United States v. Nguyen ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT February 2, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-51647
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PHONG THINH NGUYEN, also known as John Nguyen, also known as
Phong T. Nguyen,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(6:02-CR-105-14)
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
For his convictions for conspiracy to both distribute
methamphetamine and commit money laundering, Phong Thinh Nguyen
claims the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict.
AFFIRMED.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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I.
Nguyen worked in Ramirez’ automobile audio shop, installing
audio systems and hidden compartments in vehicles. In turn,
Ramirez was involved in methamphetamine trafficking, receiving
large quantities of it from Ayala. Nguyen eventually operated his
own automobile audio shop, funded in large part by drug proceeds
provided by Ayala and Dominguez, another narcotics trafficker.
After law-enforcement authorities became aware of Ayala’s
drug-trafficking activities, Nguyen was charged with: (1)
conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute,
in excess of 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846; and (2) conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Following
trial, at which he testified, the jury found Nguyen guilty of both
counts. The district court sentenced him, inter alia, to 120-
months imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.
II.
Because Nguyen properly moved for judgment of acquittal, we
apply the regular standard of review: “Challenges to evidentiary
sufficiency are reviewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, inquiring only whether a rational juror could have found
each element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt”.
United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Credibility determinations and reasonable inferences are resolved
in favor of the verdict. United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 480
(5th Cir. 1994).
A.
To prove the charged conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine,
the Government had to prove: (1) an agreement existed to violate
federal narcotics laws; (2) Nguyen knew of its existence; and (3)
he voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. E.g., United States
v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 935 (5th Cir. 1997). A jury may infer
an agreement to violate narcotics laws from circumstantial evidence
and may rely upon presence and association, among other evidence,
in finding a conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Robles-Pantoja,
887 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989).
The evidence presented was sufficient for a rational juror to
find each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Convicted methamphetamine-trafficker Ayala testified he bought
methamphetamine from Dominguez and sold it to Ramirez, among
others, and eventually, as his business grew, established stash
houses and hired delivery men. Regarding whether Nguyen knew of
this agreement to traffic in methamphetamine, there was testimony:
by Ayala, that Nguyen knew he was a drug trafficker by the way he
“carr[ied] [him]self, flashy jewelry, cars, the money [he
carried]”, Nguyen’s presence in the area of a two-pound
methamphetamine transaction Ayala made, and discussion of narcotics
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in Nguyen’s presence; by an IRS Special Agent, that Nguyen told him
he knew Ayala was involved in the narcotics business from “day
one”; and by Ramirez, that narcotics were discussed in Nguyen’s
presence, and he and Nguyen had discussed Ramirez’ involvement in
narcotics trafficking.
For the last of the three elements, a rational juror could
have found Nguyen voluntarily participated in the conspiracy, by
testimony: by Dominguez, that Nguyen built hidden compartments in
a vehicle he used to transport methamphetamine; and by Dominguez
and Ramirez, that Nguyen hid approximately $250,000 in drug
proceeds inside the doors of Ramirez’ vehicle.
B.
To prove the charged money-laundering conspiracy, the
Government was required to prove: “1) there was an agreement
between two or more persons to launder money; 2) [Nguyen]
voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy; and 3) one of the
persons committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy”.
United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the elements of money laundering
are met if “(1) [an individual] conducted or attempted a financial
transaction, (2) which he knew involved proceeds arising from
unlawful activity, (3) with the intent to promote or further those
illegal actions, or (4) with the knowledge that the transaction’s
design was to conceal or disguise the nature or source of the
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illegal proceeds”, United States v. Pennell, 409 F.3d 240, 243 (5th
Cir. 2005); or if (1) property valued at more than $10,000 was
derived from specified unlawful activity; (2) an individual engaged
in a monetary transaction with this property; and (3) that
individual knew this property was derived from unlawful activity,
Wilson, 249 F.3d at 379.
The evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find
Nguyen guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering beyond a
reasonable doubt. As noted, a rational juror could have found
Nguyen knew Ayala and Dominguez were involved in drug trafficking.
Ayala testified that Nguyen located and purchased vehicles and
corporate stock, using drug-trafficking cash Ayala gave him for
that purpose. Nguyen placed the assets in his own name, with Ayala
using and possessing them, even obtaining insurance for at least
one of the vehicles. In addition, there was evidence that, with
cash obtained from drug sales, Ayala and Dominguez invested in
Nguyen’s audio business in exchange for fifty percent of the
profits. Ayala testified he did not want assets in his name
because he wanted to hide his ownership from law enforcement, which
the purchases by Nguyen helped him do.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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