United States v. Dolenz ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-10032
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    BERNARD JOSEPH DOLENZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:98-CR-107-H-ALL
    --------------------
    August 4, 2000
    Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Proceeding pro se, Bernard Joseph Dolenz appeals his
    convictions and sentence after being convicted of 12 counts of
    mail fraud.1   Dolenz raises 17 issues in his brief, all of which
    are either unavailing or waived due to inadequate briefing.2
    Dolenz’s argument that the mail-fraud statute requires a
    connection with interstate commerce is without merit; it only
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    1
    Dolenz’s “Motion to Bar Appellee’s Brief” is DENIED.
    2
    Because Dolenz states that he is a licensed attorney, he
    is not entitled to liberal construction. See Olivares v. Martin,
    
    555 F.2d 1192
    , 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977).
    No. 99-10032
    -2-
    requires the use of the mails.    See Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 20 (1999); Badders v. United States, 
    240 U.S. 391
    , 393-94
    (1916).    Because Congress may regulate the use of the mails, his
    argument that his federal conviction violated the Tenth Amendment
    by usurping the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Texas also
    fails.    See United States v. Bailey, 
    115 F.3d 1222
    , 1232-33 (5th
    Cir. 1997).
    Likewise without merit is Dolenz’s contention that there was
    no evidence to show that he engaged in a scheme or artifice to
    deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.
    Because the definition of the phrase “scheme or artifice to
    defraud” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is inclusive rather than
    exclusive and because Dolenz was not charged under an honest-
    services theory, it matters not that there was no evidence to
    support such a theory.    See United States v. Manges, 
    110 F.3d 1162
    , 1171 (5th Cir. 1997).
    By failing to object to his indictment prior to trial,
    Dolenz waived his claim that his indictment was duplicitous for
    charging him with both mail fraud and aiding and abetting.       See
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), (f); United States v. Lyons, 
    703 F.2d 815
    , 821 (5th Cir. 1983).   In any event, his claim is meritless,
    see United States v. Masson, 
    582 F.2d 961
    , 963 (5th Cir. 1978);
    United States v. Bullock, 
    451 F.2d 884
    , 888 (5th Cir. 1971), as
    is his claim that his indictment is multiplicitous for charging a
    single offense of mail fraud in multiple counts.    See United
    States v. McClelland, 
    868 F.2d 704
    , 706 (5th Cir. 1989)(stating
    No. 99-10032
    -3-
    that each separate use of the mails to further a scheme to
    defraud is a separate offense of mail fraud).
    Dolenz’s claim that his daughter’s testimony should have
    been suppressed because it was given in exchange for leniency in
    the criminal proceedings against her is foreclosed by circuit
    precedent.   See United States v. Haese, 
    162 F.3d 359
    , 366-68 (5th
    Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
    526 U.S. 1138
    (1999).     Likewise without
    merit is Dolenz’s argument that his daughter was inherently
    untrustworthy and that the district court therefore abused its
    discretion in admitting business records from his clinic based on
    her testimony.     See United States v. Parsee, 
    178 F.3d 374
    , 380
    (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    120 S. Ct. 450
    , 465 (1999).
    Contrary to Dolenz’s assertion, the order prohibiting him
    from contacting his daughter during his criminal proceedings did
    not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.      See United
    States v. Soape, 
    169 F.3d 257
    , 270-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    527 U.S. 1
    011 (1999).    Moreover, Dolenz has not shown that the
    Government knowingly presented materially false evidence to the
    jury during its case-in-chief.     See United States v.
    Martinez-Mercado, 
    888 F.2d 1484
    , 1492 (5th Cir. 1989); see also
    United States v. Brown, 
    634 F.2d 819
    , 827 (5th Cir. Jan.
    1981)(stating that it is not enough that the allegedly false
    testimony may have been challenged by another witness).
    The district court did not improperly “split” Dolenz’s term
    of imprisonment.    Because Dolenz was convicted of 12 separate
    mail-fraud offenses, the district court was authorized to impose
    consecutive sentences.     See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d); 18 U.S.C.
    No. 99-10032
    -4-
    3584(a).   Given the discrepancy between Dolenz’s trial testimony
    and statements that he made prior to trial, no plain error
    occurred when the prosecutors commented during closing arguments
    that Dolenz had testified untruthfully.     See United States v.
    Washington, 
    44 F.3d 1271
    , 1279 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
    Loney, 
    959 F.2d 1332
    , 1343 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Dolenz cannot rely solely on the composition of the jury
    panel at his own trial to show that he was denied his Sixth
    Amendment right to a trial by a jury selected from a fair cross-
    section of the community.    See United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 
    199 F.3d 767
    , 773 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Alix, 
    86 F.3d 429
    , 434 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996).    Although Dolenz alleges in his
    fourteenth issue that his attorney was ineffective in 20
    different respects, those allegations are not cognizable in his
    direct appeal.     See United States v. Higdon, 
    832 F.2d 312
    , 313-14
    (5th Cir. 1987).
    The district court did not plainly err in refusing to
    instruct the jury on materiality because, given the overwhelming
    evidence of materiality in this case, Dolenz has not shown that
    the failure to include such an instruction affected either his
    substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.     See Johnson v. United
    States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 469-70 (1997); United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734, 741 (1993).    Dolenz’s challenge to the
    constitutionality of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a),
    which discusses harmless error, is misplaced because review of
    his claim falls under Rule 52(b), which governs review for plain
    No. 99-10032
    -5-
    error.   See 
    Johnson, 520 U.S. at 465-67
    ; United States v.
    Rios-Quintero, 
    204 F.3d 214
    , 215 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
    filed, (U.S. June 7, 2000)(No. 99-9905).     Because the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 25
    (1999)(holding that materiality is an element of the federal
    mail-fraud statute), was issued after Dolenz was convicted and
    sentenced, his trial attorney cannot be said to have been
    ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on
    materiality.   See Green v. Johnson, 
    116 F.3d 1115
    , 1125 (5th Cir.
    1997)(stating that counsel has no general duty to anticipate
    changes in the law).
    The district court did not err in refusing to consider
    Dolenz’s pro se postjudgment motions.      Because those motions were
    filed months after the filing of his notice of appeal and because
    those motions--with the possible exception of his motion for bail
    pending appeal--were not in aid of his pending appeal, the
    district court lacked jurisdiction to consider them.      See United
    States v. Hitchmon, 
    602 F.2d 689
    , 692 (5th Cir. 1979)(en banc).
    Even if it could be said that Dolenz’s motions were in aid of his
    pending appeal, this court would lack jurisdiction to review the
    district court’s orders disposing of those motions because Dolenz
    did not file a new notice of appeal or amend his previously-filed
    notice of appeal after those orders had been entered.      See Fed.
    R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).   Dolenz’s contention that the district
    court should have sanctioned the prosecutors, their witnesses,
    and various personnel at the Bureau of Prisons has no bearing on
    No. 99-10032
    -6-
    the fairness and propriety of his convictions and, therefore,
    does not warrant appellate relief.
    Dolenz also argues (1) that the district court erred in
    imposing more than $1.6 million in restitution because that
    amount exceeded the $4,000 alleged in the indictment, (2) that
    the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
    acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support his
    mail-fraud convictions, and (3) that the Sentencing Reform Act of
    1984 is unconstitutional and without legal effect.   These issues
    are not adequately briefed and are therefore waived.   See United
    States v. Flores, 
    63 F.3d 1342
    , 1374 n.36 (5th Cir. 1995).     In
    his reply brief, Dolenz also challenges various determinations
    used to calculate his sentence.   Because these issues are raised
    for the first time in his reply brief, they are also waived.        See
    United States v. Green, 
    46 F.3d 461
    , 465 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
    MOTION DENIED; AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-10032

Filed Date: 8/7/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014

Authorities (24)

United States v. Alix , 86 F.3d 429 ( 1996 )

United States v. John Hitchmon, A/K/A John Ashanti, and ... , 602 F.2d 689 ( 1979 )

United States v. Judith Tomlinson Bullock and Roy Rodriguez,... , 451 F.2d 884 ( 1971 )

United States v. Ronald Earl Green , 46 F.3d 461 ( 1995 )

United States v. Manuel Flores, United States of America v. ... , 63 F.3d 1342 ( 1995 )

Badders v. United States , 36 S. Ct. 367 ( 1916 )

United States v. Allen Perry Soape, Jr. , 169 F.3d 257 ( 1999 )

United States v. Javier Martinez-Mercado , 888 F.2d 1484 ( 1989 )

United States v. Charles Kenneth Masson, A/K/A Kenny , 582 F.2d 961 ( 1978 )

United States v. Olaniyi-Oke , 199 F.3d 767 ( 1999 )

United States v. Andrew J. Loney , 959 F.2d 1332 ( 1992 )

United States v. Jerry Washington and Herbert Edward James , 44 F.3d 1271 ( 1995 )

United States v. Clinton Manges David Wayne Myers and Carl ... , 110 F.3d 1162 ( 1997 )

Neder v. United States , 119 S. Ct. 1827 ( 1999 )

United States v. J. Marshall Brown , 634 F.2d 819 ( 1981 )

United States v. Pierre Parsee Everette Harrison , 178 F.3d 374 ( 1999 )

United States v. Arvey Hawy Lyons and Vickie Elaine Lyons, ... , 703 F.2d 815 ( 1983 )

Green v. Johnson , 116 F.3d 1115 ( 1997 )

United States v. Olano , 113 S. Ct. 1770 ( 1993 )

Johnson v. United States , 117 S. Ct. 1544 ( 1997 )

View All Authorities »