United States v. Felmo Hardeman , 449 F. App'x 408 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-51104     Document: 00511663269         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/11/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    November 11, 2011
    No. 10-51104
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    FELMO JAMES HARDEMAN,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:10-CR-108-1
    Before WIENER, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Defendant-Appellant Felmo James Hardeman appeals his jury trial
    conviction under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, for making
    a terroristic threat against a customer service representative of the Social
    Security Administration (SSA) in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.07.
    Hardeman does not dispute that after his interview with the representative had
    ended, he told the representative, “I’ve got that gun waiting for you. I’ve got that
    gun.”       Rather, Hardeman contends that the evidence was insufficient to
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-51104    Document: 00511663269       Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/11/2011
    No. 10-51104
    demonstrate that he threatened the representative with serious bodily injury
    that was imminent and that his statement to the representative was a threat.
    Hardeman also claims that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing
    arguments by misstating the law on “imminence.”
    The ACA pertains to offenses committed within the special and maritime
    territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 7, see § 13,
    and provides a set of criminal laws for federal enclaves by using the penal laws
    of the states. United States v. Brown, 
    608 F.2d 551
    , 553 (5th Cir. 1979). Under
    Texas law, Hardeman is guilty of making a terroristic threat if he threatened to
    commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to
    place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 2005). Imminent means “near at hand; mediate rather
    than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of
    happening; threatening; menacing; perilous.” Devine v. State, 
    786 S.W.2d 268
    ,
    270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Hardeman’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient to show that any
    threat of serious bodily injury was imminent is without merit. The jury heard
    testimony that (1) Hardeman had previously stated to a different representative,
    “What do I have to do? Bring a pistol in here for you people”; (2) in the past and
    on the day of the underlying statement, Hardeman was aggressive, violent, and
    loud; (3) just prior to making the underlying statement, Hardeman had reached
    into a very large bag numerous times; and (4) while in the process of being
    escorted out of the building, Hardeman walked to an area behind the
    representative, then returned and made the above-quoted statement. After
    Hardeman made the statement, other patrons of the SSA were fearful and
    moved as far away from him as possible. Finally, the representative testified
    that he perceived Hardeman’s statement as a threat of imminent serious bodily
    injury. See Stults v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 198
    , 205 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that the
    focus of the inquiry should be whether the complainant was afraid of imminent
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    No. 10-51104
    serious bodily injury at the time of the offense). Viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, see United States v. Resio-Trejo, 
    45 F.3d 907
    , 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1995), we conclude that a rational jury could have found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Hardeman threatened the representative with
    bodily injury that was near at hand, mediate, impending, or on the point of
    happening. See id.; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    Hardeman’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove that any
    statement he made was a threat is likewise meritless. As Hardeman did not
    specifically object to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove this element, our
    review is limited to determining whether there was a manifest miscarriage of
    justice, “that is, whether the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.”
    United States v. Delgado, 
    256 F.3d 264
    , 274 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Based on the testimony cited above, the record is
    not devoid of evidence that Hardeman threatened the representative with
    imminent bodily injury. See id.; see also Walker, 
    327 S.W.3d 790
    , 793-95 (Tex.
    App. 2010) (holding that the statement, “Let’s do it, [Judge] Nekhom. It’s me
    and you now,” was a threat to commit serious bodily injury based on the
    defendant’s aggressive behavior, tone, and demeanor at the time of the
    statement and based on the fact that the judge perceived the statement as a
    threat).
    Finally, Hardeman’s contention that the prosecution committed
    misconduct by misstating the law on “imminence” is unpersuasive.               Even
    assuming arguendo that the prosecution’s remarks were improper, Hardeman
    has nevertheless failed to establish, based on the foregoing testimony, that “the
    prosecutor’s remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.”
    United States v. Thompson, 
    482 F.3d 781
    , 785 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    marks and footnote citation omitted).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    3