United States v. Harrison , 108 F. App'x 987 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the United States Court of Appeals
September 23, 2004
For the Fifth Circuit
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_________________________ Clerk
No. 03-40160
Summary Calendar
_________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON,
also known as Wayne Green,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:99-CR-2-1
_________________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Henry Harrison appeals his conviction and sentence for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He argues
that 1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence, 2) the indictment was insufficient and the evidence
introduced at trial was insufficient, 3) the district court lacked
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
jurisdiction, 4) the district court abused its discretion in
ordering that he be committed for a mental competency evaluation
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, 5) the district court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for a speedy trial
violation, 6) the district court erred in denying his post-
conviction motions, and 7) the sentence was erroneous.
The district court did not err in denying Harrison’s motion to
suppress evidence. The vehicle in which Harrison was a passenger
was stopped after he was observed riding without a seat belt in
violation of state law, and the scope and duration of the stop were
reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it.
Furthermore, the search of the vehicle that ultimately revealed the
presence of illegal drugs was made pursuant to the arresting
officer’s receipt of Harrison’s voluntary consent.1
Harrison’s indictment was sufficient. It alleged each
essential element of both conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) so as to enable Harrison to prepare his
defense and invoke the double jeopardy clause in any subsequent
proceeding.2 The indictment conformed, at the very least, to
1
See United States v. Brigham, No. 02-40719, 2004 WL 1854552at *4-*6 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-40719)(en banc); United States v.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435-39 (5th Cir. 1993).
2
See United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 373 (5th Cir.
1999).
2
minimal constitutional standards.
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
Harrison’s convictions on both counts of the indictment. The
prosecution presented Harrison’s own statement that he had agreed
to drive a car from Philadelphia to Houston and back in exchange
for a large sum of money. In addition, the jury could infer
Harrison’s involvement in a conspiracy based upon the substantial
circumstantial evidence of his participation therein presented at
trial.3 Furthermore, the verdict was supported by evidence as to
the amount of drugs found in Harrison’s possession, and his
knowledge of the presence of drugs in his vehicle. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.4
Harrison’s arguments that the district court lacked
jurisdiction are frivolous.5 Likewise, his contentions that the
3
United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[A]n agreement may be inferred from a concert of action,
voluntary participation may be inferred from a collocation of
circumstances, and knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances.”).
4
See United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir.
2000); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction, exclusive of the Courts of the
States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”);
United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1994)
(argument that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed in sovereign state of Texas is frivolous).
3
district court abused its discretion in ordering that he be
committed for further mental evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d) are without merit.6
The district court did not err in denying Harrison’s motion to
dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The Act
provides that a defendant must be tried within 70 days from the
filing of indictment or date he appears, whichever occurs last.7
However, the Act excludes from this 70-day period any period of
delay resulting from, inter alia, examinations to determine the
mental competency of the defendant.8 Harrison was indicted on
January 5, 1999. Beginning on January 7, 1999, Harrison underwent
multiple evaluations in an effort to establish his competency to
stand trial. He was finally adjudicated competent on April 16,
2002, and was tried on June 3, 2002. By properly excluding the
lengthy period during which Harrison was subject to mental
competency evaluations, the district court correctly found that the
70-day requirement of the Speedy Trial Act was satisfied.
Harrison’s contention that the district court erred in denying
his numerous post-conviction motions is likewise without merit.
Harrison’s arguments on this score are largely cumulative, with the
6
See United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir.
1983) (“[I]t is clear that an order for a second psychiatric
examination is a matter wholly within the discretion of the trial
court.”).
7
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
8
Id. § 3161(h)(1)(A).
4
exception of his claim that the drugs seized from his vehicle
should not have been admitted at trial because the government
failed to produce chain of custody documentation. On this count,
Harrison has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in admitting this evidence, or any
resulting impairment of his substantial rights.9
Finally, the district court properly applied the United States
Sentencing Guidelines in formulating Harrison’s sentence. The
court did not err in finding that Harrison willfully obstructed
justice by feigning incompetence in order to avoid trial.10 In
addition, the court correctly included three criminal history
points in Harrison’s score for his 1981 conviction for criminal
possession of a forged instrument when the resulting incarceration
extended into the fifteen year period preceding the instant
offense.
In addition to raising the seven points of error discussed
above, Harrison has filed a motion to file a reply brief in excess
pages, arguing that he needs an additional space to fully address
9
See United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 1997)
(a break in the chain of custody affects the weight of the evidence
rather than the admissibility of the evidence); United States v.
Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court’s
evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and
reversed only if a party’s substantial rights are affected).
10
See United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 1998)
(feigning incompetency may constitute waste of judicial resources
and obstruction of justice for purpose of two-level increase in
offense level under sentencing guidelines).
5
sentencing issues raised by Blakely v. Washington.11 Because this
court has held that Blakely does not apply to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines,12 Harrison’s motion to file a reply brief in
excess pages is DENIED AS UNNECESSARY. Finally, Harrison has filed
a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for
release pending appeal. This motion is DENIED.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and
appellant’s motions are DENIED.
11
124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
12
United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004).
6