United States v. Membreno , 257 F. App'x 833 ( 2007 )


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  •           IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 13, 2007
    No. 06-40969
    Summary Calendar               Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    MARIO SALVADOR MEMBRENO
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:03-CR-978-ALL
    Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Mario Salvador Membreno appeals his sentence for illegal reentry after
    deportation in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1326
    (a) and (b). Membreno argues that
    the district court erred in relying upon the Presentence Investigation Report’s
    (PSR) characterizations of his prior state court offenses as crimes of violence to
    enhance his sentence by 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
    The Government contends that Membreno waived this issue or, alternatively,
    failed to demonstrate that the court plainly erred in applying the enhancement.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 06-40969
    After reviewing the record, we find that although Membreno did not
    intentionally relinquish his right to challenge the district court’s reliance on the
    PSR such that he has waived this argument, he has forfeited the error. See
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 733 (1993). We further find that although
    the district court plainly erred in relying solely upon the PSR’s characterization
    of Membreno’s past offenses for enhancement purposes, see United States v.
    Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    , 274 (5th Cir. 2005), Membreno has failed to
    demonstrate that but for the error, the district court would not have imposed the
    enhancement. See United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 520 (5th Cir.2005);
    United States v. Villegas, 
    404 F.3d 355
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2005). Consequently, he
    has failed to establish that the error affects his substantial rights. See Villegas,
    
    404 F.3d at 365
    .
    Membreno also contends that the district court committed reversible
    Fanfan error when it sentenced him pursuant to the mandatory Sentencing
    Guidelines held unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).
    In the context of a Fanfan challenge, “application of the Guidelines in their
    mandatory form constitutes error that is plain.”                United States v.
    Valenzuela-Quevedo, 
    407 F.3d 728
    , 733 (5th Cir. 2005). However, Membreno
    must establish “with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome, that if the judge had sentenced him under an advisory sentencing
    regime rather than a mandatory one, he would have received a lesser sentence.”
    United States v. Infante, 
    404 F.3d 376
    , 395 (5th Cir. 2005). The imposition of a
    sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range, as in this case, is not sufficient,
    on its own, to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the court
    would have imposed a lesser sentence under advisory sentencing guidelines. See
    United States v. Duarte-Juarez, 
    441 F.3d 336
    , 338-39 (5th Cir. 2006). The
    district court made no specific statements that would indicate that it would have
    preferred to sentence Membreno below the applicable guidelines range and, in
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    No. 06-40969
    fact, rejected Membreno’s arguments in favor of a downward departure.
    Accordingly, Membreno has failed to demonstrate that the error affects his
    substantial rights. See Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
     at 520.
    In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), Membreno
    challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and
    aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the
    offense that must be found by a jury. This court has held that this issue is “fully
    foreclosed from further debate.”            United States v. Pineda-Arrellano,
    
    492 F.3d 624
    , 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 28, 2007)
    (No. 07-6202).
    AFFIRMED.
    3