Rahim v. Dretke , 125 F. App'x 530 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 23, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 04-10331 Clerk
Summary Calendar
ABDEL MOHAMAD RAHIM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:01-CV-817-R
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Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant Abdel Mohamad Rahim appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his
1996 conviction for capital murder. Rahim contends that the
district court erred when it denied him an evidentiary hearing and
presumed the state habeas judge’s factual findings to be correct.
Rahim has not shown that the district court erred in applying the
presumption of correctness. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941,
949-51 (5th Cir. 2001). As the district court properly applied
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
a presumption of correctness to the state habeas judge’s factual
findings, Rahim has failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. Murphy v.
Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 815 (5th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Johnson,
139 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1998).
Rahim also contends that the state habeas judge’s factual
findings were an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented. Rahim has failed to show that the
district court erred in concluding that the state habeas judge’s
factual findings based on his credibility determinations were
reasonable in light of the evidence presented.
Last, Rahim argues that the state appellate court’s
determination that the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s
confession was harmless error was an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Rahim has failed to
show that the district court erred in concluding that the state
appellate court’s analysis of the evidence and application of the
Supreme Court’s harmless error standard was objectively reasonable.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Moreover, the
admission of the confession did not have a substantial and
injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The judgment of the district
court is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
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