Winn v. Brunswick ( 2022 )

Case: 22-20150 Document: 00516578274 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/14/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-20150 FILED
Summary Calendar December 14, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Monica Winn,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Brunswick Corporation; Freedom Boat Club, L.L.C.;
Goin’ Coastal L.L.C.,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-3662
Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Monica Winn appeals the district court’s orders dismissing her claims
against Brunswick Corporation (“Brunswick”), Freedom Boat Club LLC
(“FBC”), and Goin’ Coastal LLC (“GC”). Because her appellate brief is
devoid of substantive arguments concerning her claims against Brunswick or
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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FBC and her contract with GC contains a valid arbitration agreement, we
AFFIRM.
I. Background
A. Winn and Hearne’s Interaction
Winn, an African American woman, purchased a boat club
membership from GC through FBC in Galveston, Texas. Her membership
with FBC Galveston granted her access to numerous docks in the FBC
network. On September 6, 2020, Winn reserved a boat for her and nine
friends. Seven of her friends boarded immediately with no issue and they set
sail for a couple of hours. Winn returned to pick up her remaining friends
where David Hearne, a previous FBC Houston employee and spouse of the
current FBC Galveston owner, began questioning her and her guests.
Winn alleges that Hearne berated her and her guests about the liquor
and beer they had on her reserved boat. According to her, their consumption
of alcohol on the boat and dock were within FBC’s rules and Hearne ignored
other non-minorities also enjoying alcoholic drinks. She perceived Hearne’s
aggression at her party as racially motivated and contacted FBC’s corporate
office to complain about her treatment. FBC suggested that Winn stop going
to the Galveston location and take advantage of a different dock through the
reciprocity system she enjoyed as an FBC member. Dissatisfied with FBC’s
response, Winn sued GC, FBC, and FBC’s parent company, Brunswick.
B. District Court Proceedings
At the district court, Winn filed claims against GC, FBC, and
Brunswick under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (“Title II
claims”); (3) state negligence law; and (4) state constitutional and statutory
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law.1 Brunswick and FBC filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Winn
amended her original complaint on January 5, 2021. Brunswick and FBC,
again, moved to dismiss, while GC filed a motion to compel arbitration.
1. FBC & Brunswick’s Motions to Dismiss
On June 22, 2021, the district court granted Brunswick and FBC’s
motions to dismiss. Regarding Winn’s § 1981 claim, the district court noted
that she failed to allege that Brunswick “intended to discriminate against her
on the basis of her race or interfered with her contract rights.” It further
noted that she failed to demonstrate that either FBC or Brunswick “hired,
supervised, or otherwise directed the actions of Hearne.” On her Title II
claims, the district court held for Brunswick and FBC because Winn failed to
explain how she attempted to contract for a public accommodation or how
Brunswick or FBC denied her efforts to that end. Finally, the district court
rejected Winn’s negligence claim because neither Brunswick nor FBC owed
her a legal duty to prevent Hearne’s alleged harassment.
2. GC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
Winn’s claims against GC pressed on after Brunswick and FBC’s
dismissal. Ultimately, the district court ruled in favor of GC and compelled
arbitration in accordance with the parties’ contractual terms. The district
court expressed its “reservations about arbitration,” but noted that “the
Fifth Circuit has made clear that arbitration clauses prevail.” Winn timely
appealed, where she contends that the district court erred in granting: (1)
Brunswick and FBC’s motions to dismiss and (2) GC’s motion to compel
arbitration.
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Winn ultimately abandoned her Texas constitutional and statutory law claims—
leaving only the § 1981, Title II, and negligence claims for consideration at the district court
and the instant appeal.
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II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo,
“accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ferguson v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 802
F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We
only consider “the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint.” Lovelace v. Software Spectrum
Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996). To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must
plead “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Likewise, “we review the grant or denial of a motion to compel
arbitration de novo.” Lizalde v. Vista Quality Mkts., 746 F.3d 222, 225 (5th
Cir. 2014) (citing Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th
Cir. 2002)). “To determine whether an agreement to arbitrate is
contractually valid, courts apply ‘ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts.’” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d
248, 254 (5th Cir. 2008)).
III. Discussion
A. Forfeiture of Winn’s Negligence, § 1981, & Title II Claims
An appellant’s brief must provide the “appellant’s contentions and
the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record
on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Accordingly,
a “party that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is
deemed to have waived it.” United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446 (5th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Also, an appellant “abandons all issues not
raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.” MDK Sociedad De
Responsabilidad Limitada v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 367 (5th Cir. 2022)
(emphasis in original). Furthermore, we have held that “an appellant forfeits
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its appeal if the district court provides several alternative grounds for its
decision and the appellant fails to brief one of those grounds.” Frew v. Janek,
820 F.3d 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2016).
Winn purports to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing her
claims against Brunswick and FBC. She asserts that her pleading sufficiently
articulated the proper elements to sustain her negligence, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and Title II causes of action. On appeal, Rule 28(a)(8)(A) requires her to
reassert her contentions, the reasons for them, and cite relevant legal
authority and record-support. Here, she fails to meet this burden. The
relevant portion of her argument regarding her negligence, § 1981, and Title
II claims makes up roughly one page of her initial brief. She mentions none of
the relevant elements of her claims and provides no factual support with
which we might analyze them—opting, instead, for conclusory allegations
that the district court prematurely dismissed these parties without permitting
additional discovery.
Ultimately, Winn has failed to brief any of the grounds for which she
argues the district court erred in dismissing her claims against Brunswick and
FBC. See Frew, 820 F.3d at 719. Because she failed to adequately brief these
claims on appeal, she has effectively abandoned these issues and forfeited her
argument pertaining thereto. See Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 446; MDK Sociedad,
25 F.4th at 367.
B. GC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
We use a two-step approach in deciding whether to require
arbitration. “The first step is to determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate the dispute in question.” Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258
(5th Cir. 1996). At step one, we look to: “(1) whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in
question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.” Tittle v. Enron
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Corp., 463 F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 2006). The second step is to determine
“whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the
arbitration of those claims.” Webb, 89 F.3d at 258. Step two requires this
court to evaluate the scope of the arbitration clause and the nature of the
dispute. See Tittle, 463 F.3d at 419.
Winn first contends that her contract with GC did not expressly
provide that arbitrability would be decided in accordance with the American
Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) rules—indicating a step one problem
with the contract. See Webb, 89 F.3d at 258. Alternatively, she argues that
even if the contract incorporates AAA rules, the district court erred in
compelling arbitration because it would deprive her of federal rights
guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000a-3. Specifically, she asserts that
the arbitration agreement abrogates her rights under the Civil Rights Act
(“CRA”) because GC used its bargaining power to impose a fee arrangement
which would require her to share the cost of arbitration if she does not prevail.
She asserts that this fee arrangement violates the CRA and, as a result, allows
her to evade arbitration of the dispute. We disagree.
Here, Winn and GC’s contract expressly provides that the agreement
would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and AAA rules. The
contract also contemplates this type of dispute, so it is reasonable to conclude
that this dispute falls within the scope of the parties’ agreement.
Consequently, step one favors compelling arbitration. Webb, 89 F.3d at 258.
On step two, Winn’s argument that the fee-shifting provision in her contract
violates the CRA and, therefore, favors holding against arbitration is
unpersuasive. We have repeatedly upheld similarly valid arbitration
agreements that required plaintiffs to arbitrate federal statutory claims,
including those under § 1981. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Prudential, 193 F.3d 517,
517 (5th Cir. 1999) (compelling arbitration in a § 1981 claim); Rojas v. T.K.
Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Gilmer v.
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (compelling arbitration
in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim). Because both prongs
favor compelling arbitration, we affirm.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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