Brim v. Exxonmobil Pipeline Co. ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 10, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-50621
Summary Calendar
JERRY BRIM, MIKE PRINCE, MIKE TUTTLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Civil Action No. MO-05-CV-018-XR
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of state law claims
asserted by Jerry Brim, Mike Prince, and Mike Tuttle (the “former employees”) against ExxonMobil
Pipeline Co. (“ExxonMobil”). ExxonMobil appeals the dismissal without prejudice. We affirm the
district court’s judgment.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 3, 2005, the former employees filed several federal statutory and state law claims
against ExxonMobil. The federal claims included alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), § 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the Clayton Act. Under state law, the former employees alleged
tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, conspiracy, “blacklisting” under TEX.
LAB. CODE § 52.031, and negligence per se. On December 21, 2005, ExxonMobil filed a motion for
summary judgment. The magistrate judge, in his Memorandum and Recommendation, recommended
that the district court grant ExxonMobil’s motion for summary judgment on the federal statutory
causes of action; deny summary judgment on the state law causes of action; and grant the former
employees’ motion to dismiss their state law causes of action without prejudice. The district court
conducted a de novo review and accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendations. In this appeal,
ExxonMobil contests the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of the former employees’ state
law claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s determination of whether to retain jurisdiction over state law claims is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217,
226-27 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1076 (2000); McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507,
519 (5th Cir. 1998). This court affirms the district court’s decision unless we have a “definite and
firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)).
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III. DISCUSSION
As a general rule, a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state
claims when all federal claims are disposed of prior to trial. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th
Cir. 1992). To make this determination, the district court should consider the statutory provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity. City of Chicago v. Int’ Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997); see also Batiste, 179
F.3d at 227.
Under § 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if
(1) a claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially
predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction; and (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
In this instance, § 1367(c)(3) clearly applies because the district court dismissed the former
employees’ federal statutory claims on summary judgment. Section 1367(c)(1) also applies because
the blacklisting claim, pursuant to TEX. LAB. CODE § 52.031, presents a novel issue of state law. A
violation of this provision occurs when an employer blacklists or causes to be blacklisted an
employee; or (2) conspires or contrives by correspondence of any other manner to prevent an
employee discharged by a corporation, company, or individual from procuring employment. TEX.
LAB. CODE § 52.031. ExxonMobil argues that § 52.031 does not provide a private cause of action
and only discharged employees may file suit under the statute. No Texas court, however, has decided
a case on this issue. For these reasons, under § 1367(c), the district court properly exercised its
discretionary authority to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
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We next determine whether the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
weigh in favor of dismissing the former employees’ state law claims. At the time of summary
judgment, the parties were approximately one year into the litigation and two months remained until
the trial date. Although the parties had completed some discovery, two discovery disputes, regarding
a motion for protective order and motion to compel, had not been settled by the court. Compare
Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 585 (holding that the district court properly dismissed
state law claims nine months into the litigation and before the completion of discovery with weeks
until trial) with Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227 (holding that the district court abused its discretion by
retaining jurisdiction over state law claims three years into the litigation and one month before trial).
Moreover, the parties may use any trial preparation, legal research, and discovery in the state court
proceedings. See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 585. Accordingly, due to the court’s
minimal involvement with the state law claims at this stage of the litigation, the consideration of
judicial economy favors dismissing the state law claims.
The relevant factors of convenience and fairness also support dismissal of the state law claims.
The former employees initially filed suit in the Western District of Texas-Midland Division, but the
district court sua sponte transferred the case to the San Antonio Division. The former employees and
the majority of witnesses reside in Midland, Texas. Further, the events giving rise to the litigation
also occurred in Midland, Texas. The district court’s dismissal permits the former employees to re-
file their suit in a Midland state court without undue hardship placed upon ExxonMobil.
The final factors of federalism and comity dictate that the state law claims be dismissed
without prejudice. ExxonMobil argues that the straightforward nature of the issue, although not yet
decided in a Texas court, requires the district court to dispose of the state law claims on summary
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judgment. See generally Batiste (holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
retain jurisdiction over the state law claims because the causes of action presented no difficult state
law questions); Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (same). Even
though application of § 52.031 may not present a complex legal issue, it certainly qualifies as a novel
question of state law. At this point, ExxonMobil may file a revised version of its motion for summary
judgment filed in this court on the state law claims, and the state court may rule on the issue without
duplicating any legal analysis performed by the district court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of § 1367(c) and the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the former employees’ state law
claims without prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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