United States v. Perez-Cruz , 93 F. App'x 672 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 5, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-41769
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SERGIO PEREZ-CRUZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-02-CR-1028-2
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sergio Perez-Cruz (Perez) appeals his jury-trial conviction
for possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute, more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana. Perez argues that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing certain opinion testimony by law
enforcement agents. He further argues that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his convictions.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-41769
-2-
Contrary to Perez’s contentions, the law enforcement agents
who testified at his trial did not offer improper opinions
regarding his knowledge of the marijuana. Agents Garza, Medina,
and Hacking offered their analyses of the evidence found in
Perez’s case in the light of their special knowledge as experts
in narcotics trafficking. See United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d
605, 610 (5th Cir. 1994). Because the agents offered
explanations of the facts at trial, rather than forbidden
opinions regarding Perez’s guilty knowledge, see United States v.
Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003), the district court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing the testimony.
In asserting that the evidence was insufficient, Perez
challenges the guilty-knowledge elements of the crimes of
conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government and giving the Government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences, there is sufficient evidence from which
the jury could infer that Perez knew that marijuana was in the
Market Street residence and that he knowingly participated in a
drug-trafficking conspiracy. See United States v. Inocencio, 40
F.3d 716, 724 (5th Cir. 1994). The evidence at trial established
that the Market Street house was being used to store and package
marijuana for distribution. Perez had access to the residence,
as shown by his knowledge of the combination to the lock on the
front gate and his ability to open it. The jury could also
No. 02-41769
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reasonably infer that Perez had previously been inside the
residence based on his ability to open the lock. The cellophane
and grease Perez purchased with Arevalo were being used to
package the marijuana, as indicated by the “black bundle of
cellophane containing marijuana” found by Officer Hernandez.
Although Perez asserts that he did not know marijuana was in
the house and that he was not part of a conspiracy, the jury
could reasonably infer guilty knowledge and willing participation
in a conspiracy based on the circumstances as a whole. See
United States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1989). Because
“a reasonable trier of fact could [have] f[ou]nd that the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” Perez’s
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails. See United States v.
Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc).
Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.