United States v. Risby , 170 F. App'x 354 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                     March 15, 2006
    _______________________               Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-10704
    consolidated with
    No. 02-10975 and
    No. 02-11364
    _______________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WILLIAM MORRIS RISBY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:00-CR-442-1-R
    _________________________________________________________________
    ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This   court    affirmed   the   judgment   of   conviction     and
    sentence of William Morris Risby.         United States v. Risby, No. 02-
    11364 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2004).           The Supreme Court vacated and
    remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
    Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005).         See Risby v. United States, 125 S.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Ct. 1872 (2005).    We requested and received supplemental letter
    briefs addressing the impact of Booker.
    At the district court and in his original appeal to this
    court, Risby objected to the district court’s enhancements, arguing
    that the enhancements were not supported by sufficient evidence.
    To preserve Booker error, a defendant need not explicitly cite
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    (2000),
    Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.296, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004), or the
    Sixth Amendment.    See United States v. Akpan, 
    407 F.3d 360
    , 376
    (5th Cir. 2005).   However, he must “adequately apprise[] the court
    that he was raising a constitutional error.”      United States v.
    Olis, slip. op. at 8 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005).    The argument must
    be couched in terms that the facts used to enhance the sentence
    were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.     See 
    Akpan, 407 F.3d at 376
    ,   377 (finding that one defendant, who had objected
    on reasonable doubt grounds, had preserved Booker error, but
    finding that the other, who did not “couch his arguments ... in the
    same terms,” did not preserve Booker error); United States v.
    Bringier, 
    405 F.3d 310
    , 315 (concluding that the defendant had not
    preserved his Booker objection even though he objected at trial
    that the evidence did not support an enhancement because the court
    did not “consider his arguments below in the ‘essence’ of Blakely
    and the Sixth Amendment”).
    2
    Here, Risby’s objections did not apprise the district
    court that he was raising a constitutional claim of error.                      He
    objected   that   the   enhancements       were   not   supported   by   even    a
    preponderance of the evidence. This claim goes to the factual basis
    of the enhancement, not the constitutional validity of it.               Because
    Risby did not preserve a Booker-like objection in the district
    court, we review for plain error.            See United States v. Garcia-
    Rodriguez, 
    415 F.3d 452
    , 456 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that raising
    the Booker issue in a supplemental, 28(j) letter is sufficient to
    preserve plain error review).
    Under the Booker holding that changes the Guidelines from
    mandatory to advisory, there is error in this case because the
    district court viewed and acted under the Sentencing Guidelines as
    mandatory and not discretionary.            Risby, however, identifies no
    evidence in the record suggesting that the district court “would
    have reached a significantly different result” under an advisory
    scheme rather than a mandatory one.                United States v. Mares,
    
    402 F.3d 511
    , 521 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 43
    (2005).    Indeed, Risby was sentenced at the top of the applicable
    Guideline range.        Accordingly, Risby cannot make the necessary
    showing of plain error that is required by our precedent.                   See
    United States v. Bringier, 
    405 F.3d 310
    , 318 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005)
    (comments that sentence was “harsh” are insufficient to demonstrate
    3
    that defendant’s substantial rights were affected), cert. denied,
    
    126 S. Ct. 264
    (2005); United States v. Creech, 
    408 F.3d 264
    , 272
    (5th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ere sympathy ... is not indicative of a judge’s
    desire to sentence differently under a non-mandatory Guidelines
    regime.”); United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 
    405 F.3d 260
    , 262
    (5th Cir. 2005) (sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range and
    potential mitigating factors do not raise a reasonable probability
    of a different sentence), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 202
    (2005).
    Because nothing in the Supreme Court's Booker decision
    requires us to change our prior affirmance in this case, we adhere
    to our prior determination and therefore reinstate our judgment
    AFFIRMING Risby’s conviction and sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    4