuine fact issue may be raised and summary judgment may
therefore be defeated by the plaintiff’s prima facie case
combined with sufficient evidence to indicate that the employer’s
asserted justification is false. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142;
Vadie v. Miss. St. Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2000).
Whether Summary Judgment Was Appropriate
In the instant case, Bonner asserts that the district court
erred in granting the school board’s motion for summary judgment.
In particular, Bonner complains that the district court erred by
failing to assess the sufficiency of the school board’s evidence
of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting him. The school
board’s burden, however, is not a burden of persuasion. See
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Instead the school district’s burden is
one of production, and thus, and involves no credibility
assessment. See id. at 142. Because the school board presented
evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Bonner,
it met its burden. Thus, the only remaining question is whether
Bonner presented evidence that raises a question of fact about
whether the school district’s reason was a pretext for racial
discrimination.
The school board articulated several reasons why other
applicants were hired as principal instead of Bonner. One reason
advanced by the school board was that Bonner had no prior
association with the applicable schools. Although Bonner relies
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on evidence of his success as an elementary school principal, and
statistics intended to depict disparity in the numbers of African
American principals compared to Caucasian principals, he has not
raised a question of fact about whether the absence of prior
association with the schools was a pretext for racial
discrimination.
The summary judgment evidence indicates that the two
applicants who received the jobs Bonner sought had more
experience in similar settings. Michael Kraemer, who received
the principalship at St. Martinville High School, not only taught
in that high school for fifteen years, but at the time served as
assistant principal of another 5-A high school. Allen Blanchard,
who received the principalship of Cecilia Junior High School,
previously taught in that particular school, was known and
respected by the faculty, and was at the time the school’s
assistant principal.
The school district also maintained that Bonner was not the
best qualified applicant for the jobs. The school district
presented evidence of disciplinary problems at the elementary
school Bonner supervised, and that Bonner had outside business
and professional interests which could prevent him from devoting
all of his time to performing his duties. In particular, the
evidence indicates Bonner served as pastor for a church 70 miles
out of town, and Bonner held positions with administrative duties
at a local college. These factors could legitimately affect a
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school board’s decision when choosing the principal of a large
high school with numerous evening and weekend activites. Bonner,
however, failed to present any evidence that indicates this
reason for not promoting him was a pretext for racial
discrimination.
Although the statistics Bonner presented show that the
school board had hired more Caucasian principals than African
American principals, and Bonner’s evaluations show that he was
proficient at performing his past jobs, this evidence does not
raise a question of fact about whether the school board’s reasons
for not promoting Bonner were a pretext for discrimination. To
survive summary judgment, Bonner was required to show that the
proffered reasons are either false or not worthy of credence, and
that a discriminatory reason was more likely the true reason.
But Bonner did not meet this burden. Bonner has not shown that
he was a better qualified applicant, or that the reasons given by
the school board, such as support from the applicable school
faculties and lack of outside responsibilities, were pretexts for
racial discrimination. While the statistics may show more
Caucasians were hired in the past, the evidence also indicates
that some of the positions did not even have an African American
applicant. Because Bonner failed to raise a question of fact
about whether the school board’s reasons for not promoting him to
the positions he sought, the district court properly entered
summary judgment in favor of the school board. For that reason,
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this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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