Rock-Tenn Co. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers International Union , 108 F. App'x 905 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 3, 2004
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
NO. 03-11062
_______________________
ROCK-TENN COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
versus
PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL, CHEMICAL AND
ENERGY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO, CLC AND LOCAL UNION NO. 4-0895,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:02-CV-2582-L
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers
International Union (“Union”) appeals the district court’s decision
vacating an arbitrator’s ruling that Appellant Rock-Tenn improperly
subcontracted its long-haul trucking work in violation of the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Rock-Tenn is a paper manufacturing company that operates
a mill in Dallas, Texas. The company uses truck drivers to deliver
its paper products to customers and distribution centers throughout
the United States, relying both on employees and subcontractors for
these deliveries. The company categorizes these deliveries
according to their distance: trips of less than 100 miles are
“short-haul” routes, while trips of more than 100 miles are “long-
haul” routes. Historically, the company has employed relatively
few drivers, and subcontractors have carried the bulk of the
delivery loads. The precise percentage of loads carried by
subcontractors has varied over the years, ranging from 66 percent,
when Rock-Tenn employed six or seven truck drivers, to 90 percent,
when Rock-Tenn employed only one or two drivers.
In late 2001, Rock-Tenn decided to subcontract all of its
long-haul deliveries in an effort to save money. Because company
drivers earn extra compensation for long-haul routes, Rock-Tenn’s
decision reduced the pay of the company’s six drivers, but the
company did not terminate any employees. The drivers filed
grievances against the company, and the case eventually proceeded
to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union,
concluding that although Rock-Tenn had the right to subcontract its
shipping operations, its rights were not unfettered. The arbi-
trator ordered Rock-Tenn to “restore the ‘status quo’” and assign
long-haul routes to company truck drivers “at the same level as
2
before they were discontinued” — specifically, “to the maximum
extent allowed by Department of Transportation regulations.”
Rock-Tenn appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the
district court. The court ultimately concluded that the arbitrator
had exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain language of the
CBA and imposing restrictions on Rock-Tenn’s rights to subcontract
not contained in the CBA. The Union appealed.
The district court rejected the conclusions of both the
arbitrator and the magistrate judge and granted summary judgment in
favor of Rock-Tenn. We review the district court’s grant de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court.1 Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.2
Judicial review of arbitration awards arising from the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement is extremely limited.
We must affirm the arbitration award “as long as the arbitrator is
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority.”3 If the arbitrator has not exceeded
his authority, “the fact that a court is convinced he committed
1
Weber Aircraft Inc. v. Gen. Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767,
253 F.3d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 2001).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d
455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).
3
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38
(1987).
3
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”4 We may
not overrule the arbitrator’s award simply because we interpret the
contract differently, even if we are convinced he committed serious
error.5 “It is only when the arbitrator strays from interpretation
and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his
own brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be
unenforceable.”6 We have held that when an arbitrator ignores the
express language of a CBA, he has exceeded his authority and the
arbitration award must be vacated.7
The district court concluded that the arbitrator’s
decision conflicted with the express language of the CBA.
Article III of the CBA provides: “Nothing in this Agreement shall
limit in anyway [sic] the Company’s subcontracting work or shall
require the Company to perform any particular work in this plant
rather than elsewhere.” The district court concluded that this
provision by its plain terms gives Rock-Tenn an unlimited right to
subcontract work and that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
imposing a limitation on this right.
4
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001).
5
Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494
(5th Cir. 2003).
6
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001) (quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
7
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local
Union No. 66, 71 F.3d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If the language of the agreement
is clear and unequivocal, an arbitrator is not free to change its meaning.”).
4
We agree. By its terms, Article III reserves to
management the right to subcontract work. Indeed, the arbitrator
himself recognized this, noting that Article III by its literal
terms allows Rock-Tenn to subcontract without explicit limitation.
Nonetheless, the arbitrator pointed to the commentary of other
arbitrators to justify his decision to depart from the clear
language of the CBA. As we have noted in the past, “[a]rbitral
action contrary to express contractual provisions will not be
respected.”8 Given that the language of the CBA is clear and
express, the arbitrator was without authority to ignore its terms
to pursue his “own brand of industrial justice.”9
This conclusion is reinforced by the CBA’s arbitration
provisions. Article XV, Section 5 of the CBA specifies that
[t]he jurisdiction and authority of the impartial arbiter
and his opinion and award, shall be confined to the
interpretation of the provision or provisions of this
Agreement at issue between the Company and the Union.
The impartial arbiter shall have no authority to add to,
detract from, alter, amend, or modify any provision of
this Agreement or impose on any party hereto a limitation
or obligation not explicitly provided for in this
Agreement.
The arbitrator, however, violated this instruction by imposing on
Rock-Tenn a clear and distinct limitation on its ability to
subcontract: the arbitrator ordered Rock-Tenn not simply to use
8
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial
Ass’n, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1989).
9
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
5
company drivers for some long-haul routes, but to use them to the
maximum extent allowed by Department of Transportation regulations.
In so ruling, the arbitrator wrote into the CBA a new provision
limiting the ability of the company to subcontract its trucking
routes or to vary the extent to which it relies on subcontractors
for shipping purposes. The CBA nowhere imposes such a limitation,
and indeed Rock-Tenn’s past practices — relying on subcontractors
to fulfill anywhere from 66 percent to 90 percent of the shipping
needs — indicate that no such obligation has ever been contem-
plated. The arbitrator exceeded the authority delegated to him
under the CBA by imposing a limitation on Rock-Tenn’s sub-
contracting ability.10
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
10
A different case would undoubtedly be presented if, as a result of
subcontracting, the company had laid off workers, but we do not speculate on it
here.
6