United States v. Anderson , 160 F. App'x 391 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT December 23, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10483
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH DANIEL ANDERSON III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:03-CR-330-ALL)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Joseph Daniel Anderson III entered a conditional guilty plea
to being a felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Anderson reserved the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a
warrantless search of his motel room during the course of a “knock
and talk” investigation. Such procedure is a reasonable
investigative tool when officers suspect, but do not know, that the
occupant is engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Jones,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
239 F.3d 716, 720–21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 861 (2001).
For reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, the district
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. E.g.,
United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 2000). The
district court’s legal conclusions, including its ultimate
conclusion that the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, are reviewed de novo. Id.
Anderson claims: (1) the police officers did not identify
themselves prior to knocking on his motel room door; and (2) he did
not voluntarily consent to the room’s being searched. Anderson did
not, however, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
public area outside that room. See United States v. Hamilton, 931
F.2d 1046, 1050–51 (5th Cir. 1991). Fourth Amendment scrutiny is
not triggered by the knock on the door because Anderson responded
voluntarily. See United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1539 n.7
(5th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d
1060, 1063 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d
684, 691 (7th Cir. 1997). Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934
(1995), cited by Anderson, does not require that officers announce
their presence prior to knocking. Anderson opened the door
voluntarily. On seeing the officers, he knew they were uniformed
police officers. See Jones, 239 F.3d at 720.
Lacking a warrant, the officers could not enter the room
except with consent or in exigent circumstances. See United States
v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 587 n.9 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 437 (2004). The district court found that the search of
the room was justified by exigent circumstances; in plain view were
a pistol (within easy reach) and narcotics. See Jones, 239 F.3d at
720. Anderson’s contentions with respect to this finding are based
upon his own testimony about the underlying events, which the
district court found was not credible. The district court’s
findings, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
were not clearly erroneous. See Cantu, 230 F.3d at 150.
AFFIRMED