Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft ( 2004 )


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  •                                                           United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS             May 25, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-60435
    Summary Calendar
    LAURA ESTHER GONZALEZ-HERNANDEZ;
    JULIAN MONCADA-GONZALEZ,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    --------------------
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A78-129-987
    BIA No. A78-129-988
    --------------------
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Laura     Esther   Gonzalez-Hernandez    and   her     minor      son,
    Juliana Moncada, both natives of Colombia, have filed a petition
    for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of their
    petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture.
    Gonzalez argues that the IJ employed the wrong legal standard
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    and improperly weighed the evidence in determining that Gonzalez
    was not subject to persecution by the Autodefensas Unidas de
    Colombia (AUC) based on Gonzalez’s political opinion.
    Gonzalez was required to show that the persecutor’s actions
    were motivated by Gonzalez’s political opinion. Ontunez-Tursios v.
    Ashcroft, 
    303 F.3d 341
    , 350-51 (5th Cir. 2002).   Gonzalez has not
    shown by direct or circumstantial evidence that the AUC possessed
    information which indicated that Gonzalez held any particular
    political opinion.    The mere fact that the AUC believed that
    Gonzalez called the police to arrest some of their members was not
    sufficient evidence to show that the AUC believed that Gonzalez’s
    call was politically motivated.     Gonzalez did not provide any
    evidence that she had made a political position known to the AUC
    members at any time or other evidence to show that the AUC could
    have imputed a political opinion to her.      Cf. Briones v. INS,
    
    175 F.3d 727
    , 729 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)(an adverse political
    opinion was attributed by the army to the petitioner who was
    actively involved in a fiercely ideological dispute between the
    Philippine government and the army).
    Gonzalez argues for the first time in her reply to the
    Government’s motion for a summary dismissal that she was persecuted
    because she was a member of a particular social group consisting of
    all persons who oppose the AUC.     This court will not consider
    issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.    Cavallini v.
    State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
    44 F.3d 256
    , 260 n.9 (5th Cir.
    2
    1995).    In any event, Gonzalez has not shown that she was a member
    of a group of persons who shared a common characteristic that they
    either cannot change or should not be required to change because it
    is fundamental to their identities or consciences.                    Ontunez-
    
    Tursios, 303 F.3d at 352-53
    .
    Gonzalez’s remaining arguments concern the IJ’s erroneous
    factfindings and misapplication of the correct standard of proof in
    determining whether she had been persecuted and whether it was more
    likely than not that she would suffer persecution if she returns to
    Colombia.     Because Gonzalez has failed to show that any such
    persecution   was    the   result   of   her   political    opinion    or    her
    participation in a political group, she has not shown that she was
    a refugee entitled to asylum.       See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).          Thus,
    it is unnecessary to determine whether the IJ’s determination that
    there was not a reasonable possibility that Gonzalez would be
    subject to persecution if she returns to Colombia was supported by
    substantial evidence.
    To    receive   withholding    of   deportation,      “the   alien     must
    demonstrate a clear probability of persecution on one of the
    enumerated grounds.”       Jukic v. INS, 
    40 F.3d 747
    , 749 (5th Cir.
    1994).     Since Gonzalez failed to show a clear probability of
    persecution based on her political opinion or her participation in
    a social group, she is not entitled to withholding of deportation.
    Gonzalez has not argued in her brief that she is entitled
    to relief under the CAT.      Therefore, this issue is abandoned.            See
    3
    Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    The petition for review is DENIED.         Respondent Ashcroft’s
    motion    to   summarily   deny   the    petition   is   DENIED   as   moot.
    Respondent Ashcroft’s motion to waive the requirement to file a
    brief is GRANTED, and his motion to for an extension of time to
    file a brief is DENIED as unnecessary.        Ashcroft’s motion to file
    an out-of-time reply to the response is GRANTED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-60435

Judges: Smith, Demoss, Stewart

Filed Date: 5/25/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024