United States v. Bradshaw , 161 F. App'x 399 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                       January 5, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-41035 c/w
    No. 04-41110
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WILLIE DAHYL BRADSHAW,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:04-CR-176-1 c/w
    USDC No. 5:02-CR-1341-1
    --------------------
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In this consolidated appeal, Willie Dahyl Bradshaw appeals
    the sentence imposed after his 2004 conviction for transporting
    an undocumented alien and the order revoking the supervised
    release imposed as part of his sentence for a 2002 conviction for
    violating the same statute.       We affirm.
    Bradshaw argues for the first time on appeal that his
    sentence in the 2004 matter was invalid in light of United States
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-41035 c/w
    No. 04-41110
    -2-
    v. Booker.1      We review for plain error.2         To show plain error,
    Bradshaw must show that his substantial rights were affected by
    demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that the
    district court would have imposed a different sentence had it
    sentenced under an advisory Guidelines regime.3                Bradshaw has not
    made that showing here.           The district court did not impose the
    lowest sentence it could have within the Guidelines range, and
    there is no evidence that the court thought the sentence imposed
    was too severe.4
    Alternatively, Bradshaw argues that the error affected his
    substantial rights because it was structural or because prejudice
    should otherwise be presumed.           This argument is foreclosed by our
    prior precedent.5       Accordingly, Bradshaw’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
    Bradshaw also argues that the district court violated his
    due process rights, codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 31.1, when it
    revoked his supervised release without, inter alia, proper
    notice, a hearing, or written findings.6             We review the district
    court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of
    1
    
    125 S.Ct. 738
     (2005).
    2
    See United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo, 
    407 F.3d 728
    , 732-33 (5th
    Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 520 (5th Cir. 2005).
    3
    Mares, 
    402 F.3d at 521
    .
    4
    See id.; United States v. Bringier, 
    405 F.3d 310
    , 317-18 (5th Cir.
    2005).
    5
    See United States v. Malveaux, 
    411 F.3d 558
    , 560 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005).
    6
    See Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 488 (1972).
    No. 04-41035 c/w
    No. 04-41110
    -3-
    discretion.7      Although the district court may have erred in not
    following the requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. 31.1, any such
    error was harmless.8        Bradshaw stipulated to and plead guilty to
    the offense underlying the 2004 conviction.             The offense was
    punishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment.9             Therefore, the
    court had no choice but to revoke his supervised release.10               The
    court’s order revoking supervised release is AFFIRMED.
    We AFFIRM the sentence in No. 04-41035 and AFFIRM the order
    revoking supervised release in No. 04-41110.
    7
    United States v. Grandlund, 
    71 F.3d 507
    , 509 (5th Cir. 1995).
    8
    See United States v. McCormick, 
    54 F.3d 214
    , 219 (5th Cir. 1995).
    9
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(B)(i).
    10
    U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(2), 7B1.3(a)(1); see United States v. Kindred,
    
    918 F.2d 485
    , 488 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming revocation of supervised release
    where the evidence at the revocation hearing overwhelmingly established a
    violation of the defendant’s supervised release and revocation was mandatory);
    United States v. Hinson, 
    429 F.3d 114
    , 116-17 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
    Booker did not alter prior law requiring a judge to find by a preponderance of
    the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of release).