Beganovic v. Ashcroft ( 2004 )


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  •                                                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit                 August 5, 2004
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No. 03-60185                         Clerk
    ERNAD BEGANOVIC; SAFETA BEGANOVIC; JASMIN BEGANOVIC
    Petitioners,
    VERSUS
    JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Respondent.
    Petition For Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (A76 433 107)
    Before BENAVIDES, STEWART and DENNIS Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Petitioner Ernad Beganovic, his wife Safeta, and his son
    Yasmin challenge the Board of Immigration’s (“BIA”) affirmance of
    the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum. After carefully
    reviewing the record, we deny the petition for review.
    I.       Background
    In August 1997, the Beganovics, Albanians from Kosovo,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    Serbia-Montenegro, entered the United States on visitors’ visas.
    Six months later, the INS served them notice to appear charging
    them as eligible for deportation for overstaying their visas.   The
    Beganovics then filed an asylum application.
    In the asylum application, Ernad claimed that he was subject
    to both past and future persecution due to his participation in
    political activities with the Democratic Action Party (“PDA”), and
    Democratic League of Kosovo (“LDK”). Ernad alleged mistreatment or
    harassment by the Serbian police on five separate occasions because
    of his political affiliation with those groups.       In sum, the
    allegations of fact in the asylum application are as follows:
    A.   First Incident
    In October 1991, in his hometown of Pec, Ernad joined the SDA,
    a secular party that advocated for the right of Albanians in Kosovo
    as well as other Muslims throughout then-Yugoslavia.        A month
    later, a Serbian police officer arrested Ernad while Ernad was
    hanging posters with some friends.    The officer confiscated the
    posters and took Ernad and his friends to the police station for
    questioning.   The young men were roughly treated by the police and
    Ernad claims that he was beaten for roughly half an hour.   When the
    officers were finished asking questions, Ernad asked for the return
    of his posters.   In response, an officer punched Ernad in the face
    and stomach and threatened worse if he caught Ernad again.
    2
    B.    Second Incident
    In April 1992, Serbian police officers stepped up their
    harassment of party members and arrested SDA’s regional president,
    Balic.     Balic was jailed for two days and was allegedly beaten.         In
    response to Balic’s arrest and the increasing police harassment of
    party members, the SDA was disbanded and Balic fled the country.
    C.    Third Incident
    In 1994, after marrying Safeta and fathering Yasmin, Ernad
    joined LDK.       He worked frequently for the party and became a
    editorial writer for its newsletter.        In the middle of the night on
    February 3, 1996, Beganovic heard pounding on the door by three men
    he suspected were police officers though the men wore no uniform.
    When Ernad opened the door, one of the men, who was armed, attacked
    him and began to beat him.      The man put his foot on Ernad to hold
    him down and at times dropped to his knee to punch Ernad in the
    face.      The other two men ransacked the apartment, yelling, “Where
    are your guns?       Where are your friends?          Where’s your damned
    paper?”      One of the men threatened to throw Safeta and Yasmin off
    of   the    apartment’s   balcony   if   she   and   Yasmin   did   not   quit
    screaming.     After beating Ernad sufficiently enough to leave welts
    and bruises on his body and destroying most of the Beganovics’
    possessions in the apartment, the men left.
    D.    Fourth Incident
    3
    In June of 1996, four uniformed officers came to Ernad’s
    apartment   and   took   him   to   the   police   station.   The   police
    questioned Ernad about LDK and its officers.           When Ernad did not
    give the officers any specific information, he was taken into a
    dark room and beaten until he was unconscious.        Ernad awoke and was
    questioned a second time.      After Ernad refused to sign a piece of
    paper upon which he could not see what was written, Ernad was again
    taken into the dark room and beaten until unconscious. Ernad awoke
    near his apartment door on the 11th floor, but could not recall how
    he got there.     He knocked on the door and his wife Safeta helped
    him inside.   The Beganovics then abandoned their home to live with
    Ernad’s parents who lived nearby.
    E. Fifth Incident
    Seven months later, in January 1997, while Ernad was out with
    a friend, the police came looking for him at his parents’ home.
    His wife testified that the officers had a menacing tone and when
    informed that Ernad wasn’t there, said “We’ll find him.”             After
    this incident, the Beganovics moved to Novi Sad, and in August
    1997, they fled to the United States.
    F.   The Hearing and the IJ’s decision
    At the two-day asylum hearing before the IJ, the Beganovics
    had five people testify in support of the asylum petition.           They
    4
    were: (1) Ernad; (2) Safeta; (3) Professor Reinhartz, a history
    professor at University of Texas-Arlington; (4) Benin Sucheere, one
    of Safeta’s cousins, and (5) Dennis Mala, an acquaintance of
    Ernad’s from Kosovo.    After the hearing, the IJ concluded that the
    Beganovics had not carried their burden of persuasion on their
    asylum petition because the testimony of Ernad and Safeta regarding
    past persecution was incredible. The IJ made an alternative ruling
    that even if he had found the Beganovics’ testimony credible, the
    five incidents of harassment Ernad suffered did not rise to the
    level of persecution.      Finally, the IJ concluded that because of
    changed country conditions in Kosovo, even if the five incidents of
    harassment   constituted    persecution,   the   Beganovics   failed    to
    establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.      Accordingly,
    the IJ denied all relief, except that he granted the Beganovics’
    request for voluntary departure.
    The Beganovics appealed the IJ’s findings to the BIA.             The
    Beganovics also asked to supplement the record with additional
    material regarding conditions within the country as well as some
    specific documentary evidence of medical treatment Ernad received
    as a result of the June 1996 incident and that Ernad was still
    wanted by the Serbian police. The BIA summarily denied all relief,
    primarily relying on the adverse credibility determinations made by
    the IJ.   The BIA also denied the motion to supplement the record
    because the additional materials would not have affected the
    5
    outcome of the case.     The Beganovics timely filed a petition for
    review with this court challenging both the denial of asylum and
    the BIA’s refusal to grant the Beganovics’ motion to supplement the
    administrative record.
    II.   Analysis
    “Any alien who is present in the United States or who arrives
    in the United States,...irrespective of such alien’s status, may
    apply for asylum.”    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(1).   “The Attorney General
    may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum...if the
    Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee....”    
    Id.
    at § 1158(b)(1).     The term “refugee” includes “any person who is
    outside of any country of such person’s nationality...and who is
    unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
    of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
    persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
    in a particular social group, or political opinion.”       Id. at §
    1101(a)(42)(A). “The applicant may qualify as a refugee because he
    or she has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a
    well-founded fear of future persecution.” See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    .
    It is the alien who bears the burden of proof to show that he is a
    “refugee” in order to be eligible for a grant of asylum.      See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    .
    In reviewing BIA decisions, we review factual findings for
    6
    substantial evidence and questions of law de novo.                         Lopez-Gomez v.
    Ashcroft, 
    263 F.3d 442
    , 44 (5th Cir. 2001).                             “The substantial
    evidence       standard    requires       only    that       the   BIA’s      decision    be
    supported by record evidence and be substantially reasonable.”
    Omagah v. Ashcroft, 
    288 F.3d 254
    , 258 (5th Cir. 2002).                               We will
    “accord    deference       to    the    BIA’s    interpretation          of    immigration
    statutes unless the record reveals compelling evidence that the
    BIA’s interpretation is incorrect.”                Mikhael v. INS, 
    115 F.3d 299
    ,
    302 (5th Cir. 1997).            “In other words, [an alien] must show that
    the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
    conclude       against    it.”    See     Efe,    293    F.3d      at    905;    
    8 U.S.C. §1252
    (b)(4)(B)(“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive
    unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
    the contrary.”).          This court only reviews decisions made by the
    BIA.     See Castillo-Rodriguez v. INS, 
    929 F.2d 181
    , 183 (5th Cir.
    1991).     Because the BIA summarily adopted the IJ’s findings and
    conclusions       in     this    case,    we     refer       to    those      findings    as
    incorporated by the BIA decision.                Efe, 293 F.3d at 903.
    The primary basis for the IJ’s denial of the Beganovics’
    asylum petition is that he did not find the Beganovics credible and
    thus did not find that they carried their burden in proving past
    persecution.      This adverse credibility determination is based on a
    number    of    inconsistencies          that    the    IJ    observed        between    the
    7
    petitioners’     pre-hearing        asylum       statement,        Ernad’s      hearing
    testimony, Safeta’s hearing testimony, and the Beganovic’s failure
    to present documentary evidence in support of their asylum claim.
    It is clear that we give great deference to an immigration
    judge’s decisions concerning an alien’s credibility.                     Chun v. INS,
    
    40 F.3d 76
    , 78 (5th Cir. 1994).           In addition, the immigration judge
    has the duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to make
    findings accordingly.        Vasquez-Mondragon v. INS, 
    560 F.2d 1225
    ,
    1226 (5th Cir. 1977).         Furthermore, this court is simply “not
    permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the Board or the
    [Judge] with respect to the credibility of this testimony or the
    ultimate findings of fact based thereon.” See 
    id. at 1226
     (internal
    citation omitted).
    But the IJ may not completely insulate his findings from our
    review simply by stating that a petitioner is not credible. See
    Anderson v. Bessmer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 575 (citing Wainwright v.
    Witt, 
    469 U.S. 412
     (1985)).         We agree with other circuits that the
    IJ must provide cogent reasons for his credibility determination,
    see, e.g., Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 
    40 F.3d 482
    , 487 (1st Cir. 1994);
    Alvarado-Carillo      v.   INS,     
    251 F.3d 44
    ,    56    (2d   Cir.    2001);
    Balasubramanrim v. INS, 
    143 F.3d 157
    , 161 (3d Cir. 1998); Mansour
    v. INS, 
    230 F.3d 902
    , 906-09 (7th Cir. 2000); Zahedi v. INS, 
    222 F.3d 1157
    ,   1165   (9th   Cir.    2000),          and   those   reasons      must   be
    8
    supported by substantial evidence in the record much like any
    factual determination. See Lopez De Jesus v. INS, 
    312 F.3d 155
    ,161
    (5th Cir. 2002)(“a credibility determination may not be overturned
    unless the record compels it.”)
    Our review of the IJ’s reasons and the record in this case,
    however, does not compel us to reverse the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination.   Ernad’s testimony before the IJ was inconsistent
    with the first and second incidents of persecution he alleged in
    his asylum petition.    For example, in the first incident, the
    asylum petition states that Ernad was beaten for a period of 30
    minutes during police questioning. But his testimony before the IJ
    alleges only that he was punched in the stomach once after the end
    of questioning and only when he asked the police for the posters
    back. Similarly, the second incident of alleged persecution in the
    asylum petition makes no mention of Ernad being questioned and
    released by the Serbian police as he testified before the IJ.
    Instead, the petition only details the arrest of the SDA’s regional
    president, Balic.
    Further, as the IJ noted, the testimony of Ernad and Safeta
    with regard to the fourth incident in June of 1996 is inconsistent.
    Ernad never testified that he was hospitalized or that he went to
    the hospital for outpatient treatment as a result of the police
    beating.   Conversely, Safeta testified first that Ernad was taken
    9
    by an ambulance to the hospital “for a day or so.”                             Safeta next
    testified that Ernad had not gone to the hospital until hours
    later, was released the same day, and that he had been initially
    treated    by    an   emergency       ambulance        crew.        In    light      of   the
    inconsistencies, the shifting nature of Safeta’s account of who was
    present at the apartment when the ambulance arrived, and the
    absence of any reference to an ambulance or hospital visit in the
    rather detailed asylum petition submitted on the Beganovics’s
    behalf, we cannot conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility
    determination       in   this    case   was      not   supported         by    substantial
    evidence.       A reasonable judge could view these inconsistencies as
    evidence of falsity.            See United States v. Jencks, 
    353 U.S. 657
    ,
    667 (1957)(“Flat contradiction between the witness’ testimony and
    the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test
    of inconsistency.        The omission from the reports of facts related
    at trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a
    different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-
    examining process of testing the credibility of a witness’ trial
    testimony.”).
    Moreover,        the   IJ    stated        that    his    adverse         credibility
    determination was also bolstered by his “observing the respondent
    closely”    while     Ernad     was   testifying        and    by   the       lack   of   any
    documentation directly in support of Ernad’s political activities
    10
    or his troubles with the Serbian police.       While the Beganovics were
    not required to provide documentary corroboration of the alleged
    incidents     of    persecution,       the    immigration     regulations
    “unambiguously contemplate cases where an applicant’s testimony
    alone will not satisfy his burden of proof.”       See Sidhu v. INS, 
    220 F.3d 1085
    , 1090 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a)).
    Though we agree that Ernad initially testified why documentation
    was not available, i.e. the danger of keeping political articles
    and party membership cards coupled with the difficulty of getting
    information from Serbian officials, that initial testimony was
    undercut by his later testimony in which he stated that civil
    unrest prevented him from providing any documentary corroboration.
    Ultimately, we cannot find a compelling reason in the record
    to reverse the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and the IJ’s
    concomitant determination that the Beganovics had not carried their
    burden of proving past persecution necessary to warrant a grant of
    asylum.     Accordingly,   we   need   not   consider   whether   the   IJ’s
    alternative rulings withstand our scrutiny.             The petition for
    review is DENIED.
    PETITION DENIED
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